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ABSTRACT 
The Florida Domestic Security Strategic Plan 2009 to 2011 does not prioritize, assign or 
use metrics to define its goals, objectives or subobjectives thereby making it less 
effective.  The research found prioritization to be a necessary element for achieving 
results that often brings with it funding.  Funding was identified as the most significant 
determinant for progress.  Priorities should be kept to a manageable number and remain 
flexible to adapt to changing threats.  Assignment was determined to be important with 
its most significant benefit coming in the form of accountability.  To be effective, 
assignment must also come with authority.  Metrics were determined to be important to 
accountability.  They should be clearly defined, measurable in a quantifiable way and 
define an end state.  A tracking and reporting system was found to be necessary to 
enhance assignment and metrics accountability.  The research suggests that a state 
homeland security strategy and a single statewide gap analysis should guide all federal 
grant funding sources with a nexus to domestic security issues and not just the 
distribution of DHS grant funding.  Implementation steps are included for Florida to 
integrate the primary findings of this research into its future homeland security strategies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Florida developed a plan to 
address the threat of terrorism.  The state was divided into seven Regional Domestic 
Security Task Forces overseen by the Florida Domestic Security Oversight Council 
(DSOC).  The DSOC was given authority under Florida Statute 943.0313 to provide 
executive leadership and fiscal guidance to state and local agencies in their terrorism 
prevention, preparation, protection, response and recovery efforts.  In this leadership role, 
the DSOC issued their Florida Domestic Security Strategic Plan for the three-year period 
covering 2009 to 2011 (Florida Domestic Security Oversight Council [DSOC], 2008).  
The Strategic Plan contains five goals, 37 supporting objectives and 296 implementation 
steps.   
The Strategic Plan does not prioritize its goals, objectives or implementation 
steps resulting in over three hundred equally weighed tasks.  The people who serve in 
Florida’s domestic security administrative and tactical missions do so in addition to their 
regular job.  These dedicated individuals do not have time to accomplish over three 
hundred items within the short time frame of the Strategic Plan.  Since prioritization is 
not used in Florida’s homeland security strategy, it comes instead from its Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) grant funding process.  Florida has received over $1.7 billion 
in federal domestic security related grant funds since 2001 (DSOC, 2009, p. 15).  Each 
year Florida forms funding committees that are staffed by subject matter experts (SMEs) 
from state and local agencies with domestic security responsibilities.  The committees 
review projects for funding and then rate them.  Projects with the highest votes are 
funded until the grant funds are exhausted.  This process has left the prioritization of 
domestic security critical needs to the discretion of the SMEs and resulted in a high 
portion of the grant money being spent in concentrated areas, such as police and fire 
response equipment and preparedness needs, while other areas like schools, health and 
prevention received little funding.  Additionally, significant portions of the DHS grant 
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funds have been awarded to Florida’s five Urban Area Security Initiatives (UASI) 
designated cities.  Each UASI utilizes its own funding committees and processes that 
make independent decisions from the statewide funding committees.   
The Strategic Plan does not assign responsibility for making progress in 
achieving its goals, objectives or implementation steps.  Florida has identified its major 
response disciplines to be law enforcement, fire services, health and emergency 
management; other disciplines, such as education, serve roles as well.  There are 
hundreds of state, county and city agencies represented by these disciplines.  Yet, the 
Strategic Plan does not assign any discipline, agency or person responsibility to 
accomplish the specific goals, objectives or subobjectives of the Strategic Plan (DSOC, 
2008).  Without assigning responsibility, the DSOC cannot empower the assignee with 
ownership and authority to carry out its tasking and at the same time provide someone 
who is accountable to the DSOC for progress. 
The Strategic Plan indicates its implementation steps were developed to be 
measurable, actionable and attainable (DSOC, 2008, p. 6).  Few of the implementation 
steps are defined in a measureable way.  For example, Goal 2 of the Strategic Plan is to 
Prevent, Preempt and Deter Acts of Terrorism.  Objective 2.4 supporting that Goal is 
titled Law Enforcement Investigations and Operations.  This objective is supported by an 
Implementation Step that calls for obtaining adequate inventory of specialized equipment 
to conduct domestic security investigations (DSOC, 2008, p. 15).  This implementation 
step provides insufficient information on what equipment should be obtained, and if it is 
to be inventoried, what level of stock would be adequate.  The step cannot be attained if a 
completed state is not defined.  Not knowing what is needed and to what extent it is 
needed prevents the achievement of the action desired by the Strategic Plan. 
The DSOC is uniquely empowered to identify the most critical domestic security 
issues facing Florida and direct its available resources and funding to deal with them.  By 
using prioritization, assignment and metrics in their strategic plan, the DSOC could 
become more effective in executing its critical oversight responsibility.  Without change, 
the DSOC loses the opportunity to direct and coordinate the resources of the state, assign 
and empower its staff and have a clearly defined end state to achieve. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary aim of this research is to examine whether state homeland security 
strategies can be more effective toward the accomplishment of their goals, objectives or 
subobjectives if those goals and objectives are prioritized, assigned or clearly defined by 
the use of metrics.  To support this analysis, the following secondary questions will be 
explored:   
1. What does the existing literature reveal about strategy goals, objectives or 
subobjectives being prioritized?   
2. What does the existing literature reveal about strategy goals, objectives or 
subobjectives being assigned to an entity to be responsible for their 
completion?   
3. What does the existing literature reveal about strategy goals, objectives or 
subobjectives being clearly defined by the use of metrics?   
4. How do existing state homeland security strategies handle prioritization, 
assignment and the use of metrics related to their goals, objectives or 
subobjectives?   
5. What do subject matter experts that develop and/or implement state 
homeland security strategies say about the effectiveness of their method of 
prioritization, assignment or the use of metrics related to a strategy’s 
goals, objectives or subobjectives?  Finally,  
6. Can this research identify methodologies of prioritization, assignment or 
the use of metrics that if adopted, can enhance Florida’s homeland security 
strategy? 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This thesis will contribute to the national discussion regarding strategic plans.  
Specifically, it will focus on a few key elements of a state homeland security strategic 
plan and seek ways to make that plan more effective.  As the research progresses, 
additional research questions outside of the scope of this project will likely arise.  They 
will be discussed in the conclusion section as suggestions for future research. The author 
is employed in a domestic security role for the state of Florida.  Florida authorities are in 
the process of drafting an updated homeland security strategy to cover the years 2012 to 
2014.  This research should be published in time for it to be considered regarding that 
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effort.  Similar to Florida, most states revise their homeland security strategic plans every 
few years.  This research can contribute to the literature consulted by those seeking 
methodologies for enhancing their strategies.   
D. RESEARCH METHOD 
Policy analysis methodology was used to evaluate the existing Florida Domestic 
Security Strategic Plan in its ability to achieve the over 300 goals, objectives and 
implementation steps contained within the document.  The Strategy was created to guide 
Florida’s domestic security efforts during the years 2009 through 2011, and authorities 
are now planning to draft the succeeding strategy.  This research explored three areas of 
concern within Florida’s existing strategic plan.  It searched for ways to improve upon 
them and make recommendations for inclusion in the next version of The Strategy.  
Specifically, the three areas of concern were what method should be used to prioritize 
goals, objectives or subobjectives?  Second, what method should be used to assign 
responsibility to an entity for accomplishment of goals, objectives or subobjectives?  
Last, what metrics should be used to clearly define a strategy’s goals, objectives or 
subobjectives?  Florida’s homeland security strategy is not completely broken.  The 
hypothesis suggests that changing parts of the strategy would improve its effectiveness.  
The policy analysis methodology was chosen because it focuses on an existing policy, 
examines its ability to obtain its stated goals and then recommends changes that can 
benefit it.  This method of research would help to fairly evaluate the benefits of suggested 
improvements in order to reach a conclusion as to which modification to policy is 
preferable.  The intent was the improvement of the existing policy.   
The research started with a review of literature.  Literature that focused on 
government strategies, as well as business strategies were reviewed for best practices of 
prioritization, assignment and clear definition by use of metrics in relationship to strategy 
plan goals and objectives.  Once the best practices were identified, a review of thirty-five 
existing state homeland security strategies was conducted.  The best practices identified 
during the literature review were used to guide the selection of specific homeland 
security strategies for additional review.  This review sought examples of state homeland 
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security strategies exhibiting the use of prioritization, assignment or metrics.  Within each 
category, the method of use was examined to determine if any patterns existed.  
Examples of each methodology pattern were singled out for further research.  The review 
of state homeland security strategies provided an understanding of the intention of the 
authors of the document, but it did not provide data on how the strategy is applied in real 
life.  There were questions that arose from the review of the strategies that could not be 
answered by merely reading the strategies but were better answered by those tasked with 
implementing the strategies.  Therefore, interviews of subject matter experts (SMEs) 
related to the strategies were added as a second method of data collection for this 
research.  The SMEs chosen for interview all held middle to upper management positions 
in state or local agencies with a responsibility for domestic security.  These agencies 
either had a role in creating state strategies or implementing them.  The SMEs held 
positions in a number of disciplines such as governor’s staff, police, fire services, health 
departments and emergency management.  They represented state, county and city 
entities and averaged 19.75 years of experience in professional domestic security related 
disciplines.   
As stated above, the literature review pointed favorably toward the use of 
prioritization, assignment and the use of metrics related to a strategy’s goals, objectives 
or subobjectives.  These best practices were used as a guide in the review of thirty-five 
existing state homeland security strategies.  Strategies that were found to use 
prioritization, assignment or metrics were reviewed further for patterns or methods of 
use.  The review identified two different methods each of using prioritization, assignment 
and metrics.  The strategies using each identified method were reviewed, and one was 
chosen as representative of the others in that group.  Once a state strategy was selected, 
then two subject matter experts from the strategy’s state were interviewed.  One SME 
worked for an agency that had a role in creating the strategy.  The second SME worked 
for an agency that had a role in implementing part of the strategy.  The two type of SME 
were used to capture the viewpoint of the different roles related to the strategy.  These 
SMEs were asked to discuss their experience and opinions on how effective their state’s 
methodology is toward accomplishing goals or objectives.  Within each area of concern, 
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the alternative methods were compared against Florida’s looking for innovation and 
effectiveness.  They were evaluated and discussed regarding their ability to achieve the 
most desired effect within Florida’s implementation environments that included Florida’s 
Regional Domestic Security Task Force structure; budget considerations; DHS influence, 
state, county and local interagency relationships and cross-discipline considerations.  
Florida’s existing homeland security strategy was reviewed in a four-step process.  The 
first step was to identify the potential weaknesses in the strategy.  In the second, 
alternatives to those weaknesses were suggested in the hypothesis.  Using the evidence 
gathered during the research, the third step considered alternative methods and their 
impact and value on achieving progress toward the Florida’s goals, objectives or 
subobjectives.  In the fourth and final step, the policy modifications were compared 
against the existing strategy and a determination of the best policy alternative was made.  
At the conclusion of the research, recommendations were made for changes to the 
Florida Domestic Security Strategic Plan that should make the document more effective 
in helping to guide Florida’s domestic security efforts.  
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The chapter overview for this thesis is as follows. Chapter I provides an overview 
of the research project.  Chapter II then discusses the relevant literature related to 
prioritization, assignment and the use of metrics related to strategy goals, objectives and 
subobjectives.  Chapter III furthers the research by describing the review of state 
homeland strategies and interviews of subject matter experts related to prioritizing goals, 
objectives or subobjectives.  Chapter IV similarly describes the review of state homeland 
strategies and interviews of subject matter experts related to assignment of goals, objectives 
or subobjectives.  Chapter V concludes the research portion of the thesis by describing the 
review of state homeland strategies and interviews of subject matter experts related to the 
use of metrics with goals, objectives or subobjectives.  Finally, Chapter VI provides a 
summary of the research, steps to integrate the primary research findings into Florida’s 
future homeland security strategies and suggests paths of future research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. OVERVIEW 
This literature review has been organized into eight subcategories.  The first three 
review literature sequentially related to prioritization, assignment and the use of metrics 
related to goals, objectives and subobjectives.  The fourth subcategory reviews literature 
generally related to the use of goals, objectives or subobjectives in strategies while the 
fifth covers congressional testimony related to goals and objectives.  The sixth and 
seventh subcategories examine federal and state strategies respectively and how they deal 
with prioritization, assignment or use of metrics related to goals, objectives or 
subobjectives.  The eighth and final subcategory looks at Department of Homeland 
Security grant guidance and its relationship to strategic planning.  A discussion of each 
subcategory of the literature follows. 
B. LITERATURE RELATED TO PRIORITIZATION 
As discussed in the problem statement of this thesis (Chapter I, Section A), 
Florida does not prioritize the goals, objectives or implementation steps of its homeland 
security strategy.  A review of related literature suggests prioritization is useful.  In its 
2004 response to a request from the U.S. Congress, the then named U.S. General 
Accounting Office (GAO) presented its report, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of 
Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism (U.S. General 
Accounting Office, 2004), to establish the desirable characteristics of an effective 
national strategy.  In the years after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the Bush 
Administration issued seven national strategies related to homeland security.  The GAO 
was tasked by Congress to define the characteristics that comprise a good strategy and 
compare the seven national strategies to those standards.  The characteristics GAO 
identified as important for inclusion in all national strategies were as follows (GAO, 
2004, p. 1):  
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1. Purpose, scope, and methodology;  
2. Problem definition and risk assessment;  
3. Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures;  
4. Resources, investments, and risk management;  
5. Organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and 
6. Integration and implementation. 
In its report, the GAO provided further clarification of its six desirable 
characteristics.  When discussing goals, subordinate objectives, activities and 
performance measures the GAO said it addresses what the strategy is trying to achieve, 
the steps to that achievement as well as the priorities, milestones, and performance 
measures to gauge results (GAO, 2004, p. 11).  In developing these standards, the GAO 
considered statutory requirements of some of the strategies reviewed; legislative and 
executive branch guidance for other strategies; the Government Performance Results Act 
(GPRA); general literature on strategic planning and performance; guidance from the 
Office of Management and Budget; pervious GAO reports and testimonies related to the 
topic; recommendations by national commissions chartered by Congress and various 
research organizations comments on national strategies (GAO, 2004, pp. 9–10).  The six 
desirable characteristics established by the GAO in 2004 are still cited as the standard 
today in such reports as DHS’ Strategy and Plans to Counter Small Vessel Threats Need 
Improvement (Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 2009, p. 
18);  Emergency Management: Preliminary Observations on FEMA’s Community 
Preparedness Programs Related to the National Preparedness System (GAO, 2009, pp. 
4, 5, 13) and BioSurveillance: Efforts to Develop a National Biosurveillance Capability 
Need a National Strategy and a Designated Leader (GAO, 2010, pp. 32–33).  When the 
GAO compared the seven national strategies to its six desirable characteristics, it found 
they all identified goals, objectives and activities, but generally they did not identify 
priorities, milestones or performance measures that the GAO considered necessary for 
achieving results, evaluating progress and ensuring oversight (GAO, 2004, p. 12).  On the 
other end of the spectrum, the GAO criticized the federal money laundering strategy, 
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stating it identifies more priorities than can be achieved in a reasonable timeframe and 
does not rank them in order of importance (GAO, 2004, p. 18).   
Even before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the GAO was stressing 
the importance of prioritizing goals and objectives.  In his March 2001 testimony, titled 
Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National Strategy 
before a U.S. House Committee, Raymond J. Decker, Director of Defense Capabilities 
and Management for the GAO, stated that key aspects of a national strategy should 
include roles and missions of federal, state, and local entities and establish objectives, 
priorities, outcome-related goals with milestones, and performance measures to achieve 
those goals (GAO, 2001, p. 2). 
The GAO concentrates most of its research on governmental agencies; however, 
businesses use goals and objectives too.  Authors Christy Lusk and Maria I. Marshall 
wrote their article How to Use Goals to Achieve Business Success: First Steps for New 
Entrepreneurs (2005) as a guide for starting a new business.  In it, they stressed the 
importance of goals.  They likened goals to a road map to help identify where you are 
going and how to get there.  Lusk and Marshall argue that setting goals forces one to set a 
desired outcome and the steps to get there; helps prioritize what needs to be done; enables 
tracking progress and make the whole process of starting a business less overwhelming.   
In his book, Implementing your Strategic Plan How to Turn “Intent” Into 
Effective Action for Sustainable Change, C. Davis Fogg suggests that companies that are 
long-term, strategic winners faithfully practice 18 keys to strategy implementation 
(1999).  Fogg states to begin, a company must have a strategic plan that has three critical 
components.  These are a direction statement, strategic objectives and strategic priority 
issues.  The direction statement defines that company and where it needs to go.  The 
strategic objectives are used to measure how one is doing on the key dimensions of the 
direction statement.  The strategic priorities are the urgent marching orders, the must dos.  
When fleshed out, resourced and turned into action this small group of strategic priority 
issues will lead one toward an envisioned future (Fogg, 1999, p. 6).  Fogg suggests that it 
is important where you put your resources.  Assigning personnel and budget to handle 
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strategic priorities empowers that team to achieve it.  However, investment of resources 
outside of the strategy and its priorities, weakens it (Fogg, 1999, p. 257)   
In the article, Goals Gone Wild: The Systematic Side Effects of Overprescribing 
Goal Setting (Ordo'nez, Schweitzer, Galinsky, & Bazerman, 2009), the authors take a 
different look at goals.  Most researchers in the field advocate goal setting and argue that 
goals need to be specific and challenging.  But the authors of this article suggest that 
goals are overused and have lead to a number of serious problems in the business world.  
Problems such as narrowing employee’s focus to the neglect of non-goal areas, too many 
goals, too short a performance time frame, too challenging and the goal becoming the 
ceiling of performance.  The problems are exacerbated when managers chose the wrong 
goal.  They provide the example of Enron managers who were focused on revenue while 
ignoring profit percentages because they were receiving bonuses to increase revenue.  
The authors suggest that goals should be used more like a prescription drug instead of an 
over the counter medicine.  Use of goals should be carefully dosed with consideration for 
the harmful side effects and closely supervised.   
In the article, Goal Setting and Performance Management in the Public Sector 
(Latham, Borgogni, & Petitta, 2008), the authors discuss the goal setting theory of Gary 
P. Latham and Edwin A. Locke.  The goal setting theory states that a specific high-level 
goal will lead to higher performance than an easier goal, a general goal or no goal setting.  
Given ability and commitment the higher the goal the higher the performance while 
variables like participation in developing goals, praise, competition and monetary 
incentives only affect behavior to the extent that they lead to the setting of and 
commitment to a specific high goal (Latham, et al., 2008, p. 386).  Specific goals focus 
on what is to be accomplished and leads to persistence until the goal is attained.   
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on America, the U.S. Congress began to spend 
money to prevent, respond to and mitigate another terrorist attack.  On the state level, 
these funds were made available by grants from the newly formed Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS).  In 2010 alone, Florida received $91 million dollars from the 
DHS Homeland Security Grant Program (Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 
2009, pp. 13–28).  These funds do not come without guidance on how to spend them 
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from DHS.  Each year, DHS issues grant guidance that specifies how some of the funds 
are to be spent and how they are not to be spent.  This documents most recent title was 
FY 2010 Preparedness Grant Programs Overview.  For example, DHS does not allow its 
grant funds to be used to purchase firearms but in the last few years DHS has required 
that 25 percent of its Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants and State Homeland 
Security Grant Program (SHSGP) grants be spent on law enforcement prevention of 
terrorism type projects (DHS, 2009, pp. 3, 4, 13, 15).  To Florida, in 2010, that meant 
$18.6 million dollars (DHS, 2009, pp. 3, 4, 13, 15).  By controlling the use of $18.6 
million, DHS is expressing its prioritization of these types of projects.   
Additionally, in its National Preparedness Guidelines, DHS produced the Target 
Capabilities List, which contains 37 targeted capabilities, commonly referred to as TCLs 
(DHS, 2007, pp. 31–32).  The TCLs are capabilities that DHS believes state and local 
governments should possess to effectively prevent, respond to and mitigate acts of 
terrorism.  In order to receive DHS grant funds, states are required to measure their 
current capabilities against the TCLs and determine any gap between them.  DHS then 
requires states to tie the request and spending of DHS grant funds to closing those 
identified gaps.  DHS requires that states submit a state homeland security strategy to 
them each year as part of the grant application process.  In order to qualify for grant 
funding, the states must show in their strategy document how they plan to target the same 
priorities determined to be important by DHS.  Again, DHS is using its leverage to insure 
prioritization of what it has deemed important capabilities.   
The GAO testimonies, business strategy authors and DHS grant guidance stress 
the importance of prioritizing goals, objectives or subobjectives in strategy documents 
and establish that as a best practice for strategic planning.   
C. LITERATURE RELATED TO ASSIGNMENT 
In his testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, just 
10 days after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, David M. Walker, the 
Comptroller General of the United States presented his report, Homeland Security: A 
Framework for Addressing the Nation's Efforts (Walker, 2001), which discussed the need 
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for a national strategy for homeland security.  Walker commented that homeland security 
involves a large number of organizations that must have clearly articulated roles, 
responsibilities and accountability.  He stated that clarifying those roles will be a critical 
function for the entity that is given oversight for homeland security efforts.  Walker 
continued that once a national homeland security strategy is developed then all levels of 
the government and private sector will need to understand and prepare for its roles in it.  
The federal government would need to reach consensus with lower levels of government 
and the private sector on their roles since the federal government does not control them.  
The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) presented its report, Combating 
Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to 
Terrorism to the U.S. Congress in 2004.  In the report, it established six desirable 
characteristics of an effective national strategy, which, as described above, are still used 
by GAO as its standard.  One of the six desirable characteristics was to include 
organizational roles, responsibilities and coordination.  The GAO report further defined 
this characteristic as addressing who will be implementing the strategy, what their roles 
will be compared to others and mechanisms for them to coordinate their efforts (GAO, 
2004, p. 11).  In addition, the GAO stated a strategy would ideally clarify implementing 
organizations’ relationships in terms of leading, supporting, and partnering and could 
describe the organizations that will provide the overall framework for accountability and 
oversight.  Furthermore, a strategy might also identify specific processes for coordination 
and collaboration between sectors and organizations and address how any conflicts would 
be resolved (GAO, 2004, p. 22).  In his pre 9/11 testimony titled Combating Terrorism: 
Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National Strategy before a U.S. House 
Committee, Raymond J. Decker, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management for 
the GAO stated that key aspects of a national strategy should include roles and missions 
of federal, state, and local entities (GAO, 2001, p. 2). 
There are other examples of the federal government placing importance of 
identifying the roles agencies are to play in a strategy.  When the U.S. Congress passed 
the law titled the National Money Laundering and Related Financial Crimes Strategy 
(U.S. Congress, 2007), it included a coordinating role it wanted the Secretary of the 
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Treasury to play in the efforts of the many federal, state and local law enforcement 
agencies responsible for enforcing financial laws.  This law also directs the coordination 
between the private sector and law enforcement agencies regarding prevention and 
detection of money laundering and other financial crimes (U.S. Congress, 2007, p. 
(b)(4)).  In Homeland Security Presidential Directive #1 (White House, 2001) then 
President Bush, recognizing the extensive coordination needed across a broad spectrum 
of federal, state and local agencies related to prevention of terrorist attacks, directed the 
Homeland Security Council to ensure coordination of all homeland security related 
activities amongst executive departments.  He gave the responsibility and through the 
HSPD the authority to the Homeland Security Council. 
Businesses also use goals and objectives.  Maria I. Marshall suggests that goals 
can be broad and general in nature in her article, Defining Your Business Through Goals 
and Objectives First Steps for New Entrepreneurs (2004); however, she argues that 
objectives must be clear and concise.  She suggests the SMART method of objective 
writing that requires them to be specific, measurable, action oriented, realistic and timely 
(SMART) (Marshall, 2004).  Objectives should be clear targets of performance that can 
be evaluated.  They should state what needs to happen, who should do it and when 
(Marshall, 2004, p. 2).  In his book, Implementing your Strategic Plan how to Turn 
“Intent” Into Effective Action for Sustainable Change, C. Davis Fogg suggests that 
companies that are long term strategic winners faithfully practice eighteen keys to 
strategy implementation (1999).  Fogg’s first key to strategic implementation is to 
develop an accountability system.  He argues that strategic plan objectives are usually 
met when they are assigned to employees that are held accountable for achieving them.  
Organizations that hold their people accountable achieve approximately 85 percent of 
their strategic objectives (Fogg, 1999, p. 57).  Having measurable objectives and 
accountability are the best predictors of a plan’s success.  Fogg’s eleventh key suggests 
that it is important where an organization puts its resources.  Assigning personnel and 
budget to handle strategic priorities empowers that team to achieve it; however, 
investment of resources outside of the strategy and its priorities weakens it (Fogg, 1999, 
p. 257).   
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The GAO testimonies and the literature suggest that homeland security involves a 
large number of players and their roles and responsibilities must be clarified.  Someone 
has to be given the responsibility and authority to accomplish goals and objectives.  
Assignment of accountability and responsibility for strategic plan objectives empowers 
the team and results in a high probability the objective will be accomplished.   
D. LITERATURE RELATED TO THE USE OF METRICS 
The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) presented its report, Combating 
Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to 
Terrorism (GAO, 2004), to the U.S. Congress in 2004.  In its report, it establishes six 
desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy, which as described above are 
still used by the GAO as its standard.  One of the six desirable characteristics included 
goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures in the strategy.  The 
GAO provided further clarification of this characteristic by stating it addresses steps to 
achieve results, as well as the priorities, milestones, and performance measures to gauge 
results (GAO, 2004, p. 11).  The GAO felt that measuring performance was important 
enough that if there were limitations on the ability to collect performance data then one of 
the goals of the strategy could be to obtain better data (GAO, 2004, p. 16).  The GAO 
developed its six desirable characteristics as a standard to review seven national domestic 
security strategies that were issued by the Bush Administration soon after the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001 (GAO, 2004, p. 10).  In its review of the seven national 
strategies, the GAO found they all identified goals, objectives and activities, but 
generally it did not identify priorities, milestones or performance measures.  These are 
elements the GAO considered necessary for evaluating progress, achieving results and 
ensuring oversight (GAO, 2004, p. 12).  The GAO stated a better identification of 
priorities, milestones, and performance measures would aid implementing parties in 
achieving results in specific timeframes—and would enable more effective oversight and 
accountability (GAO, 2004, p. 19). 
In his April 2002 testimony before a U.S. House committee, Randall A. Yim, the 
then Managing Director of National Preparedness for the U.S. General Accounting 
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Office, stressed the importance of metrics for goals and objectives.  In his report titled 
National Preparedness, Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Efforts is 
Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland Security (GAO, 2002), Yim 
describes measuring results of federal programs as a longstanding objective of the 
Congress.  To further that effort, the Congress passed the Government Performance and 
Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), which was designed to have agencies focus on the 
performance and results of their programs rather than on program resources and 
activities.  The GPRA requires agencies to set strategic quantifiable, measurable 
performance goals, measure performance and report on the degree to which goals are 
met.  Agencies should also ensure goals within their lower organization levels support the 
agency-wide goals.  Yim argued that a preparedness program that lacks broad, but 
measurable, objectives is unsustainable because it deprives policy makers of information 
they need to make rational resource decisions (GAO, 2002).   
In his March 2001 testimony titled Combating Terrorism: Comments on 
Counterterrorism Leadership and National Strategy before a U.S. House Committee, 
Raymond J. Decker, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management for the GAO, 
stated that key aspects of a national strategy should include roles and missions of federal, 
state, and local entities and establish objectives, priorities, outcome-related goals with 
milestones, and performance measures to achieve those goals (GAO, 2001, p. 2).  In 
March 2003, Decker presented a report again before a U.S. House Subcommittee titled 
Combating Terrorism Observations on National Strategies Related to Terrorism (GAO, 
2003).  The report discussed the coordination of efforts across the vast number of federal 
and other governmental agencies with homeland security responsibilities.  Decker stated 
that performance measures are important for monitoring the successes of strategies and 
their related programs (GAO, 2003, p. 16).  One key to assessing overall performance is 
that they define an end-state of what the strategy is trying to achieve.  Decker suggests 
that lacking specific performance measures in federal homeland security strategies makes 
it more important that federal agencies have their own explicit performance measures 
such as required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA).  
Decker goes on to say that national performance goals and measurements should extend 
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beyond just federal agencies and include state and local governments, the private sector 
and the international community (GAO, 2003, p. 18).  He recognizes this is difficult with 
the principles of federalism, international sovereignty and private sector independence, 
but he stress that national strategies to combat terrorism require national and international 
performance expectations if they are to be successfully implemented (GAO, 2003, p. 18). 
Focusing on the business community, Maria I. Marshall suggests that goals can be 
broad and general in nature in her article, Defining Your Business Through Goals and 
Objectives First Steps for New Entrepreneurs (2004); however, she argues that objectives 
must be clear and concise.  She suggests the SMART method of objective writing that 
requires them to be specific, measurable, action oriented, realistic and timely.  To be 
measurable, an objective should be expressed in terms of dollars or quantities.  
Objectives should be clear targets of performance that can be evaluated.  They should 
state what needs to happen, who should do it and when (Marshall, 2004, p. 2).   
In his book, Implementing your Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” into Effective 
Action for Sustainable Change C., Davis Fogg suggests that companies that are long-term 
strategic winners faithfully practice eighteen keys to strategy implementation (1999).  
Fogg argues a company must have a strategic plan that has a direction statement, strategic 
objectives and strategic priority issues.  The direction statement defines that company and 
where it needs to go.  The strategic objectives are used to measure how one is doing on 
the key dimensions of the direction statement.  The strategic priorities are urgent 
marching orders (Fogg, 1999, p. 6).  Fogg’s first key to strategic implementation is to 
develop an accountability system.  He argues that strategic plan objectives are usually 
met when they are assigned to employees that are held accountable for achieving them.  
Organizations that hold their people accountable achieve approximately 85 percent of 
their strategic objectives (Fogg, 1999, p. 57).  Having measurable objectives and 
accountability are the best predictors of a plan’s success.  Fogg’s definition of measurable 
includes a completion date and results that can be measured by numbers such as dollars 
or percentages.   
In the article, Goal Setting and Performance Management in the Public Sector 
(Latham, Borgogni, & Petitta, 2008), the authors discuss the goal setting theory of Gary 
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P. Latham and Edwin A. Locke.  The goal setting theory states a specific high-level goal 
will lead to higher performance than an easier goal, a general goal or no goal setting.  
Given ability and commitment the higher the goal the higher the performance while 
variables like participation in developing goals, praise, competition and monetary 
incentives only affect behavior to the extent that they lead to the setting of and 
commitment to a specific high goal (Latham, Borgogni, & Petitta, 2008, p. 386).  Specific 
goals focus on what is to be accomplished and leads to persistence until the goal is 
attained.  The goal setting theory works in the public sector, as it does in the private 
sector.  On the federal level, goal specificity, a core aspect of the goal setting theory, is 
not as often present.  Federal legislatures have diverse stakeholders and are reluctant to 
set specific goals that communicate a goal not specified is of secondary importance.  
While local level governments are more operational than the national level and setting 
specific goals is more similar to that in the private sector (Latham et al., 2008, p. 398)   
The governmental reports and literature suggest that the objectives or 
subobjectives of a strategic plan should be results driven.  They should establish 
milestones, be measurable in a quantifiable way and be an action item.  They should 
describe a specific action that can be recognized when completed and done so in a timely 
manner.  If done correctly, goals, objectives and subobjectives can be used to evaluate 
progress, provide oversight, enhance management decisions and above all, achieve 
results. 
E. GENERAL LITERATURE 
In their article, Enhancing the Benefits and Overcoming the Pitfalls of Goal 
Setting (2006), Gary P. Latham and Edwin A. Locke explain that more than 1,000 studies 
with over 40,000 participants from five different continents show that specific goals are 
effective in significantly increasing a person’s performance.  It does not matter whether 
the goal was set by a manager, self set or a combined effort so long as it includes a logic 
or rationale from the manager (Latham & Locke, 2006, p. 332).  People who realize their 
performance is below a goal will likely increase their effort or change to attain it (Latham 
& Locke, 2006, p. 332).  Studies across a wide variety of professions show the more 
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difficult the goal, the greater will be the effort, focus and persistence by the employee.  
Studies even show that praise, public recognition and money have no effect on a person’s 
performance unless they lead to a specific high goal; however, goals can have potential 
drawbacks.  If people lack the knowledge and skill to obtain a goal, then giving them a 
difficult goal can lead to poorer performance (Latham & Locke, 2006, p. 334).  Problems 
can also occur if people see their assigned goals as competitive with others.  Then they 
could set off on their own withholding information and ideas from one another instead of 
sharing for the good of the organization (Latham & Locke, 2006, p. 334).  Goals can 
sometimes cause nongoal performance to be ignored, or stress can increase if a person is 
challenged with thirty goals instead of a manageable three to seven.  Finally, the authors 
caution that progressively increasing the challenge eventually lead to unattainable goals 
(Latham & Locke, 2006, p. 337).   
In the article, Goals Gone Wild: The Systematic Side Effects of Overprescribing 
Goal Setting (Ordo'nez, Schweitzer, Galinsky, & Bazerman, 2009), the authors take a 
different look at goals.  Most researchers in the field advocate goal setting and argue that 
goals need to be specific and challenging.  But the authors of this article suggest that 
goals are overused and have lead to a number of serious problems in the business world.  
Problems exist, such as narrowing employee’s focus to the neglect of nongoal areas, too 
many goals, too short a performance time frame, too challenging and the goal becoming 
the ceiling of performance.  The problems are exacerbated when managers chose the 
wrong goal.  They provide the example of Enron managers who were focused on revenue 
while ignoring profit percentages because they were receiving bonuses to increase 
revenue.  The authors suggest that goals should be used more like a prescription drug 
instead of an over the counter medicine.  Use of goals should be carefully dosed with 
consideration for the harmful side effects and closely supervised. 
A number of references were found that combined the topics of strategies and the 
public sector.  For example, in their article A Strategic Planning Approach Defining 
Alternative Counterterrorism Strategies as an Illustration (2009), authors Lynn Davis 
and Melanie Sisson suggest adding a new step into traditional strategic planning that will 
lead to means or methods of accomplishing goals being prioritized.  The article was 
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written for U.S. policy makers, specifically the military; however, the authors kept their 
article generic so the theory easily translates to other forms of strategic planning and is 
very relevant to this research project (Davis & Sisson, 2009).  In another example in the 
article Changing Homeland Security: What Should Homeland Security Leaders Be 
Talking About? (2006), Christopher Bellavita suggests that because of a lack of terrorist 
attacks on American soil only homeland security professionals are thinking about the 
future of homeland security.  In addition, Bellavita suggests that homeland security 
officials plan today with wisdom for sweeping changes that will be demanded if another 
terrorist attack happens.  This article is thought provoking about strategic thinking needs 
of the day but does not specifically discuss strategy methodology.   
A review of Darren Chen’s master’s thesis, State and Urban Area Homeland 
Security Strategy v3.0 Evolving Strategic Planning (2006), provided a historical review 
of how state domestic security strategies developed from 1999 until 2006.  The author 
promotes comprehensive, multi-discipline, nonfunding based strategies that have defined 
and measurable goals and objectives.  Chen’s thesis is outdated for the purpose of this 
research, as the strategy requirements from DHS have continued to change since 2006.  
In his thesis, What Type of State Homeland Security Strategy Should the State of New 
Jersey Develop? (2007), Richard Rosell discussed the need for the state of New Jersey to 
create a homeland security strategy.  Rosell first justifies the need for a strategy and then 
offers suggestions for building one.  While Rosell’s research is interesting, it does not 
delve into the detail of goals, objectives, prioritization, accountability and measuring 
accomplishments desired for the current research project.   
A number of literature sources reviewed were found to be written for the business 
community but their arguments translate well into the public sector.  In his article The 
Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning, Henry Mintzberg tells his readers that strategic plans 
are used so that everyone pulls in the same direction (1994, p. 113), but strategic planning 
should not take the place of strategic thinking.  Thinking comes from managers and 
workers who are working in the production units of the entity.  They are exposed to the 
subtle trends and currents of their industry.  They understand the data from statistics and 
how they apply to their work.  Mintzberg states most successful strategies are visions, not 
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plans (Mintzburg, 1994, p. 107).  Strategic planners should not be developing vision.  
They should supply data for consideration by managers and once a vision is chosen, then 
they should specify the series of steps needed to carry out the vision (Mintzburg, 1994, p. 
108).  The articles in this subcategory are scholarly and offer insight into theories of 
strategic planning.  Some were found to be more directly related to the present research 
than others, but all add value.   
F. CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 
In testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, just 10 
days after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, David M. Walker, the Comptroller 
General of the United States, presented his report Homeland Security: A Framework for 
Addressing the Nation's Efforts (Walker, 2001) discussing the need for a national strategy 
for homeland security.  Walker commented on the need for clearly articulated roles, 
responsibilities and accountability for homeland security efforts for all levels of the 
government and private sector.  In his April 2002 testimony before a U.S. House 
committee, Randall A. Yim, the then Managing Director of National Preparedness for the 
U.S. General Accounting Office, stressed the importance of metrics for goals and 
objectives.  In his report titled National Preparedness, Integration of Federal, State, 
Local, and Private Sector Efforts is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for 
Homeland Security (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2002) Yim describes measuring 
results of federal programs as a longstanding objective of the U.S. Congress.  He 
discusses the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, which was designed to 
have agencies focus on the performance and results of their programs rather than on 
program resources and activities.   
In March 2003, Raymond J. Decker, Director of Defense Capabilities and 
Management of the US Government Accountability Office presented a report titled 
Combating Terrorism Observations on National Strategies Related to Terrorism (GAO, 
2003) before a House Subcommittee.  The report discussed the coordination of efforts 
across the vast number of federal and other governmental agencies with homeland 
security responsibilities.  The report promotes defining a desired end state and 
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establishing performance measures to track the progress there.  In a March 2001 
appearance before a U.S. House Committee, Decker stated that key aspects of a national 
strategy should include roles and missions of federal, state, and local entities and 
establish objectives, priorities, outcome-related goals with milestones, and performance 
measures to achieve those goals (GAO, 2001, p. 2).   
In its report, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in 
National Strategies Related to Terrorism (GAO, 2004), the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office discusses six characteristics that a national strategy should contain.  
Three of these are directly related to the hypothesis of this research.  The report examined 
seven national strategies that deal directly with homeland security and national security 
issues.  This report provides quality supporting documentation for its conclusions that 
also help to guide further research.  The report was created in 2004, but it remains 
pertinent as it is often cited as a standard in recent GAO reports.   
A review of the record of testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives 
Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, 
Preparedness, and Response dated October 27, 2009 was made.  The testimony was titled 
Preparedness: What has $29 Billion in Homeland Security Grants Bought and How do 
We Know (US House of Representatives, Homeland Security Committee, 2009)?  One of 
the topics of the testimony was relevant to this research—specifically, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency’s use of the Cost 2 Capability (C2C) method of 
measuring progress.  The C2C was discussed as a tool for measuring the effectiveness of 
federal grants for homeland security enhancements.  The prepared statements given by 
two testifying witnesses were similar in that they made unsupported claims about the 
C2C tool.  One witness provided bullet statements of the virtues of the system without 
any providing any supporting evidence.  All of the testimony was general in nature and 
none of the witnesses provided any details about how the C2C tool works.  One witness 
did offer credible testimony on the tools deficiencies (US House of Representatives, 
Homeland Security Committee, 2009, p 18–22).   
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This subcategory shows a pattern of congressional testimony supporting the 
prioritization, assignment and use of metrics related to goals and objectives of strategies.  
Most of the testimony before the congress is supported by evidence in reports submitted 
with the testimony.  
G. FEDERAL STRATEGIES 
A review of One Team, One Mission, Securing Our Homeland: U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2008–2013 (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2008) was made regarding this research.  The Strategy was found to 
be broad with five strategic goals.  The document points to an innovative document titled 
Department of Homeland Security Annual Performance Report Fiscal Years 2008–2010 
(DHS, 2009).  This second document lists individual program goals within the many 
divisions of the Department of Homeland Security and ties those program goals back to 
the department-wide objectives of the first document.  The program is innovative and will 
be useful to examine for the current research. 
Along similar lines, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s document 
titled FEMA Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2008–2013 (Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2008) showed a typical strategy comprised of goals and objectives.  The 
document did not prioritize, assign tasks or suggest metrics to measure success.  An 
interesting addition to this strategy was a list of nine core competencies for the agency 
and an effort made to relate them into their strategic goals and objectives.  In 2005 the 
U.S. Homeland Security Council issued the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza 
(U.S. Homeland Security Council, 2005).  This strategy listed three overarching goals 
and promised a future document to provide more details.  In 2006, the National Strategy 
for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan (U.S. Homeland Security Council, 2006) 
was published that provided roles and responsibilities of government, private and 
international entities in dealing with a pandemic outbreak.  This second document listed 
by name federal agencies and assigned them responsibilities, including measurements of 
progress and timelines for implementation for parts of the strategy implementation plan.  
The documents in this subsection are useful to the current research by providing 
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examples of whether federal strategies prioritize goals, assign responsibility for 
achievement or establish metrics to measure progress.  While not considered scholarly, 
they are the official strategies of the United States that should be considered when 
researching protocols for statewide strategies.  Since they are government strategies, they 
do not provide explanations or rationale for their contents and directions.   
H. STATE HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGIES 
State homeland security strategies were the most useful forms of literature in this 
research project.  Thirty-five state strategies were reviewed and found to be very different 
in the manner they handled prioritization, assignment and metrics related to goals, 
objectives or subobjectives.  The state homeland security strategies were found to fit into 
five separate categories.  Those that prioritize, those that assign, those that use metrics, 
those that use a combination and those that do not prioritize, assign or use metrics.  Each 
category will be discussed below. 
Two state homeland security strategies were found that prioritize their goals or 
objectives.  In his opening address in Maryland's Strategic Goals and Objectives for 
Homeland Security (State of Maryland, 2009), Governor Martin O’Malley expresses his 
belief that Maryland should focus its goals and objectives on 12 basic, core capabilities that 
should be available in every region of the state.  The governor had developed these priorities 
in the previous year and the pursuit of those goals would continue in this updated strategy 
document.  These core goals are then supported by objectives and implementation steps.  The 
goals, objectives and steps are not assigned nor measured within the document.  In its State 
of Colorado Homeland Security Strategy 2008–2013 (2008), the Governor’s Office of 
Homeland Security added three state priorities to round out its guidance priorities.  The 
guidance priorities do not appear as goals or objectives.  Colorado has five goals in its 
strategy.  Each goal is assigned a “goal champion” who then establishes objectives and 
assigns a goal leader for each.  The goal champion and leader are state agencies.   
One state homeland security strategy was found that assigned its goals and 
objectives.  California has a 100-page strategy titled State of California Homeland 
Security Strategy 2008 (California Governor's Office of Homeland Security, 2008).  The 
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strategy provides goals and objectives that are not prioritized nor measured.  The strategy 
does identify divisions of the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and the goal or 
objective it is to serve in a supporting role (California Governor's Office of Homeland 
Security, 2008, pp. 18, 26, 34, 44, 52, 57, 62, 67, 70, 72, 76 ). 
Five state homeland security strategies were found that use metrics on their goals 
or objectives.  The New Hampshire Homeland Security Strategy (New Hampshire 
Department of Safety, 2004) sets completion dates for each of its objectives.  The 
completion dates are general as they only specify the year the objective is to be 
completed by.  Otherwise, this strategy does not prioritize, assign or measure its goals 
and objectives.  South Carolina’s 2003 State Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy 
(South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, 2003) was developed by the South Carolina 
Division of Law Enforcement (SLED) to cover a three-year period.  In its strategy, it uses 
three goals that are further supported by action goals, objectives and implementation 
steps.  SLED sets completion milestones by listing completion dates for 60 percent of its 
objectives and 41 percent of its implementation steps(South Carolina Law Enforcement 
Division, 2003, p. 8–24).  Examination of South Carolina’s methods will be useful in this 
research.  In the state of Georgia’s 2004 State Strategic Plan for Terrorism and All-
Hazards Preparedness, Georgia Office of Homeland Security based its strategy’s 
priorities on national guidelines, such as the eight national priorities (DHS, 2007, p. 11) 
and the 37 TCLs (DHS, 2007, p. 31–32).  In addition, it added three Georgia specific 
priories that were to strengthen agro terrorism defense, strengthen search and rescue and 
establish an urban evacuation plan (Georgia Office of Homeland Security, 2006, p. 6).  
The priorities do not appear in their goals or objectives, except for search and rescue 
training and equipment.  Interestingly, they also prioritize all future funding decisions 
based upon the population of the submitting jurisdiction with larger populations receiving 
a higher priority.  The Strategy lists objectives and supporting implementation steps for 
each of their goals.  The objectives are assigned a completion date; however, no agency is 
made responsible for them.  Virginia’s Secure Commonwealth Strategic Plan (Virginia 
Office of Commonwealth Preparedness, 2009) uses a blend of goals, objectives and 
implementation steps.  The objectives are organized into planning, organizing, equipping, 
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training and exercise groups.  The Strategy discusses how each state agency is rated 
annually on its emergency preparedness, with 20 percent of the reviews conducted by an 
onsite independent team.  The goals and objectives are not prioritized nor are the 
implementation steps assigned to a specific agency.  The Alaska State Homeland Security 
Strategy 2008 (Alaska Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 
2008, p. 27) does not incorporate metrics toward completion of its goals and objectives 
within the document; however, the Strategy describes how its goals and objectives are 
incorporated into the grant award of subgrantees who are then responsible for quarter 
reports on their progress toward achieving them.   
Ten homeland security strategies were found to use a combination of 
prioritization, assignment or metrics with their goals or objectives.  In its State of 
Wisconsin Homeland Security Strategy (Wisconsin Homeland Security Council, 2009), 
the council identifies nine specified priorities as the core of its strategy.  Each of the nine 
priorities is assigned a lead state agency called a champion.  The priorities are then 
broken down into goals and subgoals.  Each goal is assigned a state agency to serve as the 
goal champion to ensure progress toward them.  Some of the subgoals include completion 
dates.  The Kansas State Homeland Security Strategy Goals and Objectives (Kansas 
Division of Emergency Management, 2009) is a 22-page document that lists six goals 
that are supported by objectives and implementation strategies.  All of the 
implementation strategies related to the first two goals list the agency responsible for 
completion of it and lists a completion date for that task.  In the third goal, ownership of 
the task continues to be identified but completion dates are not provided.  As the strategy 
gets into the remaining three goals, it does not provide ownership or completion dates 
very often.  The implementation steps are often succinct and clearly obtainable.  
Missouri's Homeland Security Strategy (Missouri Department of Public Safety, 2008) 
provides a great deal of relevant data regarding this research.  The strategy priorities 
objectives, assigns ownership of objectives and includes measurement toward 
completion.  This document is thorough and well organized.  The authors of the Idaho 
Homeland Security / Emergency Management Strategy (Idaho Bureau of Homeland 
Security, 2010) used the eight national priorities (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
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2007, p. 11) as the priorities of its state strategy.  The bureau also added two of its own 
state priorities (Idaho Bureau of Homeland Security, 2010, p. 3).  Each priority was 
supported by goals, objectives and implementation steps.  Each objective in the strategy 
is assigned a completion date.  Based upon input from project managers, a project 
tracking software is used to monitor the progress of goals and objectives.  Results are 
discussed with the Bureau of Homeland Security Director who is the State Administrative 
Agency, each quarter.  The Washington Statewide Homeland Security Strategic Plan 
2006–2011 (Washington Emergency Management Division, 2006) lists goals, objectives 
and implementation steps.  The objectives are assigned a government agency or formal 
committee to guide in the completion of its implementation steps.  Each subobjective is 
given a targeted completion date.  The objectives are neither prioritized nor assigned 
further metrics for progress.  The National Capital Region Homeland Security Strategic 
Plan Overview 2007–2009 (National Capital Region Homeland Security Partners, 2006) 
is part of a three part strategy document presentation.  The first is an overview document.  
The second, titled National Capital Region Homeland Security Strategic Plan Volume I: 
Core Plan (National Capital Region Homeland Security Partners, 2006), provides details 
of the goals, objectives and the initiatives toward achieving the objectives. The third part, 
titled National Capital Region Homeland Security Strategic Plan Volume II: Appendices 
(National Capital Region Homeland Security Partners, 2009), contains detailed 
descriptions and metrics for initiatives developed to support the goals and objectives of 
the strategy.  The Strategic Plan provides a detailed time frame for the implementation of 
the initiatives and prioritizes some of them.  Since the Strategic Plan covers a multi state 
region, it goes on to discuss working within the various budget periods of the states and 
coordinating with the various levels of government within the region.  This document is 
detailed and well-organized and should be beneficial to this current research.  In the 
Delaware Strategy for Homeland Security, the authors established 12 high-level state 
goals for the state.  Each goal is assigned a team manager which is assigned to lead the 
efforts of stakeholders along a timeline provided with its objectives.  Objectives each are 
given a completion date and are assigned to a discipline instead of a specific agency 
(Department of Safety and Homeland Security, 2004, p. 23).  The Iowa Strategy for 
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Homeland Security and Emergency Management has five goals supported by objectives 
and implementation steps (Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management 
Division, 2009).  Each step has a completion date in the form of a year with most 
indicating they are ongoing efforts.  In Annex B of the Strategy, each objective is 
assigned performance measures as well as a state agency to be responsible for it.  The 
performance measures do not link directly to the implementation steps assigned to each 
objective earlier in the Strategy.  The Indiana Strategy for Homeland Security (Indiana 
Department of Homeland Security, 2008) limits its goals to just eight that are supported 
by objectives and implementation steps.  Indiana effectively handles progress toward its 
goals and objectives by including a completion date and a clearly defined measure that 
describes what must be done to complete each step.  It uses the SMART criteria to draft 
its measurements so that they are specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time 
sensitive.  This document will be very useful to comparison in this research.  In the 
Nevada State Homeland Security Strategy (Nevada Division of Emergency Management, 
2010), it states that Nevada will focus its efforts over the next three years on 13 specific 
priorities.  They use those priorities as the goals of the strategy.  The goals are supported 
by objectives and implementation steps.  The implementation steps are given completion 
dates but most of those are already past. 
Seventeen of the homeland security strategies reviewed did not prioritize, assign 
or use metrics with their goals or objectives.  These state strategies include:   
• Florida Domestic Security Strategic Plan (Florida Domestic Security 
Oversight Council, 2008)  
• State of Arizona 2007 Homeland Security Strategy (Arizona Department 
of Homeland Security, 2008) 
• Alabama State Homeland Security Strategy 2008 (Alabama Department of 
Homeland Security, 2008) 
• Kentucky’s Strategic Plan (Kentucky Office of Homeland Security, 2006) 
• Nebraska 2009 State Homeland Security Strategy (Nebraska Emergency 
Mangement Agency, 2009) 
• Vermont Homeland Security Strategy (Vermont Department of Public 
Safety, 2010) 
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• Connecticut Department of Emergency Management and Homeland 
Security State Wide Strategy 2010–2015 (Emergency Management 
Homeland Security Coordinating Council, 2009) 
• New Mexico Strategic Plan (New Mexico Department of Homeland 
Security & Emergency Management, 2009) 
• New York State Homeland Security Strategy 2009 (New York State 
Emergency Management Office, 2009) 
• North Carolina State Homeland Security Strategy: (North Carolina 
Department of Crime Control and Public Safety, 2010) 
• Ohio Homeland Security Strategic Plan Version 3 (Ohio Department of 
Public Safety, 2007) 
• Oregon State Homeland Security Strategy (Oregon Office of Emergency 
Management, 2009) 
• A Strategy for Tennessee (The Governor's Office of Homeland Security, 
2003) 
• Texas Homeland Security Strategic Plan (Texas Office of Homeland 
Security, 2005) 
• West Virginia Homeland Security Strategy (West Virginia Department of 
Military Affairs and Public Safety, 2010) 
• Commonwealth of Massachusetts State Homeland Security Strategy 
(Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security, 2007) 
• Mississippi State Homeland Security Strategy (Mississippi Department of 
Public Safety Office of Homeland Security, 2006)  
This subcategory of literature is comprised entirely of governmental documents.  
These documents, while all fairly recent, are not considered scholarly; however, they are 
the executive level strategy documents that the states use to guide important funding and 
resource decisions.  They are an important resource offering insight into how Florida’s 
peer states are handling their domestic security strategies.  Since they are government 
strategies, they do not provide explanations or rationale for their contents or findings.   
I. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT DOCUMENTS 
The Fiscal Year 2010 Homeland Security Grant Program Guidance and 
Application Kit (DHS, 2009) is perhaps one of the most significant documents in this 
literature review.  The review of many state homeland security strategies shows close 
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adherence to federal grant funding guidance.  This document and its preceding annual 
iterations are the guiding force for those funds.  This document sets the rules for 
obtaining U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grant funds.  Few would argue 
that state and local governments have extra funding to invest in domestic security 
preparation, response and mitigation.  Most such progress since 2002 has been made 
using DHS grant funding.  This document makes it clear that grant funds will be allocated 
based on legislative mandates, DHS’ risk methodology and effectiveness (DHS, 2009, p. 
48).  Any research regarding state strategic plans must consider the most significant 
source of funding for that plan and the requirements to obtain it.  The document is a 
government document that is detailed, but does not provide any logic or reasoning for its 
directions. 
J. CONCLUSION 
The literature reviewed can be divided into two main categories.  The first are 
government documents and the second scholarly articles.  Much of the literature herein 
was written by government agencies.  Most are recent, but neither scholarly nor peer 
reviewed.  Often statements of fact in these documents are generic or not supported by 
evidence; however, they are the official documents used by governments to allocate 
resources and funding.  Like most government documents, they do not provide 
explanation, evidence or rationale for their contents and directions.  Some of the literature 
found is right on point for this research project while others were generally informative 
but not relevant.  Some literature was found to be outdated, while some did not 
specifically focus on goals and objectives and how they should be used in a strategic 
plan.  Overall, the literature resources reviewed will help guide this research and provide 
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III. PRIORITIZATION OF GOALS, OBJECTIVES OR 
SUBOBJECTIVES IN STRATEGIC PLANS 
I learned that we can do anything, 
but we can’t do everything… 
at least not at the same time. 
So think of your priorities not in terms of what activities you do, 
but when you do them.  
Timing is everything. 
Dan Millman 
The hypothesis of this research project theorizes that prioritization of Florida’s 
state homeland security strategy’s goals, objectives or implementation steps will help 
make the strategy more effective in accomplishing them.  A summary of the literature 
suggests that prioritization is an important and effective tool in a strategy.  The U.S. 
General Accounting Office used prioritization as a component in the definition of one of 
its six desirable characteristics of a strategy (GAO, 2004, p. 11).  It states that priorities 
are considered necessary for achieving results.  This same GAO report continues to be 
cited in recent years as a government standard (Department of Homeland Security Office 
of Inspector General, 2009, p. 18); (GAO, 2009, pp. 4, 5, 13; 2010, pp. 32–33).  DHS 
grant funding guidelines also take advantage of the power of prioritization to insure grant 
funding is spent on items that DHS believes are the most important.  Once the findings 
from the literature were identified, they were used as a guide to review thirty-five state 
homeland security strategies to find those that appear to utilize those best practices.  The 
identified state strategies were then reviewed to determine the way prioritization was use 
in their goals, objectives or subobjectives.   
In an effort to establish additional data for evaluation, two subject matter experts 
(SME) were interviewed: one from the agency that helped to create the selected strategies 
and one from an agency responsible for implementing part of them.  The SMEs were 
asked their opinion on how effective their state’s method of prioritization of goals, 
objectives or subobjectives has been toward accomplishing them.  SMEs interviewed for 
other chapters in this research at times made statements related to prioritization.  These 
comments will be included in this chapter as supporting evidence.  To encourage answers 
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that reflect reality without the fear of repercussion each SME was assured complete 
confidentiality in this research.  Therefore, the statements made by SMEs will be written 
to prevent attribution.  The data from these two phases of the research will be analyzed 
and the findings will be considered for suggested use by Florida in its future homeland 
security strategies. 
A. REVIEW OF STATE STRATEGIES 
The first data collection in this phase of the research involved a review of existing 
state homeland security strategies for evidence of prioritization of their goals, objectives 
or subobjectives.  Thirty-five state homeland security strategies were reviewed for this 
research project; they appear in Table 1. Most strategies were found to mentioned 
priorities in some manner, but that often did not seem to have a direct influence on the 
goals or objectives that appeared in the strategy.  Commonly, the priorities referred to in 
the strategies were federal priorities, such as the eight federal priorities (U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, 2007, p. 11), the 37 TCLs (DHS, 2007, p. 31–32), as well as 
priorities from various national strategic plans and presidential directives.  Since the 
focus of this phase of the research is on prioritization of actual goals, objectives or 
subobjectives the review of the state strategies was focused there.   
It was determined that six or 17 percent of the thirty-five reviewed strategies 
employed some form of prioritization of their goals, objectives or subobjectives.  Based 
upon this criterion, the six state homeland security strategies were selected for review.  
Upon review, the strategies seem to fit into two categories.  First, those that used their 
priorities as their goals or objectives, and, second, those that had multiple goals and 
objectives but prioritized only some of them.  A discussion of each category follows. 
1. Strategies That Used Their Priorities as Their Goals or Objectives 
In his opening address in Maryland's Strategic Goals and Objectives for 
Homeland Security (O’Malley, 2009), Governor Martin O’Malley expresses his belief 
that Maryland should focus its goals and objectives on 12 basic, core capabilities that 
should be available in every region of the state.  The governor’s office had developed 
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these priorities in 2007, and the pursuit of those goals would continue in this updated 
strategy document.  These core goals are then supported and fleshed out by objectives 
and implementation steps.  In the State of Wisconsin Homeland Security Strategy 
(Wisconsin Homeland Security Council, 2009), the authors identify nine specific 
priorities as the core of their strategy.  The priorities appear in the goals section and are 
broken down further into goals and subgoals.  The authors of the Idaho Homeland 
Security / Emergency Management Strategy used the eight national priorities (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2007, p. 11) as the goal sections of their state 
strategy.  They also added two of their own state priorities, which were to implement a 
statewide training and exercise program and to implement and synchronize emergency 
management, administration, finance and logistics process (Idaho Bureau of Homeland 
Security, 2010, p. 3).  Each priority was supported by goals, objectives and 
implementation steps.  In the Nevada State Homeland Security Strategy (Nevada Division 
of Emergency Management, 2010), the authors advise that Nevada will focus its efforts 
over the next three years on 13 specific priorities.  They use those priorities as the goals 
of the strategy.  The goals were then supported by objectives and implementation steps.   
Table 1.   Review of State Homeland Security Strategies 
State 




Assign Goals / 
Objectives 
Presence of metrics 
for Goals / 
Objectives 
Alabama 2008 No No No 
Alaska 2008 No No No 
Arizona 2007 No No No 
Arkansas No review No review No review No review 
California 2008  2011 No Yes No 
Colorado 2008  2013 No Yes Yes 
Connecticut 2010  2015 No No No 
Delaware 2004 No Yes Yes 
DC /National 
Capital Region 
2007  2009 Yes Yes Yes 
Florida 2009  2011 No No No 
Georgia 2006 No No Yes 
Hawaii No review No review No review No review 
Idaho 2010 Yes No Yes 
Illinois No review No review No review No review 
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State 




Assign Goals / 
Objectives 
Presence of metrics 
for Goals / 
Objectives 
Indiana 2008 No No Yes 
Iowa 2009  2014 No Yes Yes 
Kansas 2009 No Yes Yes 
Kentucky 2006 or 
earlier 
No No No 
Louisiana No review No review No review No review 
Maine No review No review No review No review 
Maryland 2009 Yes No No 
Massachusetts 2007 No No No 
Michigan No review No review No review No review 
Minnesota No review No review No review No review 
Mississippi 2006 No No No 
Missouri 2008 Yes Yes Yes 
Montana     
Nebraska 2009 No No No 
Nevada 2007 Yes No Yes 
New Hampshire 2003 No No Yes 
New Jersey No review No review No review No review 
New Mexico 2009 No No No 
New York 2009 No No No 
North Carolina 2010 
(Draft) 
No No No 
North Dakota No review No review No review No review 
Ohio 2007 No No No 
Oklahoma No review No review No review No review 
Oregon 2009 No No No 
Pennsylvania No review No review No review No review 
Rhode Island No review No review No review No review 
South Carolina 2003 No No Yes 
South Dakota No review No review No review No review 
Tennessee 2003 No No No 
Texas 2005  2010 No No No 
Utah No review No review No review No review 
Vermont 2010 No No No 
Virginia 2009 No No No 
Washington 2006 - 
2001 
No Yes Yes 
West Virginia 2010 No No No 
Wisconsin 2009  2011 Yes Yes Yes 
Wyoming No review No review No review No review 
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2. Strategies That Have Multiple Goals and Objectives but Prioritized 
Only Some of Them 
In Missouri's Homeland Security Strategy, it describes the use of a multi-
discipline approach to build a consensus on 17 state initiatives that were felt to be 
important to protect Missourians (Department of Homeland Security, 2007).  Missouri 
uses DHS’s 37 TCLs (DHS, 2007, p. 31–32) as the objectives for its strategy.  Missouri 
recognized that while it has needs within each of the 37 target capabilities, it is prudent to 
prioritize their spending on its 17 specific state initiatives.  In the strategy, it states that 
capabilities and associated implementation steps not specifically referenced in Missouri’s 
17 state initiatives will be addressed in future funding cycles. (Missouri Department of 
Public Safety, 2008, p. 3).   
The National Capital Regions (NCR) strategic plan is a regional and not a state 
plan; however, like the other states reviewed for this research, the NCR territory is 
comprised of state, county and city level governments working together.  Based upon 
2009 U.S. Census Bureau estimates, the NCR has a combined population of nearly 4.5 
million (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009, p. 1).  NCR’s population level is larger than the 
Census Bureau’s estimate for 25 other states in the nation (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009, p. 
1).  These facts suggest that the NCR is similar enough to other states for the purpose of 
comparison in this research.  The National Capital Region Homeland Security Strategic 
Plan Volume 1 Core Plan (National Capital Region Homeland Security Partners, 2006) 
has four goals.  Each goal has an average of three objectives that serve as milestones 
toward the accomplishment of each goal. The Strategy then breaks down each objective 
into more tangible and measurable components called initiatives that serve to achieve the 
objective it supports.  The NCR stakeholders prioritized their initiatives.  The initiatives 
were prioritized based on their alignment with and support of three criteria: the eight national 
priorities (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007, p. 11); 37 TCLs (DHS, 2007, p. 
31–32); and regional gaps identified by the NCR partners.  As a result, 14 of the 30 
initiatives are considered “priority initiatives.”  These are placed first in line for 
implementation and funding (National Capital Region Homeland Security Partners, 2009, p. 
A–3).  The NCR stakeholders set their initiatives on a time line chart to determine when 
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they should begin and end the initiative.  Their order on the time line was based on 
factors such as their current status, priority and dependencies on prerequisite initiatives. 
3. Analysis 
The two different methods of prioritization produced similar results.  The states 
that used their priorities as their actual goals averaged 10.5 goals.  Those that had many 
goals and objectives, but prioritized only some of them, averaged 15.5 prioritized goals or 
objectives.  In their article Enhancing the Benefits and Overcoming the Pitfalls of Goal 
Setting (2006), Gary P. Latham and Edwin A. Locke warn that stress can increase, if a 
person is challenged with 30 goals instead of a manageable three to seven (Latham & 
Locke, 2006, p. 337).  In the article, Goals Gone Wild: The Systematic Side Effects of 
Overprescribing Goal Setting (Ordo'nez, Schweitzer, Galinsky, & Bazerman, 2009), the 
authors suggest that goals should be used more like a prescription drug instead of an over 
the counter medicine.  While surpassing Latham and Locke’s target of seven goals, the 
six strategies reviewed here were definitely closer to the idea number of prioritized goals 
than Florida’s 338 goals, objectives or subobjectives that were not prioritized.   
The review of thirty-five state homeland security strategies revealed the majority 
of states (83 percent) do not prioritize the goals, objectives or subobjectives in their 
homeland security strategy.  That is a significant percentage of states that fail to take 
advantage of the power of prioritization.  In 2004, the U.S. General Accounting Office 
(GAO) identified prioritization as a necessary element for achieving results.  This 
standard continues to be cited into 2010 in many federal homeland security related 
strategies (Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 2009, p. 18; 
GAO, 2009, pp. 4, 5, 13; GAO, 2010, pp. 32–33).  On the other end of the spectrum, the 
GAO criticized the federal money laundering strategy stating it identifies more priorities 
than can be achieved in a reasonable timeframe and does not rank them in order of 
importance (GAO, 2004, p. 18).  In his book Implementing your Strategic Plan How to 





priorities a critical component of a strategic plan.  He continued that once fleshed out, 
resourced and turned into action, strategic priority issues will lead to toward the 
envisioned future (Fogg, 1999, p. 6). 
There are several examples of the federal government using prioritization 
methodologies to insure desired actions.  In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on America, 
the U.S. Congress began to spend money to prevent, respond to and mitigate another 
terrorist attack.  On the state level, these funds were made available by grants from the 
newly formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  In 2010 alone, Florida will 
receive $91 million dollars from the DHS Homeland Security Grant Program 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2009, pp. 13–28).  These funds do not come without 
guidance from DHS on how to spend them.  Each year, DHS issues grant guidance that 
specifies how some of the funds are to be spent, and how they are not to be spent.  The 
2010 grant guidance document is titled FY 2010 Preparedness Grant Programs Overview 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2009).  In the last few years, DHS has required that 
25 percent of their Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants and State Homeland 
Security Grant Program (SHSGP) grants be spent on law enforcement prevention of 
terrorism type projects (Department of Homeland Security, 2009, pp. 3, 4, 13, 15).  In 
2010, for Florida that meant $18.6 million dollars (Department of Homeland Security, 
2009, pp. 13–28).  By controlling the use of $18.6 million, DHS is expressing and 
enforcing its prioritization of these types of goals.  Additionally, in their National 
Preparedness Guidelines DHS produced the Target Capabilities List which contains 
thirty seven targeted capabilities commonly referred to as the TCLs (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2007).  The TCLs are capabilities that DHS believes state and local 
governments should possess to effectively prevent, respond to and mitigate acts of 
terrorism.  In order to receive DHS grant funds, states are required to measure their 
current capabilities against the TCLs and determine any gap between them.  DHS then 
requires states to tie their request and spending of DHS grant funds to closing those 
identified gaps.  Again, DHS is using their leverage of funding to insure prioritization of 
what they have deemed important goals.   
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Federal strategies, GAO testimonies, literature and DHS grant guidance all 
demonstrate the importance and power of prioritization of goals, objectives or 
subobjectives.  As determined here, 83 percent of the reviewed state homeland security 
strategies did not prioritize their goals, objectives or subobjectives.  State homeland 
security strategies are still in their first decade of development.  In time, they should 
begin to align with federal guidance related to prioritization.  In a 2004 report to the U.S. 
Congress, the U.S. General Accounting Office established the desirable characteristics of 
an effective national strategy.  In the report, the GAO stated that priorities are an 
important part of goals and subordinate objectives (GAO, 2004, p. 11).  Current budget 
constraints are limiting the amount of grant funding available to states from DHS and 
other sources.  As grant funds decline, the competition for them will increase and as will 
the importance for states to use them more effectively.  Prioritizing goals, objectives or 
subobjectives will play an important role in that effort. 
Just because a strategy exists and prioritizes goals, objectives or subobjectives 
does not necessarily mean that it is practiced in reality.  Questions arise, such as does 
prioritization produce results?  Is prioritization used to focus other resources available 
beyond DHS funding?  Upon what standard should prioritization be based?  These 
questions cannot be answered by merely reading the strategies but are better answered by 
those tasked with implementing the strategies. 
B. SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS 
The second data collection in this phase of the research was to speak to subject 
matter experts (SMEs) related to two of the state homeland security strategies reviewed 
above.  There were a total of 12 SMEs interviewed for this entire research project.  The 
SMEs held positions in a number of disciplines such as governor’s staff, police, fire 
services, health departments and emergency management.  They represented state, county 
and city entities and averaged 19.75 years of experience in professional domestic security 
related disciplines.  The SME’s opinions will serve as evidence toward the findings of 
this research.   
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The state homeland security strategies above were divided into two categories.  
One from each was selected for further research with SMEs related to it.  The first 
category was comprised of strategies that used their priorities as their goals or objectives.  
The choice from this category was Maryland's Strategic Goals and Objectives for 
Homeland Security.  This strategy was chosen because its authors developed their entire 
strategy around 12 core capabilities they believed they needed.  Most of the other 
strategies used federal priorities to justify their own.  Maryland came into its strategy 
with its own priorities and pursued them.  The second category contained strategies that 
had multiple goals and objectives but prioritized only some of them.  The National 
Capital Region Homeland Security Strategic Plan Volume 1 Core Plan was chosen from 
this category because it goes into greater detail than the others on its prioritized 
initiatives.  Two SMEs related to each chosen strategy were interviewed.  The SMEs 
were assigned the confidential names of Subject Matter Expert 1, 2, 3 and 4.  Two were 
from an agency that had a part in the creation of one of the state homeland security 
strategies while two were from an agency that has responsibility to implement part of the 
strategies.  Choosing SMEs with these different points of view related to their strategy 
should provide more balance data. 
1. Strategies That Used Their Priorities as Their Goals or Objectives 
a. Maryland's Strategic Goals and Objectives for Homeland 
Security 
SMEs 1 and 2 provided an overview of how their state determined its 13 
priorities used in Maryland’s state homeland security strategy.  The strategy priorities 
were built upon the assumption that there are certain basic building blocks to sustaining a 
community.  If the electrical power is lost with no generator back up, it does not matter if 
a hospital is fully equipped for mass surge—that capability is worthless without electrical 
power.  Maryland felt its 12 core capabilities represent the primary building blocks upon 
which all other capabilities were built.  They were (O’Malley, 2009, pp. 4–5): 
• Interoperable Communications 
• Intelligence/Information Sharing 
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• HAZ MAT/Explosive Device Response 
• Personal Protective Equipment for First Responders 
• Bio surveillance 
• Vulnerability Assessment 
• Training and Exercises 
• Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) 
• Mass Casualty/Hospital Surge 
• Planning 
• Backup Power and Communications 
• Transportation Security   
Uniquely, Maryland does not intend to change its priorities.  It does not 
plan to move on to other priorities once the original 12 have been accomplished; it 
intends only to sustain them.  Maryland’s strategy was built with state and local input.  
The intent of the strategy is to guide both state and local jurisdictions in their 
preparedness efforts.   
Most domestic security professionals in Maryland did not take part in the 
selection process for Maryland’s strategy priorities.  This came from the Governor’s 
Office with input from subject matter experts.  Maryland has formed Joint Executive 
Committees that are given oversight over different priorities.  The Joint Executive 
Committees meet monthly to discuss the strategy and its application.  Domestic security 
professionals have an opportunity for input into the strategy, and how it is implemented, 
through these committees. 
The review of state strategies above raised the question whether 
prioritization produces results.  The SMEs provided three examples as evidence that 
prioritizing Maryland’s goals was effective.  First, the development of a statewide radio 
system, second, the development of a statewide Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) 
system, and third, the statewide coordination of bomb squads.  In 2007, Maryland had a 
number of statewide radio systems in use or in the planning stages.  The state police used 
a number of different systems throughout the state; the transportation department was in 
the process of planning a 450 MHz system while another agency was planning a 700 
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MHz system.  At the same time, most of the large municipal agencies were using 800 
MHz systems while smaller agencies could not afford a new radio system.  
Interoperability was one of the core priorities of the new strategy.  Leaders recognized 
that it made better sense to build a single statewide system for all state agencies.  It 
should be 800 MHz, since most of the big local agencies already used that frequency 
range and that would enhance interoperability.  Another benefit was that small agencies 
could piggy back on the infrastructure of the state system with a substantial cost savings.  
It is expected that Maryland will commit to a statewide radio system build out by the end 
of 2010.   
In 2007, the state had five major law enforcement agencies.  Three had 
different CAD systems while the other two had none.  Following the same core priority 
of interoperability Maryland is expected to built a statewide CAD and make it available 
for all to use.  As before, smaller agencies would be able to piggy back on state’s 
infrastructure at a substantial savings while they work to make larger city existing CAD 
systems compatible.  It is expected that Maryland will commit to a statewide CAD 
system build out by the end of 2010.   
Another core priority was explosive device response.  To accomplish this 
goal, the state wanted the bomb squads around the state to work together in regional 
support.  It got the team leaders together and found each was very different.  Some were 
run by a sergeant, while others were run by a higher ranking person.  Some were run by a 
fire department; others by the police; they had different equipment and different response 
protocols.  Leaders wanted a standard system for the state.  Collectively the teams set out 
protocols and goals for themselves.  The bomb squads were able to use this statewide 
guidance to go back to their agencies to make the changes.  They agreed to exercise and 
train together and developed a comprehensive agreement so all areas of the state had 
coverage and back up.   
The SMEs believe Maryland is serious about its priority goals.  Additional 
evidence to prove that is represented by how Maryland spends it resource allocations in 
the prioritized area of intelligence/information sharing.  Maryland invests in this priority 
in a number of different ways.  First, it dedicated approximately one million dollars of 
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DHS funding annually to support the Maryland Coordination Analysis Center (MCAC), 
which is Maryland’s fusion center.  Second, Maryland receives funding from National 
Capital Region’s DHS grants that is used to fund four full-time positions in the MCAC.  
Third, the MCAC has over 80 full-time members assigned there from many different 
agencies.  Fifty to 60 percent of those members are Maryland state employees from 
various state agencies.  Maryland also has three Regional Information Centers (RIC) that 
work in concert with the MCAC.  Maryland state employees also partially staff the RICs.  
Overall, Maryland has approximately 100 state employees dedicated to the 
intelligence/information sharing mission.  These state employee’s salary and benefits 
costs are paid from Maryland general revenue funds.  This represents a serious 
commitment of Maryland’s general budget to this strategic priority.  Finally, in 2009, 
Maryland received federal funding from the American Recovery and Investment Act.  
Maryland chose to use part of those funds to add seven full-time employees to the 
MCAC.  Essentially, Maryland is proving its commitment to its strategic priority by the 
amount of funding it is willing to devote to it. 
The review of state strategies above raised another question.  Is 
prioritization used to focus other resources available to the state beyond DHS funding?  
Both SMEs agree Maryland uses its homeland security strategy to guide the use of not 
just DHS grants funds but all the resources of the state.  The strategy directs how 
Maryland spends its manpower, goodwill, time, Center for Disease Control (CDC) 
grants, transportation grants, seaport grants and more.  DHS grants are just part of the 
resources guided by the strategy.  As already described, Maryland commits general 
revenue salary dollars, NCR funds and American Recovery and Investment Act toward 
the priority of information sharing.  Another example pointed out by an SME was a grant 
proposal to purchase vehicle license plate readers for local police agencies.  The grant 
request was for two million dollars to purchase the systems.  Maryland added a condition 
to the grant that local agencies would be required to provide collected data from the 
systems to the MCAC.  It made information sharing a condition of the grant.  Similarly, 
Maryland is requiring another of its priorities, Close Circuit Television (CCTV) systems, 
to direct feed their signals into the MCAC, and state emergency management offices  
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thereby combining the priorities of CCTV and information sharing.  One SME stated 
he/she often tells DHS that their state’s strategy is not a DHS strategy; it is Maryland’s 
homeland security strategy.   
The SMEs agreed that prioritized goals should be developed from base 
line capabilities with threat as part of the equation.  The goal of public safety should be 
the primary goal.  An example of this threat consideration is the pattern of terrorists 
attacking mass transit targets around the world.  Using that factor lead Maryland to 
include transportation security as a prioritize goal.  Threat is the most critical 
consideration when developing strategic priorities.  One SME suggests that jurisdictions 
should consider their assets and which are the most likely to be a target and then spend 
their effort there.  Once spread out amongst different projects/disciplines, limited 
resources become spread too thin and ineffective.  One SME suggested if a local agency 
does not want to follow the state strategy, then it should be free to go on its own but 
without any funding support.   
One SME posited traditional strategy planning takes into consideration 
what resources are available to accomplish goals.  It is not a matter of just having $24 
dollars and 12 goals, therefore, one should spend two dollars per goal.  Maryland 
prioritized the goals it thought it needed.  In Maryland’s case, the statewide radio system 
costs hundreds of millions of dollars.  The organizing of the bomb teams did not really 
cost dollars, but rather leadership and time.  Maryland did not build its strategy off DHS 
funding.  Instead, it build it off the core capabilities it felt necessary.   
The SMEs differed on one point.  One believed that even though 
Maryland’s strategy did not specifically cover common homeland security issues, such as 
campus safety, such issues can be addressed through the core building blocks of the 
strategy.  Campus safety needs interoperable communications, emergency power and 
they need law enforcement intelligence to keep away threats.  So, the many needs can be 
supported upon the foundation goals of their strategy.  The other SME felt that 
Maryland’s strategy is too broad.  It does not cover enough detail, which leads to certain 
threats not being addressed.  If the strategy covered more objectives, it would help to 
facilitate them.   
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One SME closed by saying that a state strategy actually matters to the 
people who have to implement it; it gives them direction.  It represents a clear statement 
from the governor where to place state and local efforts.  If it is not articulated in the 
strategy, it can be overlooked amongst the many responsibilities of homeland security 
professionals. 
SME 2 believed that a state homeland security strategy can not be very 
effective if it does not prioritize its goals, objectives or subobjectives.  SME 1 believed 
moderate progress was being made on goals, objectives or subobjectives that had been 
prioritized in the strategy.  Both SMEs agreed that progress made toward goals, 
objectives or subobjectives was in large part due to the fact that it had been prioritized.  
Both SMEs felt that state homeland security strategies should use prioritization 
methodologies. 
b. Analysis 
The SMEs both agreed that prioritizing goals, objectives or subobjectives 
within a strategy is important.  They gave examples, such as the statewide radio system 
and information sharing that showed prioritizing the goals of the strategy lead directly to 
progress being made toward their accomplishment.  The literature supports this concept.  
In his article The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning, Henry Mintzberg tells his readers 
that strategic plans are used so that everyone pulls in the same direction (Mintzburg, 
1994).  Prioritization gives the direction for everyone to pull.  In their article Enhancing 
the Benefits and Overcoming the Pitfalls of Goal Setting (2006) Gary P. Latham and 
Edwin A. Locke explain that more than 1,000 studies with over 40,000 participants from 
five different continents show that specific goals are effective in significantly increasing a 
person’s performance.  People who realize their performance is below a goal will likely 
change their effort to attain it.  Studies across a wide variety of professions show the 
more difficult the goal, the greater will be the effort, focus and persistence by the 
employee.  In a 2004 report to the U.S. Congress, the then named U.S. General 
Accounting Office (GAO) presented its report, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of 
Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, to establish the 
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desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy.  When examining existing 
federal homeland security strategies, the GAO found the reviewed strategies all identified 
goals, objectives and activities, but generally did not identify priorities among other 
desirable elements that the GAO considered necessary for achieving results (U.S. General 
Accounting Office, 2004, p. 12).   
The literature, the review of state strategies in the first part of this chapter 
and the SMEs touched on the appropriate number of priorities a strategy should have.  
The review of state strategies showed states that used their priorities as their actual goals 
set an average of 10.5 goals.  Those that had many goals and objectives but prioritized 
only some of them averaged 15.5 prioritized goals or objectives.  SME 1 stated when 
developing the strategy the authors wanted to use a manageable number of goals.  Not too 
few, not too many yet have enough to keep busy.  If they prioritized just one or two 
items, it might keep one discipline very busy, but others would have nothing to do.  They 
wanted to engage all disciplines.  SME 2 cautioned that too many priorities spread 
limited resources amongst different projects and disciplines to the point where they 
become ineffective.  The SMEs suggested picking priorities and fully funding them.  In 
addition, the SMEs are supported by the literature.  When the GAO compared existing 
national security strategies to its six desirable characteristics, it criticized the federal 
money laundering strategy stating it identifies more priorities than can be achieved in a 
reasonable timeframe (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2004, p. 18).   
In the article Goals Gone Wild: The Systematic Side Effects of 
Overprescribing Goal Setting (Ordo'nez et al., 2009), the authors suggest that goals are 
overused and have lead to a number of serious problems in the business world.  Problems 
such as narrowing employee’s focus to the neglect of non-goal areas, too many goals, too 
short a performance time frame, too challenging and the goal becoming the ceiling of 
performance.  The authors suggest that goals should be used more like a prescription drug 
instead of an over the counter medicine.  Use of goals should be carefully dosed with 
consideration for the harmful side effects and closely supervised.  In their article 
Enhancing the Benefits and Overcoming the Pitfalls of Goal Setting (2006), Gary P. 
Latham and Edwin A. Locke explain goals can have potential drawbacks.  Goals can 
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sometimes cause non goal performance to be ignored or stress can increase if a person is 
challenged with 30 goals instead of a manageable three to seven.  In the second category 
of strategies reviewed above there existed more objectives and subobjectives than those 
that had been prioritized.  This allows for all disciplines to have some goals, objectives or 
subobjectives to make progress toward, but allows the focusing or concentrating on just a 
few.  Literature suggests a manageable level of priorities is three to seven.  The strategies 
reviewed for this research averaged 10 to 15 priorities.  It is suggested that a state 
strategy could reasonability handle seven to 10 priorities. 
One SME pointed out that Maryland does not intend to change its 
priorities.  Their priorities, which are also their goals, are written broadly to cover all 
issues.  One SME gave the example that a potential need in campus safety can fit within 
the broad goal priorities.  Campus safety officials need interoperable communications and 
emergency power, and the officials need law enforcement intelligence to keep away 
threats.  Therefore, many needs can be supported within the prioritized goals of the 
strategy.  The other SME disagrees with this one size fits all method and believes it takes 
away the advantage of a clearly defined priority.  By having all the strategy’s goals as a 
priority, literally everything that is placed within the supporting objectives and 
subobjectives becomes a priority.  The net effect is there are no real priorities to the 
exclusion of other projects.  The generalized one size fits all goals seemingly do not make 
logical priorities. 
SME 1 and 2 gave solid examples of Maryland’s commitment to fund 
identified prioritizes.  Prioritization brings with it funding.  SME 5, from Colorado, 
believes prioritization is more important than assignment, since it brings with it funding.  
SME 6, also from Colorado, posited progress depends mostly upon whether the locals 
receive DHS grant funding for a project.  For optimum progress, SME 5 and 6 agreed that 
a combination of prioritization, funding and assignment is best.  The fact that 
prioritization brings funding is supported by the literature.  As described above in the 
summary section related to the review of state strategies, DHS will give Florida $91 
million dollars in 2010 alone.  These funds do not come without guidance on how to 
spend them from DHS.  For example, in the last few years DHS has required that 25 
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percent of their Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants and State Homeland 
Security Grant Program (SHSGP) grants be spent on law enforcement prevention of 
terrorism type projects (Department of Homeland Security, 2009, pp. 3, 4, 13, 15).  To 
Florida, in 2010, that meant $18.6 million dollars (Department of Homeland Security, 
2009, pp. 13–28).  By controlling the use of $18.6 million, DHS is expressing their 
prioritization of these types of projects.  Also, as described above, DHS requires states to 
measure their current capabilities against the DHS 37 TCLs and determine any gap 
between them.  DHS then requires states to tie the request and spending of DHS grant 
funds to closing those identified gaps.  DHS is using its leverage to insure prioritization 
of what it has deemed important capabilities.  In these examples, local agencies that 
followed the prioritization mandates of Maryland’s strategy and DHS’ grant guidance 
were in position to receive significant funding to accomplish those priorities. 
An important issue related to prioritization is whether a state homeland 
security strategy guides more than just the distribution of DHS grant funding.  Both 
Maryland SMEs strongly agreed Maryland uses its homeland security strategy to guide 
the use of not just DHS grants funds but all the resources of the state.  One SME stated 
the strategy directs how they spend their manpower, goodwill, time, CDC grants, 
transportation grants, seaport grants and more.  As demonstrated above, Maryland 
committed general revenue salary dollars, NCR UASI funds and American Recovery and 
Investment Act toward its priority of intelligence and information sharing.  One SME 
stated they often tell DHS that their strategy is not a DHS strategy, instead it is 
Maryland’s homeland security strategy.   
The final area discussed by the SMEs was the basis on which priorities 
should be built.  The SMEs agreed that prioritized goals should be developed from base 
line capabilities with threat as part of the equation.  One SME suggested that public 
safety should be the primary goal.  An example of this threat consideration is the pattern 
of terrorists attacking mass transit targets around the world.  Using that factor led 
Maryland to include transportation security as a prioritized goal.  Threat is the most 
critical consideration when developing strategic priorities.  One SME stated that 
Maryland set its priorities without consideration as to whether or not it had funding to 
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meet that need.  The SME provided the examples of the statewide radio system and the 
coordination of the bomb squads around the state.  The statewide radio system cost 
hundreds of millions of dollars, while the coordination of the bomb squad cost very little 
money, but required leadership and time to accomplish.  
2. Strategies That Have Multiple Goals and Objectives but Prioritized 
Only Some of Them 
a. National Capital Region Homeland Security Strategic Plan 
Volume 1 Core Plan 
SMEs 3 and 4 provided an overview of organizations within the National 
Capital Region (NCR) with oversight and input into the regional homeland security 
strategy.  The NCR has a pseudo government known as the Metropolitan Washington 
Council of Governments (COG) that coordinates a variety of mutual interest issues for 
the surrounding state, county and city governments.  For example, the council 
coordinates transportation grants, economic development as well as DHS Urban Area 
Security Initiative (UASI) grants to name a few.  The Senior Policy Group and the Chief 
Administrative Officers Committee (SPG-CAO) combines to serve as the lead oversight 
group for matters related to domestic security.  This group worked together to set the 
priorities that are found in the NCR regional homeland security strategy.  Supporting this 
group are two additional layers of committees.  The first level is a department or agency 
head group such as the Police or Fire Chiefs Committees.  The second layer of 
committees is known as operations groups, such as the Fire, Hazmat or Emergency 
Medical Operations Sub Committees.  SME 3 and 4 agree that these lower level 
committees provided suggestions for inclusion in the NCR strategy up through the levels 
of committees to the SPG-CAO; however, there was a disconnect between what was 
provided by the lower level committees and what ended up in the strategy.  The 
committees continue to have input via monthly meetings where they work on current 
issues, training and exercising.  They also work with other discipline committees to 
develop joint response protocols.   
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The review of state strategies above raised the question whether 
prioritization produces results.  The SMEs both agree that prioritization of a strategy’s 
goals, objectives or subobjectives is important and can lead toward their accomplishment.  
Prioritization focuses attention and, therefore, funding on the issue.  One SME stated 
prioritization gets the organization closer to a goal.  Prioritization is an important 
principle but in practice there are potential gaps.  One SME gave an example of a priority 
gone wrong.  The NCR had a priority of situational awareness.  In order to support that 
priority, they have built a multimillion dollar information exchange system.  The system 
uses the latest technology and equipment and was built to be bomb proof.  The problem is 
that no one has agreed to exchange information.  Local agencies cannot agree on what 
information to share.  The system was built to serve a purpose that is not in place yet.  
The SME suggests that operations level people would have recognized the potential 
problem with this system prior to it being built.   
One SME stressed the importance of being able to be flexible regarding 
priorities.  The SME suggests that COG committees need to be able to adapt to new and 
changing threats and have the ability to change strategy priorities.  The example given 
occurred within one of the NCR operations group.  Three years ago members of the 
group tried to raise a new priority to build protocols, train and exercise joint response for 
police and fire to active shooter incidents.  At that time, the committee could not raise the 
issue to a priority level to obtain funding.  Since it was not a priority, the initiative went 
nowhere; however, on September 1, 2010 the Discovery Communications building in 
Silver Springs, Maryland had an armed take over incident.  As a result, the committee’s 
previous requests were then gaining attention.   
The review of state strategies above raised another question.  Is 
prioritization used to focus other resources available to the state beyond DHS funding?  
One SME pointed out that the NCR strategy only directs UASI grant funding from DHS 
which in 2010 will total approximately $60 million (DHS, 2009, p. 15).  The NCR 
strategy does not direct the use of SHSGP, Health Human Services (HHS), Center for 
Disease Control (CDC) or any other type of funding.  One SME pointed out that UASI 
funds are often used to perform gap analysis on capabilities.  The gap analysis research 
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sometimes includes a look at other resources and funding that can be utilized to close 
identified gaps.  This serves as a potential coordination point for using other resources 
beside UASI funding to address an issue, but these other grants and resources are 
controlled by state and local agencies.  The SME pointed out that most of the SMEs who 
sit on the CAO-SPG committee and its subcommittees are the same people who handle 
SHSGP, CDS, HHS and other grants for their states or jurisdictions.  These people are in 
a position to deconflict against duplicitous spending, but they do not coordinate the use of 
the separate grants together.  The SME believes the states and local agencies wait to see 
what resources they can get from UASI funding and then use the other grants available to 
them to fund their remaining gaps.  The SME believes that the NCR strategy should 
prioritize the 37 TCL gaps and have the power to direct the many resources available in 
the region to accomplish these priorities; however, this does not take place in reality. 
The SMEs agreed that threat and gap analysis were the preferred method 
to establish priorities.  One benefit to this method is that UASI funds are commonly used 
to assess current capabilities and provide accurate gap analysis for what needs to be 
accomplished.  One SME cautioned that attention needs to remain focused on capabilities 
already built out.  An example would be radiation detection equipment purchased but not 
maintained in a ready usable state.   
The NCR SMEs agreed that a state homeland security strategy can not be 
very effective if it does not prioritize its goals, objectives or subobjectives.  SME 4 
believed moderate progress was being made on goals, objectives or subobjectives that 
had been prioritized in the strategy while neither believed much progress was made on 
goals, objectives or subobjectives that had not been prioritized.  Only one SME agreed 
that progress made toward goals, objectives or subobjectives was in large part due to the 
fact that it had been prioritized.  Both SMEs felt that state homeland security strategies 
should use prioritize its goals, objectives or subobjectives. 
b. Analysis 
SME 3 and 4 both agree that prioritization of a strategy’s goals, objectives 
or subobjectives is an important step toward accomplishing them.  They believe 
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prioritization focuses the attention of those in a position to make the needed progress.  
This is supported by the literature.  In 2004, the then named U.S. General Accounting 
Office (GAO) presented a report to Congress in which they identified six desirable 
characteristics a federal homeland security strategy should possess.  When defining one 
of those characteristics the GAO pointed out that priorities were necessary for achieving 
results (GAO, 2004, p. 12).  In the article, Goal Setting and Performance Management in 
the Public Sector (Latham, Borgogni, & Petitta, 2008), the authors suggest that specific 
goals focus on what is to be accomplished and leads to persistence until the goal is 
attained.  One SME suggested that prioritization also leads to funding.  SME 5 from 
Colorado also suggested that prioritization is important, since it brings with it funding.  
The federal government does tie funding to prioritized objectives, which is demonstrated 
in two examples.  First, in the last few years, DHS has required that 25 percent of its 
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants and State Homeland Security Grant 
Program (SHSGP) grants be spent on law enforcement prevention of terrorism type 
projects (DHS, 2009, pp. 3, 4, 13, 15).  Second, DHS requires states to compare their 
current capabilities against the DHS 37 TCL’s and determine any gap between them.  
DHS then requires states to tie their request and spending of DHS grant funds to closing 
those identified gaps.  Many of the SMEs interviewed for this research project identified 
funding as the most important determinant whether there will be progress made on goals, 
objectives or subobjectives.  SME 5, from Colorado, believed one can look at where the 
state directed its funding and expect to see progress.  SME 6, also from Colorado, stated 
progress depended mostly upon whether the locals receive DHS grant funding for a 
project.  SME 8, also from the NCR, saw progress being made but only on the items 
being funded.  SME 9, from Indiana, said funding and prioritization were a greater 
influence toward progress then the use of metrics.  SME 11, from Washington State, also 
suggested that progress in a strategy was more a factor of prioritization and supporting 
funding than the use of a metric.   
SME 10, from Indiana, spoke of many independent steps toward progress 
that had been made toward the goals, objectives or subobjectives of Indiana’s homeland 
security strategy.  SME 10 went on to say that unfortunately no one had taken charge to 
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put these steps into a logical order to accomplish prerequisites and focus on priorities.  
When building a house, the foundation must precede the walls that must be in place to 
support the roof.  SME 10 felt it was important to determine what needed to be done first 
and apply resources to get those things done first.  SME 10 lamented nothing was going 
in the right direction.  In his article The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning, Henry 
Mintzberg tells his readers that strategic plans are used so that everyone pulls in the same 
direction.  Law enforcement agencies often take advantage of the force multiplying effect 
of task forces to focus on priority issues like serial rapists and gang violence.  The 
expertise and unique resources of the various agencies work efficiently and effectively 
together to solve problems.  But the benefits of working together and prioritizing are lost 
when groups work independent of each other.  The NCR SMEs reveal that the NCR 
strategy only applies to UASI funding allotted to the NCR which for fiscal year 2010 was 
$59,392,477 (DHS, 2009, p. 15).  The NCR strategy does not provide guidance for 
additional DHS Homeland Security Preparedness Grant Program funds provided to these 
three states, which total $30,382,135 for Maryland, $19,399,981 for the District of 
Colombia and $37,126,020 for Virginia (DHS, 2009, pp. 13–28).  Details for the 
additional grants awarded to these three states are provided in Table 2.   
Table 2.   Additional DHS Grant Awards for Tri State Area 
DHS Fiscal Year 2010 Maryland District of 
Colombia 
Virginia 
Port Security Grant Program   
(PSGP) $3,214,934 NA $4,253,186 
State Homeland Security Program   
(SHSP) $15,819,538 $10,073,987 $18,680,612 
Metropolitan Medical Response 
System  (MMRS) $317,419 NA $1,904,514 
Citizen Corps Program  
(CCP) $2,363,786 $107,969 $282,223 
Emergency Management Performance 
Grants  (EMPG) $6,086,158 $2,853,025 $7,455,585 
Interoperable Emergency 
Communications Grant Program   
(IECGP) $1,031,500 $595,000 $1,223,500 
Driver’s License Security Grant 
Program  (DLSGP) $748,800 $600,000 $1,046,400 
Buffer Zone Protection Program   $800,000 $1,600,000 $600,000 
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Regional Catastrophic Preparedness 
Grant Program  (RCPGP) NA $3,570,000 $1,680,000 
TOTAL FUNDING PER STATE $30,382,135 $19,399,981 $37,126,020 
 
The lack of coordination results in independent groups setting their own 
priorities and directing separate resources to address the same problems, literally.  SME 3 
stated that state and local agencies wait to see what resources they can get from the NCR 
UASI and then use their other resources to build out remaining gaps.  SME 8, also from 
the NCR, explained that local agencies are trying to meet their response and preparedness 
needs and that becomes the focus of their UASI grant submissions.  The NCR strategy 
cannot compete with the political landscape of the region.  Tax revenue is down and 
citizen expectations for services are up.  So, the local agencies are using DHS funds to 
support their needs, which tend to be in the area of response and preparedness.  Most of 
the NCR strategy priorities do not deal with the things that police and fire do on a day-to-
day basis, but that has been where the investment of dollars has been.   
This problem is exacerbated by the disparate control over complementary 
grant sources like Center for Disease Control and Health and Human Services grants that 
are lead and controlled by additional groups of people.  Three of the SMEs interviewed 
for this chapter agreed that a single strategy should be used to set the priorities and direct 
all the resources available to address the issues of domestic security.  The taxpayers of 
the United States have been living through a depression for the last several years.  At the 
same time, the federal government has ballooned its deficit spending into tens of trillions 
of dollars per year.  The DHS grant funds spent by state and local governments is the 
taxpayer’s money.  Taxpayers deserve to have the money used as efficiently and 
effectively as possible.   
It is not uncommon to hear that we are fighting a war on terror.  The U.S. 
military maintains its command and control in a central location.  It does not divide up its 
resources to field commanders who then engage the enemy in isolated uncoordinated 
attacks.  Similarly, it does not make sense to divide prioritization and direction of funding 
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resources that have been identified as the most important determinant whether there is 
progress made on a strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives.  As described above, 
DHS does play a centralizing role to prioritize the use of their grant funding.  However 
the literature suggests that might not be enough.  In the article, Goal Setting and 
Performance Management in the Public Sector (Latham et al., 2008), the authors discuss 
the goal setting theory that states a specific high-level goal will lead to higher 
performance than an easier goal, a general goal or no goal setting.  The goal setting 
theory works in the public sector as it does in the private sector.  On the federal level, 
goal specificity, a core aspect of the goal setting theory, is not often present.  The authors 
argue federal legislatures have diverse stakeholders and are reluctant to set specific goals 
that communicate a goal not specified is of secondary importance.  While local level 
governments are more operational than the national level and their ability to set specific 
goals is more similar to that found in the private sector (Latham et al., 2008, p. 398).  
State strategies are uniquely positioned to be detailed about the priorities need to 
accomplish their goals, objectives or subobjectives.  However, as described above there is 
room for improvement. 
One SME discussed the need for flexibility in a strategy’s priorities.  Most 
state homeland security strategies cover periods of three or more years.  Terrorist tactics 
and threats to communities can change more quickly than that.  Examples of such rapid 
changes are the 2004 Besian school siege, which brought attention to campus safety, and 
the 2009 H1N1 flu virus, which brought attention to mass prophylaxis measures.  One 
SME above provided the example of an operations group committee desire to change 
priorities to active shooter incidents, but the committee could not influence the needed 
change.  This suggests that states should consider developing a capacity to change the 
direction on its state homeland security strategy and with it the prioritization and funding 
influence it carries.  As described above, the NCR has levels of committees that provide 
input to the SPG-CAO committee that has ultimate authority to direct the use of UASI 
funding.  Operational personnel will likely be the first to recognize the need to change 
and adapt to new threats.  These individuals hold important roles in the operations group 
committees of the NCR; however, as both SME 4and 5 described, there was a 
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disconnection between the input of operational level personnel and the final strategy 
produced by the SPG-CAO.  SME 8 also described a disconnection between the 
leadership of the NCR strategy and the operational entities that benefit from the UASI 
funding.  This problem is also discussed in the article Goals Gone Wild: The Systematic 
Side Effects of Overprescribing Goal Setting (Ordo'nez et al., 2009) where the authors 
suggest that goals are overused and have lead to a number of serious problems in the 
business world.  The problems are exacerbated when managers chose the wrong goal.  
They provide the example of Enron managers who were focused on revenue while 
ignoring profit percentages because they were receiving bonuses to increase revenue.   
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND APPLICATION TO FLORIDA 
The review of thirty-five state homeland security strategies revealed the majority 
of states (83 percent) do not prioritize the goals, objectives or subobjectives in their 
homeland security strategy.  That is a significant percentage of states that fail to take 
advantage of the power of prioritization.  The literature supports the idea that 
prioritization is a necessary element for achieving results and that priorities will lead to a 
desired end state.  The federal government ties DHS grant funding to compliance with 
prioritization to insure progress on goals, objectives or subobjectives it deems most 
important.  The Maryland and NCR SMEs all agreed that prioritizing goals, objectives or 
subobjectives within a strategy is important and effective.   
The research above found two methods to apply priorities in a strategy.  The first 
was Maryland’s approach to make all goals a priority.  The second was NCR’s 
prioritization of just a few of many objectives and subobjectives.  The NCR method 
appears more useful.  By having all goals as a priority, literally everything that is placed 
within the supporting objectives and subobjectives becomes a priority.  The net effect is 
there are no real priorities to the exclusion of other projects.  The two different methods 
of prioritization did produce similar results in the number of priorities.  The states that 
used their priorities as their actual goals set an average of 10.5 goals.  Those that had 
many goals and objectives but prioritized only some of them set an average of 15.5 
prioritized goals or objectives.  Latham and Locke suggest that a person is challenged 
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with 30 goals instead of a manageable three to seven  (Latham & Locke, 2006, p. 337).  
Ordo’nez, et al. suggest goals should be more like a prescription drug instead of an over 
the counter medicine (Ordo'nez, et al., 2009, p. 14).  SME 1 stated when developing 
Maryland’s strategy the authors wanted to use a manageable number of goals.  Not too 
few, not too many yet have enough to keep busy.  SME 2 cautioned that too many 
priorities spread limited resources amongst different projects and disciplines to where 
they become ineffective.  In the NCR method of assigning priorities, there are more 
objectives and subobjectives than those that had been prioritized.  This is a more 
favorable method, since it allows for all disciplines to have some goals, objectives or 
subobjectives to make progress toward, but it also allows additional focus on a few 
through prioritization.  The SMEs from both Maryland and the NCR agreed that 
prioritized goals should be developed from base line capabilities gap analysis with threat 
as a critical part of the equation.   
One SME discussed the need for flexibility in a strategy’s priorities.  Most state 
homeland security strategies cover periods of three or more years.  Terrorist tactics and 
threats to communities can change more quickly than that.  The SMEs suggested that 
states consider developing a capacity to change the direction of its state homeland 
security strategy and with it the prioritization and funding influence it carries.  
Operational personnel will likely be the first to recognize the need to change and adapt to 
new threats.  Leadership committees like the SPG-CAO have the authority to alter the 
priorities of a strategy.  The two must work together.  However, SME 4, 5 and 8 
described a disconnection between the input of operational level personnel and the final 
strategy produced by the SPG-CAO.  Such issues must be recognized and prevented to 
insure the appropriate flexibility is available to meet changing demand. 
The SMEs suggested that prioritization brings with it funding.  SME 1 and 2 
provided examples of Maryland’s commitment to fund identified prioritizes.  SME 5, 
from Colorado, believes prioritization is more important than assignment, since it brings 
with it funding.  SME 6, also from Colorado, posited progress depends mostly upon 
whether the locals receive DHS grant funding for a project.  For optimum progress, SME 
5 and 6 agreed that a combination of prioritization, funding and assignment is best.  The 
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fact that prioritization brings funding is supported by DHS grant guidance that ties 
funding to compliance to DHS’ priorities.  DHS is using its funding leverage to insure 
what it has decided are important capabilities.  Agencies that follow DHS grant guidance 
are in position to receive significant funding to accomplish those priorities.  Many of the 
SMEs interviewed for this research project identified funding as the most important 
determinant whether or not there will be progress made on goals, objectives or 
subobjectives.  SME 5 believed one can look at where the state directed its funding and 
expect to see progress.  SME 6 stated progress depended mostly upon whether the locals 
receive DHS grant funding for a project.  SME 8, from the NCR, saw progress being 
made but only on the items being funded.  SME 9, from Indiana, said funding and 
prioritization were a greater influence toward progress then the use of metrics.  SME 11, 
from Washington State, also suggested that progress in a strategy was more a factor of 
prioritization and supporting funding than the use of a metric.   
An important issue related to prioritization is whether a state homeland security 
strategy should guide more than just the distribution of DHS grant funding.  Resources, 
such as CDC, HHS, transportation, sea port, general revenue and other resources can be 
useful in making progress toward priorities of a homeland security strategy.  In his article 
The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning, Henry Mintzberg tells his readers that strategic 
plans are used so that everyone pulls in the same direction.  As pointed out above, the 
NCR strategy only guides $59 million in UASI funding while nearly $87 million in other 
forms of DHS grants funding is prioritized separately by other entities within the same 
geographical area (DHS, 2009, p. 13–28).  This lack of coordination fails to take 
advantage of the force multiplier on expertise and resources.  It results in independent 
groups setting their own priorities and directing separate resources to address literally the 
same problems.  While this describes disconnection on the strategic level, there is another 
disconnection between the operational and strategic levels.  SME 3 and 8 described local 
agencies focusing on the use of grant funds to meet their local response and preparedness 
needs in competition with the boarder statewide strategic viewpoint.   
Three of the SMEs interviewed specifically regarding prioritization agreed that a 
single strategy should be used to set the priorities and direct all the resources available to 
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address the issues of domestic security.  SME 12, from Washington State, believes a 
strategy should be written to direct all statewide resources including local agencies.  SME 
6 pointed out that meetings tend to focused the specific grant deliverables of the person 
calling the meeting instead of focusing across funding sources/grants or other resources 
of the state.  SME 5 suggests one way to bridge the gap between disparate funding 
sources is to require everyone to use a singular statewide capability assessment and gap 
analysis.  Currently, the different funding sources utilize their own assessments of needs 
and set their own priorities.  Having a single needs analysis could enable and encourage 
each grant source to focus its unique resources on the parts of the single gap analysis 
where it has jurisdiction and expertise.  It does not make sense to spread out the authority 
to prioritize and direct domestic security grant funding resources, which have been 
identified herein, as the most important determinant whether there is progress made on a 
strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives.  As described above, DHS does play a 
centralizing role to prioritize the use of their grant funding; however, the literature 
suggests the federal government often will not commit to priorities for political reasons 
and that role is better handled by state and local governments, which are more 
operationally focused (Latham, Borgogni, & Petitta, 2008, p. 398).  SME 12 warned not 
to let political sensitivities interfere with prioritizing goals, objectives or subobjectives.  
Prioritization is very important but can be politically sensitive when telling one discipline 
that their need is less important than another’s.  Therefore, state homeland security 
strategies are uniquely positioned to be detailed about the priorities needed to accomplish 
statewide goals, objectives or subobjectives.   
The research in this chapter shows the literature and many SMEs support the idea 
that prioritization is a necessary element for achieving results and that priorities can lead 
to a desired end state.  The SMEs from both Maryland and the NCR agreed that 
prioritized goals should be developed from base line capabilities gap analysis with threat 
as a critical part of the equation.  Most state homeland security strategies cover periods of 
three or more years.  Terrorist tactics and threats to communities can change quicker than 
that.  The research suggested that states should develop a capacity to change the direction 
of their state homeland security strategy along with it the prioritization and funding 
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influence they carry.  The research suggested that prioritization brings with it funding.  
Over half of the SMEs interviewed made statements confirming this.  Many of the SMEs 
identified funding as the most important determinant whether there will be progress made 
on a strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives.  An important issue discussed by the 
SMEs was whether a state homeland security strategy should guide more than just the 
distribution of DHS grant funding.  Three of the SMEs interviewed for this chapter 
agreed.  One method to accomplish this would be to require all domestic security related 
funding sources to use a singular statewide capability assessment and gap analysis.  
Currently, the different funding sources utilize their own assessments of needs and set 
their own priorities.  Having a single needs analysis could enable and encourage each 
grant source to focus its unique resources on the parts of the single gap analysis where it 
has jurisdiction and expertise.   
Florida is included in the 83 percent of the reviewed states that do not take 
advantage of the power of prioritization.  It is recommended that Florida develop and 
implement a prioritization method in their future state homeland security strategies.  In 
order to understand the proposed implementation plans listed below, the reader will need 
to understand the way Florida is structured for guidance over its domestic security efforts 
and funding.  Florida’s Domestic Security Oversight Council (DSOC) is statutorily 
empowered to oversee all matters related to domestic security in the state.  The DSOC is 
an executive policy advisory group, which is comprised of heads of state agencies that 
have a critical role in Florida’s domestic security.  Representatives from Florida’s 
Regional Domestic Security Task Forces (RDSTF) and key members of federal, private 
sectors and professional associations make up the balance of the executive committee.  
The DSOC is served by seven Regional Domestic Security Task Forces (RDSTF) and a 
State Working Group on Domestic Preparedness (SWG).  The SWG has an Executive 
Board that is served by two different groups of subcommittees.  The first is known as 
primary committees.  The second group is known as funding committees.  Collectively, 
all the entities listed above are known as Florida’s Domestic Security Task Force 
(DSTF). 
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The SWG primary committees are staffed by subject matter experts from all 
disciplines and from all regions of the state.  These committees research and recommend 
policies and response protocols for all the specialty teams and programs funded by DHS 
grant funding through the DSTF.  Florida’s primary subcommittees are: 
• Operations and Planning 
• Critical Infrastructure 
• Training and Exercise 
• Logistics and Equipment 
• Campus Safety 
• Interoperability 
The second group of SWG subcommittees are known as funding committees.  
These subcommittees are also staffed by subject matter experts from all regions of the 
state but tend to be discipline specific.  These committees are active during DHS grant 
funding cycles.  These subcommittees are responsible for reviewing DHS funding 
proposals within their area of expertise from state and local agencies.  As expected, there 
are more funding requests then DHS grant funds available.  These subcommittees vote to 
determine which projects are to be selected for funding and to what level of funding.  
Once these subcommittees make their selections, they are brought to the SWG Executive 
Board for review and approval.  The approved projects are then brought to the DSOC for 
final review and approval.  In 2010, Florida had the following funding subcommittees: 
• Agriculture and Environment 
• Community Health 
• Campus Security 
• Medical Surge 
• Emergency Management 
• Fire Rescue 
• Interoperable Communications 
• Law Enforcement Prevention 
• Law Enforcement Response 
• Public Information 
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It is recommended that the SWG primary subcommittees be charged with 
developing initial ideas for priorities for the domestic security efforts of the state.  They 
are operational level SMEs who are already responsible to develop the interdisciplinary 
response protocols for Florida’s domestic security assets.  Each primary subcommittee 
should recommend its own priorities.  Based upon the results of the research, it is 
recommended that Florida prioritize only some of their strategy’s goals, objectives and 
subobjectives.  A total of 10 to 15 priorities should be the maximum.  This would 
intensify the resources available to accomplish the priorities while remaining within a 
manageable amount.  The priorities would best be based upon capability assessment gap 
analysis related to the federal 37 TCL list.  Once draft priorities are prepared, the primary 
subcommittees should have a joint session with the SWG Executive Committee to select 
the statewide priorities.  The selected priorities could then be reviewed and approved by 
the DSOC.  Another issue raised in the research is the flexibility for priorities to be 
changed in response to changing terrorist threats.  The SMEs serving on the SWG 
primary subcommittees will likely be the first to recognize the need to change and adapt 
to new threats.  Florida will need to insure that the changing needs and challenges 
identified by operational SMEs are clearly shared with the DSOC.  The DSOC should 
remain sensitive to the unique position of operational SMEs and heed their call for rapid 
change.   
To implement the priorities, Florida could use a similar system that has been 
effective for DHS.  Florida could determine a percentage of its DHS funding must be 
spent toward prioritized goals, objectives and subobjectives of their homeland security 
strategy.  All DHS grant proposals must be approved by the SWG funding committees.  
The funding committees could be required to spend a designated percentage of their 
allotted funding toward Florida’s prioritized items.   
The research determined that it would be more effective if Florida’s state 
homeland security strategy priorities guided more than just the distribution of DHS grant 
funding.  Resources, such as CDC, HHS, education, transportation, sea port, general 
revenue and other resources can be useful in making progress toward the priorities of 
Florida’s homeland security strategy.  In his article, The Fall and Rise of Strategic 
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Planning, Henry Mintzberg tells his readers that strategic plans are used so that everyone 
pulls in the same direction.  There is a serious flaw in the SWG funding committees used 
in Florida.  They have no oversight over Florida’s five UASI funding entities.  While 
Florida received $33,011,575 in 2010 State Homeland Security Program funding, the five 
UASIs in Florida will received a total of $35,367,406 in funding (DHS, 2009, pp. 13, 15) 
and each UASI city applies funding based on its own priorities.  Therefore, the SWG 
funding committees have oversight over less than half the DHS funding coming to 
Florida.  In addition, the funding committees have no oversight over hundreds of millions 
of dollars in domestic security related federal grants available to the state such as Health 
and Human Services, Center for Disease Control, Department of Education, Emergency 
Management Performance Grants, Metropolitan Medical Response System, Interoperable 
Emergency Communications Grant Program, Driver’s License Security Grant Program 
and the Port Security Grant Program to name a few.  Florida could leverage the 
coordination and prioritization power of this funding by requiring state agencies that 
receive such grants to also gain approval for grant proposals through the funding 
committees.  These agencies would logically need to have representative voting powers 
on the funding committees.  To support this methodology, it is also recommended that 
Florida develop a singular statewide capability assessment and gap analysis.  Currently, 
the different funding sources utilize their own assessments of needs and set their own 
priorities.  Having a single needs analysis could enable and encourage each grant source 
to focus its unique resources on the parts of the single gap analysis where it has 
jurisdiction and expertise.  The issues raised here could be corrected if the DSOC would 
bring the matter before the Florida legislature and ask for amendments to the Florida 
State Statute that gives authority to the DSOC. 
This chapter has concentrated on prioritizing goals, objectives and subobjectives.  
Once priorities have been identified, they will need to be implemented.  The following 
chapter will discuss the assignment of goals, objectives and subobjectives. 
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IV. ASSIGNMENT OF GOALS, OBJECTIVES OR 
SUBOBJECTIVES IN STRATEGIC PLANS 
“I must do something" 
always solves more problems than 
“Something must be done.” 
Author Unknown 
The hypothesis of this research project theorizes that assignment of Florida’s state 
homeland security strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives to a person or entity 
would be more effective in accomplishing them.  A summary of the literature suggests 
that the homeland security discipline involves a large number of players and their roles 
and responsibilities must be clarified.  Someone has to be given the responsibility and 
authority to accomplish goals and objectives.  Assignment of accountability and 
responsibility for strategic plan objectives empowers the team and results in a high 
probability the objective will be accomplished.  Once the findings from the literature 
were identified, they were used as a guide to review thirty-five state homeland security 
strategies to find the ones that appear to utilize those best practices.  The identified state 
strategies were reviewed to determine the methodology used in the assignment of their 
goals, objectives or subobjectives.   
In an effort to establish additional data for evaluation, interviews were conducted 
with a subject matter expert (SME) from the agency that helped to create the selected 
strategies and one from an agency responsible for implementing part of them.  The SMEs 
were asked their opinion on how effective their state’s methodology of assignment of 
goals, objectives or subobjectives has been toward accomplishing them. SMEs 
interviewed for other chapters in this research at times made statements related to 
assignment.  These comments will be included in this chapter as supporting evidence.  To 
encourage answers that reflect reality without the fear of repercussion each SME was 
assured complete confidentiality in this research.  Therefore, the statements made by 
moved a line of text to next page SMEs will be written to prevent attribution.  The data 
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from these two phases of the research will be analyzed and the findings will be 
considered for suggested use by Florida in its future homeland security strategies. 
A. REVIEW OF STATE STRATEGIES 
The first data collection in this phase of the research involved a review of existing 
state homeland security strategies for evidence of assignment of responsibility for 
completion of their goal, objectives or subobjectives.  Thirty five state homeland security 
strategies were reviewed for this research project (see Table 1).  It was determined that 
eight or nearly 23 percent of the strategies reviewed assigned responsibility for some 
portion of their goals, objectives or subobjectives.  Based upon this criterion, these eight 
state homeland security strategies were selected for review.  Upon review, the strategies 
seem to fit into two categories: those that assigned responsibility for goals and objectives 
to entities of the state government and those strategies that assigned responsibility for 
goals and objectives in part to multiagency committees.  A discussion of each category 
follows. 
1. Strategies That Assign Goals, Objectives or Subobjectives to State 
Entities   
California has a 100-page strategy, State of California Homeland Security 
Strategy 2008.  The strategy uses goals and objectives and links them to divisions of the 
Governor’s Office of Homeland Security, which are to serve in a supporting role toward 
completing the goals and objectives (California Governor's Office of Homeland Security, 
2008, pp. 18, 26, 34, 44, 52, 57, 62, 67, 70, 72, 76 ).  The Iowa Strategy for Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management has five goals supported by objectives and 
implementation steps (Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division, 
2009).  In Annex B of the Iowa Strategy, each objective is assigned a state agency to be 
responsible for it.  The State of Colorado Homeland Security Strategy 2008–2013 
((Governor's Office of Homeland Security, 2008) established five goals, and each goal is 
assigned a goal champion.  The goal champion is a public agency of the state.  The goal 
champion then establishes objectives and assigns a goal leader for each.  Like the 
champion, the goal leader is from a state agency. The Kansas State Homeland Security 
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Strategy Goals and Objectives (Kansas Division of Emergency Management, 2009) is a 
22-page document that lists six goals that are supported by objectives and implementation 
strategies.  All of the implementation strategies related to the first three goals list the 
agency responsible for completing it.  These agencies are almost entirely state agencies.  
As the strategy gets into the remaining three goals, the implementation strategies do not 
identify a responsible agency very often.  In their State of Wisconsin Homeland Security 
Strategy (Wisconsin Homeland Security Council, 2009), the authoring council identifies 
nine specified priorities as the core of the strategy.  Each of the nine priorities is assigned 
a lead state agency called a champion.  The priorities appear in the goals and objectives 
section of the strategy and are broken down further into goals and subgoals.  Each goal is 
assigned a state agency to serve as the goal champion to ensure progress toward them.   
2. Strategies That Assign Goals, Objectives or Subobjectives in Part to 
Multiagency Committees   
The NCR strategic plan is a regional plan; however, as described in more detail in 
Chapter II, the NCR is similar enough to states for the purpose of this research based on 
governmental structure and the population of the region.  The National Capital Region 
Homeland Security Strategic Plan Volume II: Appendices (National Capital Region 
Homeland Security Partners, 2009) explains how its strategy is comprised of four goals 
and 12 associated objectives.  Thirty initiatives were developed as action steps toward 
completion of the objectives.  The Strategy provides a great amount of detail for each 
initiative.  One of the details provided is the identification of the initiative lead.  The 
strategy states the initiative leads are responsible for the definition, development and 
enhancement of the initiatives.  The leads will be held accountable to the National Capital 
Region leadership for the successful and timely completion of the initiative (National 
Capital Region Homeland Security Partners, 2009, p. A15).  The initiative lead consists 
of a variety of entities that are part of the NCR structure.  These include the NCR 
Homeland Security Grants and Program Management Office, regional emergency support 
function committees, regional program working groups and the Emergency Preparedness 
Council.  Most of these entities are comprised of city, county and state subject matter 
experts serving on these regional groups.  In the Delaware Strategy for Homeland 
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Security, the authors list their goals and objectives (Department of Safety and Homeland 
Security, 2004).  Each goal is assigned a team manager who is assigned to lead the efforts 
of stakeholders along a timeline provided with its objectives.  The team managers are 
state agencies or organizations.  The objectives are handled slightly different as they are 
assigned to a response discipline instead of a specific agency (Department of Safety and 
Homeland Security, 2004, p. 23).  The Washington Statewide Homeland Security 
Strategic Plan 2006–2011 (Washington Emergency Management Division, 2006) lists 
goals, objectives and implementation steps.  The objectives are assigned a state level 
government agency or formal committee to guide in the completion of its implementation 
steps.   
3. Analysis 
This review of thirty-five state homeland security strategies revealed the majority 
of states (77 percent) do not assign goals, objectives or subobjectives to someone.  Those 
that did, assigned the responsibility to a state government entity, a multiagency group or 
some combination of the two.  This low use of assignment contrasts with the suggested 
benefits found in the literature.  David M. Walker, the Comptroller General of the United 
States in his report Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation's Efforts 
(2001) commented that homeland security involves a large number of organizations that 
must have clearly articulated roles, responsibilities and accountability.  He stated that 
clarifying those roles will be a critical function.  An interesting point made by Walker 
was that the federal government would need to reach consensus with lower levels of 
government and the private sector on their roles since the federal government does not 
control them.   
Similarly, in its report Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected 
Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism the U.S. General Accounting 
Office pointed out the importance of identifying specific processes for coordination and 
collaboration between sectors and organizations and address how any conflicts would be 
resolved (2004).  These two issues are also found in state homeland security strategies 
since the state often does not have the authority to control local response agencies, 
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especially in home rule states.  The technique of assigning goals, objectives or 
subobjectives to multiagency committees found in this review provides a workable 
method to facilitate coordination across agencies and levels of government, as well as 
encouraging local agency buy in on accomplishing assigned goals, objectives or 
subobjectives.  The majority of the thirty-five reviewed homeland security strategies fail 
to take advantage of the power of assignment.   
In his book, Implementing your Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” Into 
Effective Action for Sustainable Change, C. Davis Fogg argues that strategic plan 
objectives are usually met when they are assigned to employees that are held accountable 
for achieving them.  Organizations that hold their people accountable achieve 
approximately 85 percent of their strategic objectives (Fogg, 1999, p. 57).  Fogg added 
that having measurable objectives and accountability are the best predictors of a plan’s 
success.  The assignment of goals, objectives or subobjectives to state agencies was the 
most prevalent methodology found since five of the strategies solely use this technique 
and two others use it partially.  State agencies have authority or influence that can be 
used to direct the implementation of a statewide strategy.   
Just because a strategy exists and assigns responsibility for an objective does not 
necessarily mean that it is practiced in reality.  Questions arise, such as is the strategy 
actually used?  Does assignment produce results?  Does assignment come with authority?  
Does assignment create an environment for interdisciplinary and inter agency 
cooperation?  These questions can not be answered by merely reading the strategies but 
are better answered by those tasked with implementing the strategies. 
B. SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS 
The second data collection in this phase of the research was to speak to subject 
matter experts (SMEs) related to two of the state homeland security strategies reviewed 
above.  There were a total of 12 SMEs interviewed for this entire research project.  The 
SMEs held positions in a number of disciplines such as governor’s staff, police, fire 
services, health departments and emergency management.  They represented state, county  
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and city entities and averaged 19.75 years of experience in professional domestic security 
related disciplines.  The SMEs opinions serve as evidence toward the findings of this 
research.   
The state homeland security strategies above were divided into two categories.  
One from each will be selected for further research with SMEs related to it.  The first 
category was comprised of strategies that assign goals, objective and subobjectives to 
state entities.  The choice for further review from this category was the State of Colorado 
Homeland Security Strategy 2008–2013 (Governor's Office of Homeland Security, 2008).  
This strategy was chosen because it assigns responsibility for both its goals and its 
objectives to state agencies called goal champions and goal leaders, respectively.  The 
second category contained strategies that assigned goals, objectives or subobjectives at 
least in part to multi agency committees.  The National Capital Region Homeland 
Security Strategic Plan Volume II: Appendices was chosen from this category because it 
assigns responsibility for the initiatives almost entirely to regional committees or work 
groups.  Two SMEs related to each chosen strategy were interviewed.  They were 
assigned the confidential names of Subject Matter Expert 5, 6, 7 and 8.  Two were from 
an agency that had a part in the creation of one of the state homeland security strategies 
while two were from an agency that has responsibility to implement part of the strategies.  
Choosing SMEs with these different points of view related to their strategy should 
provide more balance data. 
1. Strategies That Assign Goals, Objectives or Subobjectives to State 
Entities 
a. State of Colorado Homeland Security Strategy 2008–2013 
SME 5 and 6 provided a general overview of how the State of Colorado 
Homeland Security Strategy 2008–2013 assigned responsibility for goals and objectives.  
The Governor’s Office of Homeland Security (OHS) was responsible for creating the 
strategy.  The OHS assigned state executive or Governor’s cabinet members to serve as 
goal champions for the strategy’s five goals.  The goal champions then developed 
objectives and chose department head level staff to serve as goal leaders.  The goal 
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leaders were expected to lead the progress toward accomplishment of their assigned 
objectives.  One SME suggested that local agencies do not want the state directing their 
actions and state agencies felt a dominant state role caused relationship issues for them 
with local agencies.  These concerns were defused by the use of capability working 
groups.  A capability working group was formed for each of the federal 37 TCL 
capabilities with one of the state goal leaders assigned to lead it.  Colorado is divided into 
nine regions and each send representatives to serve on the various capability working 
groups.  They bring their regional needs and point of view to the statewide discussions.  
The goal leaders use the capability working groups to gain consensus amongst the 
various jurisdiction and disciplines that have an interest in the TCL covered by the group.  
The goal leader remains accountable to the goal champion for the progress of the 
objectives assigned to him.   
The review of state strategies above raised the question whether the 
assignment of goals, objectives or subobjectives actually produced results.  The SMEs 
both agreed that assignment brings with it accountability.  It focuses attention on the 
important issues.  People with responsibilities in homeland security often have other job 
responsibilities.  Assigning a task to people keeps it in the forefront of their efforts and 
prevents it becoming lost amongst other responsibilities.  Twice a year the Governor’s 
OHS asks for an update from the goal champions.  The report has two parts.  First, a 
report on the local regions’ progress and second the state agencies report on their 
progress.  SME 5 believed one can look at where the state directed its resources of 
funding and personnel and expect to see progress in those TCL categories.  While these 
reports will show progress toward the 37 TCL identified gaps, the SMEs caution that 
progress reports do not identify what caused results to be accomplished.  They believe 
results are a factor of many variables and not just assignment.  There also exists a Senior 
Advisory Committee that approves all funding projects related to DHS funding.  This 
group holds the goal champions accountable for their assigned goals and objectives.  The 
review of each goal champion team’s efforts is conducted by the governor in the presence 
of the other goal champions.  A goal champion does not want to be embarrassed that his 
goal leaders failed to make the progress expected.  To date, the governor has not needed 
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to intercede and encourage a goal champion to get something moving.  The peer pressure 
has been successful in producing progress.  But, funding is a key issue taken into 
consideration.  If an objective is not funded or staffed, then the goal champion or leader is 
not expected to get it done.   
SME 5 believed that assigning a goal or objective brings accountability 
that will help to move toward accomplishment.  The act of assigning assures the task will 
remain on someone’s list of things to do.  But, accountability alone is not enough.  SME 
5 believes prioritization is more important, since it brings with it funding.  SME 6 posited 
progress depends mostly upon whether the locals receive DHS grant funding for a 
project.  While assignment of goals, objectives or subobjectives is useful in combination 
with funding, it alone will not produce results.  For optimum progress, the SMEs agreed 
that a combination of prioritization, funding and accountability is best.   
Another consideration raised during the review of the state strategies was 
if authority came with assignment.  Both SME raised the issue of Colorado being a home 
rule state.  The goal champions and leaders have no direct authority over the local 
agencies in implementing the strategy.  The SMEs agree that local agencies do not want 
to be recognized as not getting the work done.  The SMEs believed the local agencies 
strived to implement the strategy but only to the point it was funded.  Also, both SMEs 
believe interdisciplinary and interagency relationships are strengthened by assigning 
responsibilities for goals, objectives or subobjectives.  The capability working groups, 
lead by the goal leaders, bring subject matter experts from many agencies and disciplines 
together to work on a wide variety of issues.  In the course of daily work, people are too 
busy to go out and interact with other disciplines and agencies.  The assignment function 
forces the assignee to get involved with others and that results in relationships that 
transcend into daily work.   
SME 5 believed that a state homeland security strategy can not be very 
effective if it does not assign its goals, objectives or subobjectives.  SME 6 felt that other 
factors, such as prioritization, funding, and federal guidelines play important roles too.  
Both SMEs believed progress was being made on goals, objectives or subobjectives that 
had been assigned in their strategy.  When asked if progress made toward goals, 
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objectives or subobjectives was in large part due to the fact that it had been assigned the 
SME rating differed, but their reasoning was similar.  SME 5 rated this high but qualified 
the answer by stating that funding was important too.  SME 6’s answer was neutral but 
qualified by stating prioritizing a goal is what makes things happen stating it is more 
important than assignment.  Both SMEs strongly felt that state homeland security 
strategies should use assignment methodologies. 
b. Analysis 
The SMEs agreed that assigning Colorado’s state strategy goals to goal 
champions and its objectives to goal leaders was effective in moving them toward 
completion.  One SME suggests assigning tasks to people keeps it in the forefront of their 
efforts and prevents it becoming lost amongst other their responsibilities.  The SMEs 
point out the most important benefit of assignment came in the form of accountability.  
This is supported by the literature.  In his testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, David M. Walker, then Comptroller General of the United States 
presented his report Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation's 
Efforts (Walker, 2001).  In it, Walker commented that homeland security organizations 
that must have accountability.  In a March 2001 appearance before a U.S. House 
Committee, Raymond J. Decker, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management of 
the U.S. Government Accountability Office, stated that key aspects of a national strategy 
should include roles and missions of federal, state, and local entities (GAO, 2001, p. 2).  
In his book Implementing your Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” Into Effective Action 
for Sustainable Change, C. Davis Fogg’s first key to strategic implementation is to 
develop an accountability system.  He argues that strategic plan objectives are usually 
met when they are assigned to employees that are held accountable for achieving them.  
Organizations that hold their people accountable achieve approximately 85 percent of 
their strategic objectives (Fogg, 1999, p. 57).  Fogg adds having measurable objectives 
and accountability are the best predictors of a plan’s success.   
Another issue of importance discussed by the SMEs was the amount of 
authority that comes with the assignment of a goals, objectives or subobjectives.  In 
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Homeland Security Presidential Directive #1 Directive on Organization and Operation of 
the Homeland Security Council (White House, 2001) then President Bush, recognizing 
the extensive coordination needed across a broad spectrum of federal, state and local 
agencies related to prevention of terrorist attacks, directed the Homeland Security 
Council to ensure coordination of all homeland security related activities amongst 
executive departments.  He gave the responsibility and through the Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive the authority to one agency.  Colorado, like Florida, is a home rule 
state.  Colorado’s state goal champion and goal leaders do not have any authority to tell 
local jurisdictions what to do.  One SME suggests this short coming is mitigated by two 
factors.  First, for the purpose of obtaining DHS grants funding state homeland security 
strategies tend to mirror DHS grant guidance requirements.  The local agencies will 
insure they follow DHS grant guidance rules such as assessing capabilities and 
addressing gaps related to the federal 37 TCLs.  The locals will comply because they 
want to remain eligible for grant funding.  Second, local agencies do not want to be seen 
as not accomplishing goals.  In the article Goal Setting and Performance Management in 
the Public Sector (Latham et al., 2008), the authors suggest most people given ability and 
commitment, regardless of praise, competition and monetary incentives, react to a higher 
goal with higher performance.  Specific goals keep focus on what is to be accomplished 
and leads to persistence until the goal is attained.   
The progress reports made by the goal leaders and goal champions showed 
evidence of progress toward the goals, objectives or subobjectives of Colorado’s strategy.  
Both SMEs agree that this evidence could be misleading when assessing the reason for 
the success.  The reports do not tell what lead to those results.  Many factors, such as 
funding, prioritization, staffing, DHS grant guidance, committee direction and 
assignment contributed to the success.  Each SME believed that assignment is a factor in 
the equation leading to results especially in its ability to place accountability.  As Fogg 
argued above, organizations that hold their people accountable achieve approximately 85 
percent of their strategic objectives.  Both SMEs strongly felt that state homeland security 
strategies should assign their goals, objectives or subobjectives to someone.  The SMEs 
stressed the importance that assignment must include accountability.  Goal leaders and 
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goal champions should report their progress on a regular basis.  Without accountability 
assignment has no value.  For optimum progress, the SMEs agreed that a combination of 
prioritization, funding and accountability is best.   
One of the SMEs commented that Colorado is geographically and 
culturally diverse.  Florida is the same.  Florida has densely populated areas south and 
mid-state with very rural areas surrounding them.  Most Floridians are not native but are 
foreign immigrants or transplanted from another state.  State agency person are exposed 
to the variations of capabilities and needs throughout the state while a local agency SME 
view can be myopic.  Assigning goals and objectives to state agency personnel appears 
effective and logical, so long as accountability comes with the assignment.  State agency 
personnel have jurisdiction and an understanding of the diversity found throughout their 
state.  They can encourage local agency and multidiscipline contribution and buy in for 
projects that result in accomplishment of assigned objectives.  As the SMEs suggest, the 
capability of a state agency goal leader can be enhanced by joining together with a 
capability working group that brings the innovation, experience and buy in from local 
agencies throughout the state. 
2. Strategies That Assign Goals, Objectives or Subobjectives in Part to 
Multiagency Committees 
a. National Capital Region Homeland Security Strategic Plan 
Volume II: Appendices 
SME 7 and 8 provided a general overview of how the National Capital 
Region Homeland Security Strategic Plan Volume II: Appendices assigned responsibility 
for its initiatives.  The NCR strategy was formed under the guidance of the Chief 
Administrative Officers Homeland Security Executive Committee (HSEC) that serves 
chief executives from Maryland, Virginia and D.C. and the Senior Policy Group that is 
made up of leaders that represent agencies from within the NCR.  Supporting these 
leadership groups are Council of Governments (COG) working groups that represent 
police, fire and other disciplines.  The process to develop the strategy involved a region 
wide risk assessment and a gap analysis.  This process developed insight into what was 
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needed to make NCR resilient against a terrorist attack.  Once the needs were identified, 
the COG working groups came up with initiatives to fill those needs.  When determining 
who would be the lead for an initiative, they logically went back to the working group 
that developed it, since they were the experts in that field.   
The review of the state strategies described above raised the question 
whether the assignment of goals, objectives or subobjectives produced results.  One SME 
sees the NCR strategy as essentially a document that was not used.  The strategy was 
written by the HSEC and the Senior Policy Group, intending it lean toward prevention.  
That viewpoint was from top down.  The funding projects are submitted by local agencies 
that view the world from the bottom up.  They are trying to meet their response and 
preparedness needs during difficult budget years and that is the focus of their grant 
submissions.  Both SMEs agreed that most of the strategy does not cover the things that 
police and fire do on a day-to-day basis, but that has been where the investment of DHS 
grant dollars has been.  By approving the DHS grant submissions of the local agencies, 
one SME suggested the NCR leadership were deploying funds outside of the guidance of 
its own strategy.  There has been progress, but only on the items being funded, not 
necessarily in the initiatives of the strategy.  There has not been a great amount of buy in 
to the strategy from the lower level leaders.  In this case, the assignment of the initiatives 
did not produce results. 
The review of the state strategies also raised the issue of authority and if it 
came with assignment.  One SME felt that that the regional work groups hold no power.  
They can not force agencies across state, county and city boundaries to comply with the 
work group’s guidance.  The assignment of initiative leads in the NCR strategy document 
failed to produce results because the power base remains in the local agencies who utilize 
grant funding to fill their local needs first.  The strategy can not compete with the 
political landscape of the region.  Tax revenue is down and citizen expectations for 
services are up.  So the local agencies are using DHS funds to support their needs, which 
tend to be in the area of response and preparedness.  Prevention initiatives, like those in 
the strategy, suffer because of that concentration. 
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The SMEs disagreed whether or not interdisciplinary and interagency 
relationships are strengthened by assigning responsibilities for goals, objectives or 
subobjectives.  One believed the NCR still wrestles with stove pipes across the 
disciplines reflected by health, police and fire—all having their own needs and interests.  
The other SME pointed out that the COG working groups that developed the initiatives 
were already staffed by cross discipline and multi agency personnel.  The assignment of 
the initiatives to these work groups results in good coordination across the disciplines and 
agencies; however, this same SME agreed that this cooperation cannot compete with the 
interests at the local level agencies. 
Both SMEs believed that a state homeland security strategy cannot be very 
effective if it does not assign its goals, objectives or subobjectives.  One SME believed 
progress was not really being made on initiatives that had been assigned in their strategy 
while the other believed that their success was due in part due to the fact that they had 
been assigned.  One SME stressed the importance of regular progress reports and 
accountability to make assignment effective.  Both SMEs strongly felt that state 
homeland security strategies should use assignment methodologies. 
b. Analysis 
The idea of assigning responsibility for the completion of the NCR 
initiatives to multiagency and multidiscipline COG working groups makes sense except 
for the disconnect in authority to oversee the initiatives.  The SMEs point out that COG 
working groups are made up of subject matter experts that have expertise in their 
discipline and firsthand knowledge of the needs of their local communities throughout the 
region.  They bring those assets to the working groups that develop initiatives to the 
benefit of the entire region.  The working group members have the opportunity to have 
their ideas considered by the rest of the region which encourages buy in on the initiatives 
that finally get recommended by the committee.  In his testimony before the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, David M. Walker, then Comptroller General of the 
United States presented his report Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the 
Nation's Efforts (Walker, 2001) in which he commented that homeland security involves 
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a large number of organizations.  He went on to suggest that since the federal government 
does not have direct authority over state, local and private entities, then the use of 
consensus would be helpful in coordinating the actions of those various levels of entities.  
In its report titled Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in 
National Strategies Related to Terrorism (GAO, 2004), the U.S. General Accounting 
Office discussed coordination as one of their six desirable characteristics for a strategy 
document.  This GAO report is still used as the government standard for the desirable 
components of a government strategy.  In this report, the GAO suggested that strategies 
should identify specific processes for coordination and collaboration between sectors and 
organizations and address how any conflicts would be resolved (U.S. General Accounting 
Office, 2004, p. 22).  The NCR faces similar coordination issues as the federal 
government.  The use of the COG working groups provide an excellent platform to 
coordinate across jurisdictions, agencies and disciplines as suggested by the SMEs and in 
the literature.   
The SMEs felt that authority needs to come with assignment.  In 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive #1 Directive on Organization and Operation of 
the Homeland Security Council (White House, 2001) then President Bush, recognizing 
the extensive coordination needed across a broad spectrum of federal, state and local 
agencies related to prevention of terrorist attacks, directed the Homeland Security 
Council to ensure coordination of all homeland security related activities amongst 
executive departments.  He gave the responsibility and through the HSPD, the authority 
to one agency.  The COG working groups would be idea to serve in such a lead 
coordinating role.  The assignment of responsibility for the initiatives in this case failed, 
because as pointed out by the SMEs, the working groups have no direct authority over the 
local agencies of the region.  However, if the working groups were given actual authority 
over the local agencies ability to submit grant applications to DHS then they would be in 
a position to leverage consensus.  This concept is partially in use in Florida and will be 
further explored  in the chapter summary. 
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Both SMEs felt strongly that a state homeland security strategy should 
assign its goals, objectives or subobjectives and believed it could not be very effective if 
it did not; however, they each stressed the importance that assignment must include 
accountability.  SME 7 stated a strategy should be specific about who should be 
accountable and that person should be required to make regular progress reports.  This is 
supported by the literature.  In his testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, David M. Walker, then Comptroller General of the United States, 
presented his report Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation's 
Efforts (Walker, 2001).  In it Walker commented that homeland security organizations 
must have accountability.  In a March 2001 appearance before a U.S. House Committee, 
Raymond J. Decker, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management of the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office stated that key aspects of a national strategy should 
include roles and missions of federal, state, and local entities (GAO, 2001, p. 2).  In his 
book Implementing your Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” Into Effective Action for 
Sustainable Change, C. Davis Fogg’s first key to strategic implementation is to develop 
an accountability system (1999).  He argues that strategic plan objectives are usually met 
when they are assigned to employees that are held accountable for achieving them.  
Organizations that hold their people accountable achieve approximately 85 percent of 
their strategic objectives (Fogg, 1999, p. 57).  Fogg adds having measurable objectives 
and accountability are the best predictors of a plan’s success.   
The literature and SMEs agree that assignment of a strategy’s goals, 
objectives or subobjectives is a best practice.  It failed in this case because of the lack of 
authority given to the COG working groups.  The SMEs stated that assignment is only 
one of many factors that produce results in the pursuit of goals, objectives or 
subobjectives.  Additional factors of authority, funding and priority are important too.  
Assignment brings with it accountability, which according to Fogg, produces results.   
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND APPLICATION TO FLORIDA 
The data found in this phase of the research supports the hypothesis that 
assignment of goals, objectives or subobjectives will contribute to the effectiveness of the 
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state strategy to accomplish them.  The literature and SMEs strongly support assignment 
and the accountability it brings.  The review of state strategies showed that only 23 
percent of thirty-five reviewed strategies used some form of assignment of their goals, 
objectives or subobjectives.  State homeland strategies are still in a developmental phase 
and will likely follow national guidance such as the U.S. General Accounting Office 
report Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National 
Strategies Related to Terrorism (2004) that promotes assignment as one of the six 
desirable characteristics of a strategy and strategies like the National Strategy for 
Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan (U.S. Homeland Security Council, 2006) that 
lists by name federal agencies and assigned them responsibility for parts of the strategy 
implementation plan.  The SMEs all agreed that assignment is a factor in the equation 
leading to results.  While the weight assignment should have in the equation can be 
debated, it remains a factor that needs to be present.   
The most important benefit of assignment comes in the form of accountability.  
This is supported by the literature and the SMEs.  In his testimony before the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, David M. Walker, the Comptroller General of the 
United States, commented that homeland security organizations that must have 
accountability (Walker, 2001).  The U.S. General Accounting Office in its report 
Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies 
Related to Terrorism stated a strategy would ideally clarify the relationship between 
implementing organizations in terms of leading, supporting, and partnering and could 
describe the organizations that will provide the overall framework for accountability and 
oversight (2004, p. 24).  In his book, C. Davis Fogg’s first key to strategic 
implementation is to develop an accountability system (1999).  He argues that strategic 
plan objectives are usually met when they are assigned to employees that are held 
accountable for achieving them.  Organizations that hold their people accountable 
achieve approximately 85 percent of their strategic objectives (Fogg, 1999, p. 57).  Fogg 
adds that having measurable objectives and accountability are the best predictors of a 
plan’s success.  SME 5 and 6 each believe that assignment is a factor in the equation 
leading to results related to goals, objectives or subobjectives, especially in its ability to 
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place accountability.  SME 7 and 8 each stressed that assignment must include 
accountability.  SME 7 offered that accountability must include reporting progress on a 
regular basis, at least biannually, for it to be effective.  SME 12, from Washington and 
who was interviewed regarding the use of metrics, also spoke of the importance of 
accountability.  SME 12 felt that progress made should be compared quarterly to the 
metrics in place and the results reported to someone in charge of making progress on the 
strategy’s goals, objectives and subobjectives.  If the metric is not being met, then that is 
a good time to reevaluate the objective.  Someone needs to be placed in charge of each 
objective and subobjective.   
Another requirement for assignment to be effective is that it be accompanied by 
authority.  All the SMEs felt that authority needs to come with assignment.  In Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive #1 then President Bush, recognizing the extensive 
coordination needed across a broad spectrum of federal, state and local agencies related 
to prevention of terrorist attacks, directed that a single agency ensure coordination of all 
homeland security related activities amongst executive departments.  He gave the 
responsibility and through the HSPD the authority to one agency.  Similarly Florida, 
Colorado and the NCR all face the same issue.  They have no direct authority over the 
local agencies who are the main DHS grant recipients.  Government committees and task 
forces have long dealt with the lack of authority over their member agencies.  Consensus 
plays a role in every successful multi agency endeavor.  David M. Walker, former 
Comptroller General of the United States, presented a report to the U.S. Senate in which 
he commented that since the federal government does not have direct authority over state, 
local and private entities, then the use of consensus would be helpful in coordinating their 
actions (Walker, 2001, p. 6).  The U.S. General Accounting Office suggested that 
strategies should identify specific processes for coordination and collaboration between 
sectors and organizations and address how any conflicts would be resolved.  The 
literature suggests that strategies need to encourage cooperation across jurisdictions and 
disciplines.  Progress will depend upon consensus. 
Interestingly, Colorado and the NCR both used multiagency work groups in their 
formula for assigning goals, objectives or subobjectives.  While Colorado’s strategy did 
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not directly mention their capability working groups, in reality the goal leaders were 
embedded in those working groups to further their assigned missions.  SME 11 and 
SME12 (both from Washington State and interviewed regarding the use of metrics in a 
strategy), stated that Washington has also begun to rely on the strength of multiagency 
work groups.  They have established a work group for each of the 37 TCLs.  These 
groups are conducting assessment and gap analysis for their assigned TCL.  They are 
building a better understanding of the capabilities in their state and beginning to provide 
guidance toward what they need to do to close gaps.  Those assigned to make progress 
for goals, objectives or subobjectives in Colorado and the NCR both faced problems with 
having the authority to so.  This short coming was mitigated by two factors.  First, for the 
purpose of obtaining DHS grants funding state homeland security strategies tend to 
mirror DHS grant guidance requirements.  The local agencies will insure they follow 
DHS grant guidance.  The locals will comply because they want to remain eligible for 
grant funding.  Second, local agencies do not want to be seen as not accomplishing goals.  
In the article Goal Setting and Performance Management in the Public Sector (Lathamet 
al., 2008), the authors suggest most people given ability and commitment, regardless of 
praise, competition and monetary incentives, react to a higher goal with higher 
performance.  Specific goals keep focus on what is to be accomplished and leads to 
persistence until the goal is attained (Lathamet al., 2008, p. 386).   
A review of thirty-five state strategies showed that only 23 percent used some 
form of assignment of their goals, objectives or subobjectives.  Florida would benefit by 
adopting the use of assignment as recommended in the research.  The research showed 
assignment of goals, objectives or subobjectives will contribute to the effectiveness of the 
state strategy to accomplish them.  In order to understand the proposed implementation 
plans listed below, the reader will need to understand the way Florida is structured for 
guidance over its domestic security efforts and funding.  This process is described in 
detail in the chapter summary section of Chapter III and will only be summarized here.   
Florida’s Domestic Security Oversight Council (DSOC) is statutorily empowered 
to oversee all matters related to domestic security in the state.  The DSOC is served by a 
State Working Group on Domestic Preparedness (SWG).  The SWG has an Executive 
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Board that is served by two different groups of subcommittees.  The first is known as 
primary committees the second as funding committees.  The SWG primary committees 
research and recommend policies and response protocols for all the specialty teams and 
programs funded by DHS grant funding.  The SWG funding committees are responsible 
to review DHS funding proposals within their area of expertise submitted by state and 
local agencies.  They determine which projects are to be selected for funding and to what 
level of funding.   
It is recommended that Florida adopt a hybrid of the two methods of assignment 
studied in this research.  The first was assigning a strategy’s goals, objectives and 
subobjectives to a state agency.  The second assigned them to a multiagency committee.  
The two methods could work well together by taking advantage of each one’s strengths.  
State agency personnel have jurisdiction, an understanding of the diversity throughout 
their state and can encourage local contribution and buy in.  Multiagency committees 
give a voice to local communities, bring the expertise of local SMEs, and can build 
consensus.  As described above, all DHS grant funding requests must be approved by the 
SWG funding committee that oversees the discipline or specialty in which it falls.  These 
funding committees are uniquely situated to exert control over the entire DHS grant 
process.   
As discussed in Chapter III, that control can be used to ensure DHS funds are 
being applied toward priorities established in Florida’s homeland security strategy.  The 
control can also be used to insure accountability that DHS grant recipients are making 
progress toward the goals, objectives and subobjectives of Florida’s strategy.  The 
research has shown that the use of assignment brings accountability and that brings 
results.  It is recommended that Florida assign responsibility for each goal, objective or 
subobjective of its strategy to one of the SWG funding committees.  Since individual 
agency proposals must be approved by the funding committees, they have the authority to 
approve, deny or modify a proposal and its subsequent funding requests.  This enables the 
funding committee to enforce compliance with expectations.  As suggested by the 
research, a Florida state goal leader should be identified and placed as the lead 
chairperson on each funding committee.  This would place the goal leader in a position of 
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authority over local agency grant submission with the tempering of a multi agency 
working group to insure statewide consensus prevails.  As discussed in detail in the 
chapter summary of Chapter III, this recommendation is not without issue.  As also 
described in Chapter III, most of the DHS and other federal funding available to Florida 
for domestic security related issues do not pass through the SWG funding committee for 
approval but this could be changed by the DSOC bringing the matter before the Florida 
Legislature.  
The research suggested that a progress reporting system be established to help the 
SWG funding committees with accountability.  The accurate tracking of projects can 
insure the funding committees have the data, they need to make accurate decisions to 
promote effective progress toward the accomplishment of Florida’s homeland security 
strategy goals, objectives or subobjectives.  This topic and the use of metrics in a strategy 
will be discussed further in the following chapter. 
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V. USE OF METRICS IN STRATEGIC PLANS 
One accurate measurement is 
worth a thousand expert opinions. 
Grace Murray Hopper 
The hypothesis of this research project theorizes that using metrics to clearly 
define what is needed to achieve the goals, objectives or implementation steps of 
Florida’s state homeland security strategy will make the strategy more effective in 
accomplishing them.  A summary of the literature suggests that the objectives or 
subobjectives of a strategic plan should be results driven.  They should establish 
milestones, be measurable in a quantifiable way, and be an action item.  They should 
describe a specific action that can be recognized when completed and done so in a timely 
manner.  If done correctly, goals, objectives and subobjectives can be used to evaluate 
progress, provide oversight, enhance management decisions and above all, achieve 
results.  Once the best practices from the literature were identified, they were used as a 
guide to review thirty-five state homeland security strategies.  State strategies found to 
use metrics were reviewed to determine how they applied metrics to their goals, 
objectives or subobjectives.  In an effort to establish additional data for evaluation, a 
subject matter expert (SME) from the agency that helped to create the selected strategies, 
and one from an agency responsible for implementing part of them, were interviewed.  
The SMEs were asked their opinion on how effective their state’s use of metrics in 
relation to their goals, objectives or subobjectives has been toward accomplishing them. 
SMEs interviewed for other chapters in this research at times made statements related to 
the use of metrics.  These comments will be included in this chapter as supporting 
evidence.  To encourage answers that reflect reality without the fear of repercussion, each 
SME was assured complete confidentiality in this research.  Therefore, the statements 
made by SMEs will be written to prevent attribution.  The data from these two phases of 
the research will be analyzed and the findings will be considered for suggested use by 
Florida in their future homeland security strategies. 
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A. REVIEW OF STATE STRATEGIES 
The first data collection in this phase of the research involved a review of existing 
state homeland security strategies for evidence of the use of metrics that clearly define 
their goals, objectives or subobjectives.  The literature review in Chapter I lead to the 
identification of four desirable characteristics of performance measures to be used in a 
strategy.  These four desirable characteristic were sought during the review of the thirty-
five state homeland security strategies.  The four desirable characteristics of performance 
measures are to: 
• Establish milestones 
• Be measurable in a quantifiable way 
• Be an action item 
• Have an identifiable completed state 
Thirty-five state homeland security strategies were reviewed for this research 
project.  They appear in Table 1 for review.  Thirteen state homeland security strategies 
were found to use at least one of the desirable performance measure criteria.  These 13 
strategies were selected for further review.  Since the review sought evidence of four 
different types of desirable performance measures, a summary table was built to organize 
the findings.  The results are located in Table 3.  In the table, the ratings reflect the type 
of metric commonly found to be used on the goals, objectives or subobjectives.  For 
example, if a strategy had 50 objectives and only a few of them were quantifiable 
objectives, then the rating would reflect that the strategy does not commonly use 
quantifiable objectives.   















Delaware Yes No Yes No 
Georgia Yes No Yes No 
















Kansas Partial No Yes No 
New 
Hampshire 
Yes No No No 
Nevada Yes No Yes No 
South Carolina Yes No Yes No 
Washington Yes No Yes No 
Wisconsin Partial Partial Yes No 
Indiana Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Missouri Yes No Yes  Partial 
Iowa Yes Partial Yes No 
National 
Capital Region 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Upon review, the strategies seemed to fit into two categories.  First, strategies 
whose performance measures were quantifiable or had an identifiable completed state, 
and second, those that did not.  A discussion of each category follows. 
1. Strategies Whose Performance Measures Were Quantifiable or Had 
Identifiable Completed State 
In the State of Wisconsin Homeland Security Strategy (Wisconsin Homeland 
Security Council, 2009), some objectives are assigned completion dates.  A number of 
subobjectives were found to be quantifiable.  The subobjectives were actionable but a 
completed state was not readily evident.  In the Indiana Strategy for Homeland Security 
(Indiana Department of Homeland Security, 2008), it establishes a target completion date 
for each objective.  Each objective has an identifiable measure toward completion.  Many 
of these measures were quantifiable, such as ten courses will be offered, 10 percent of 
facilities designated as critical infrastructure shall have Buffer Zone Protection Plan 
(BZPP) grant consideration or 50 percent of fusion centers will have private sector 
participation.  The objectives were actionable and a completed state could be identified 
for most.  The Iowa Strategy for Homeland Security and Emergency Management has 
five goals supported by objectives and implementation steps (Iowa Homeland Security 
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and Emergency Management Division, 2009).  Most of the implementation steps have a 
completion date in the form of a year.  In Annex B of the Iowa Strategy, each objective is 
associated with performance measures.  These performance measures are quantifiable, 
such as the number of attendees to train, number of exercises held, and percentage of 
impact plans that cover pets.   
In the National Capital Region Homeland Security Strategic Plan Volume II: 
Appendices (National Capital Region Homeland Security Partners, 2009), each goal and 
objective is given a performance measurement many of which are quantifiable.  The 
supporting initiatives are documented in great detail (National Capital Region Homeland 
Security Partners, 2009, p. A15).  Each NCR initiative provides a desired result, which is 
a description of the planned outcome of the initiative.  They provide quantifiable 
measures, such as the number of citizens that have signed up for a county alert system.  
Missouri's Homeland Security Strategy uses goals, objectives and implementation steps.  
Each implementation step is assigned a completion date and given a score indicating its 
progress toward completion.  Missouri was conducting a pilot capability assessment in 
2009 where their capabilities would be rated toward completion (Missouri Department of 
Public Safety, 2008, p. 10).  The grading was based on a scale of 1 to 10 with ten 
representing objective being achieved.  Missouri included these ratings within their 
strategy, so they can quantify their current capacity and allow for measurement of future 
improvements.   
2. Strategies with Performance Measures That Are Not Quantifiable 
Nor Have an Identifiable Completed State 
A number of state strategies provided completion dates for objectives or 
subobjectives and they were written as actionable items.  These strategies include: the 
Delaware Strategy for Homeland Security (Department of Safety and Homeland 
Security, 2004); the State of Georgia’s 2004 State Strategic Plan for Terrorism and All-
Hazards Preparedness (Georgia Office of Homeland Security, 2006); the Idaho 
Homeland Security / Emergency Management Strategy (Idaho Bureau of Homeland 
Security, 2010) and the Washington Statewide Homeland Security Strategic Plan 2006–
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2011 (Washington Emergency Management Division, 2006).  Two state strategies 
provided completion dates for only some of their objectives or subobjectives, and they 
were written as actionable items.  These include the Kansas State Homeland Security 
Strategy Goals and Objectives (Kansas Division of Emergency Management, 2009) and 
South Carolina’s 2003 State Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy (South Carolina 
Law Enforcement Division, 2003).  The New Hampshire Homeland Security Strategy 
(New Hampshire Department of Safety, 2004) was found to set completion dates for each 
of its objectives, but they were generally not actionable items.  In the Nevada State 
Homeland Security Strategy (Nevada Division of Emergency Management, 2010), many 
of the objectives and implementation steps are given completion dates but most of those 
dates were already past. 
3. Analysis 
The review above revealed the majority of states (62.8 percent) did not use 
metrics to further define their goals, objectives or subobjectives.  This is in contrast to the 
benefit of doing so suggested in the literature.  In the article Goal Setting and 
Performance Management in the Public Sector (Latham et al., 2008), the authors discuss 
the goal setting theory of Gary P. Latham and Edwin A. Locke.  The goal setting theory 
states a specific high-level goal will lead to higher performance than an easier goal, a 
general goal or no goal setting.  Given ability and commitment, the higher the goal the 
higher the performance (Latham et al., 2008, p. 386).  Specific goals focus on what is to 
be accomplished and leads to persistence until the goal is attained.  The U.S. General 
Accounting Office presented its report Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected 
Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism to the U.S. Congress in 2004 
in which establish six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy, which as 
described in Chapter II, are still used by the GAO as its standard in the year 2010.  One 
of the six desirable characteristics was to include performance measures in the strategy.  
The GAO felt that measuring performance was important enough that if there were 
limitations on the ability to collect performance data then one of the goals of the strategy 
should be to obtain better data (GAO, 2004, p. 16).  The GAO developed their six 
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desirable characteristics as a standard to review seven national domestic security 
strategies that were issued by the Bush Administration soon after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001.  In its review of the seven national strategies, the GAO found all did 
not identify priorities, milestones or performance measures (GAO, 2004, p. 12).  These 
are elements the GAO considered necessary for evaluating progress, achieving results 
and ensuring oversight (GAO, 2004, p. 12).  The GAO stated a better identification of 
priorities, milestones, and performance measures would aid implementing parties in 
achieving results in specific timeframes—and would enable more effective oversight and 
accountability (GAO, 2004, p. 19).   
In his April 2002 testimony before a U.S. House committee, Randall A. Yim, the 
then Managing Director of National Preparedness for the U.S. General Accounting 
Office, stressed the importance of metrics for goals and objectives.  In his report titled 
National Preparedness, Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Efforts is 
Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland Security (U.S. General 
Accounting Office, 2002), Yim describes measuring results of federal programs as a 
longstanding objective of the Congress.  To further that effort, the Congress passed the 
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), which was designed to have 
agencies focus on the performance and results of their programs.  The GPRA requires 
agencies to set strategic quantifiable, measurable performance goals.  Yim argued that a 
preparedness programs that lacks broad, but measurable objectives are unsustainable 
because they deprive policy makers of information they need to make rational resource 
decisions (GAO, 2002, P. 15).   
The review of state strategies found 13 states (37.2 percent) use some form of 
metric to further define their goals, objectives or subobjectives.  Eight (62 percent) of 
those use a milestone such as a date for completion.  This method is supported by author 
C. Davis Fogg in his book Implementing your Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” Into 
Effective Action for Sustainable Change (1999).  Fogg argues having measurable 
objectives and accountability are the best predictors of a plan’s success (1999, p. 57).  
Fogg’s definition of measurable includes providing a completion date.  Five (38 percent) 
of the 13 strategies used a more complex metric that was measurable in a quantifiable 
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way or that defined an end state to the desired goals, objectives or subobjectives.  This 
method is also supported by the literature.  In his March 2001 testimony titled Combating 
Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National Strategy before a 
U.S. House Committee, Raymond J. Decker, Director of Defense Capabilities and 
Management for the GAO, stated that a national strategy should establish outcome-
related goals with milestones, and performance measures to achieve those goals (GAO, 
2001, p. 2).  In March 2003, Decker presented a report again before a U.S. House 
Subcommittee titled Combating Terrorism Observations on National Strategies Related 
to Terrorism (GAO, 2003).  The report discussed the coordination of efforts across the 
vast number of federal and other governmental agencies with homeland security 
responsibilities (GAO, 2003).  Decker stated that performance measures are important for 
monitoring the successes of strategies and their related programs.  One key to assessing 
overall performance is that they define an end-state of what the strategy is trying to 
achieve.  As mentioned above, author C. Davis Fogg, in his book Implementing your 
Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” Into Effective Action for Sustainable Change (1999), 
argues having measurable objectives and accountability are the best predictors of a plan’s 
success (Fogg, 1999, p. 57).  Fogg’s definition of measurable includes a completion date, 
and in addition results that can be measured by numbers such as dollars or percentages.   
Just because a strategy exists and states it uses metrics does not necessarily mean 
that it is practiced in reality.  Questions arise, such as: does the use of metrics in a 
strategy actually contribute to progress toward its goals, objectives or subobjectives?  
How detailed should the metric be?  These questions can not be answered by merely 
reading the strategies, but are better answered by those tasked with implementing the 
strategies. 
B. SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS 
The second data collection in this phase of the research was to speak to subject 
matter experts (SMEs) related to two of the state homeland security strategies reviewed 
above.  There were a total of 12 SMEs interviewed for this entire research project.  The 
SMEs held positions in a number of disciplines, such as governor’s staff, police, fire 
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services, health departments and emergency management.  They represented state, county 
and city entities and averaged 19.75 years of experience in professional domestic security 
related disciplines.  The SME’s opinion will serve as evidence toward the findings of this 
research.   
The state homeland security strategies above were divided into two categories.  
One from each was selected for further research with SMEs related to it.  The first 
category was comprised of strategies whose performance measures were quantifiable or 
had an identifiable completed state.  The choice for further review from this category was 
the Indiana Strategy for Homeland Security (Indiana Department of Homeland Security, 
2008).  This strategy was chosen because it had the most detailed and highest usage of 
metrics of all the strategies reviewed.  Many of the metrics were quantifiable, such as ten 
courses will be offered, 10 percent of facilities designated as critical infrastructure should 
have BZPP plans or 50 percent of fusion centers will have private sector participation.  
The objectives were actionable and a completed state could be identified for most.  The 
second category contained strategies with performance measures that were not 
quantifiable nor did they have an identifiable completed state.  The Washington Statewide 
Homeland Security Strategic Plan 2006—2011 (Washington Emergency Management 
Division, 2006) was chosen from this category because it was representative of the others 
in that it provided completion dates (month and year) for its objectives and subobjectives.  
Two SMEs related to each chosen strategy were interviewed.  They were assigned the 
confidential names of Subject Matter Expert 9, 10, 11 and 12.  Two were from an agency 
that had a part in the creation of one of the state homeland security strategies while two 
were from an agency that has responsibility to implement part of the strategies.  Choosing 
SMEs with these different points of view related to their strategy should provide more 
balance data. 
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1. Strategies Whose Performance Measures Were Quantifiable or Had 
Identifiable Completed State 
a. Indiana Strategy for Homeland Security 
SME 9 and 10 provided a summary of how the metrics used in Indiana’s 
strategy were developed.  The Governor’s Office of Homeland Security (OHS) met with 
SMEs around the state.  They asked three questions.  What is it that you want to 
accomplish?  How do you define the completed state?  How long will it take you to arrive 
at the completed state?  The OHS built the metrics for the strategy objectives from those 
answers.  One SME recalls that many of the completion dates were set because of grant 
requirements.  The strategy went into effect in 2008, but a performance review on 
progress was delayed until early 2010.  The assessment showed 55 to 60 percent of the 
objectives had been achieved.   
Both SMEs believe the use of metrics help toward the completion of a 
strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives.  One SME suggested metrics provide a 
target to achieve and helps to develop a plan.  Metrics establish milestones useful to 
measure progress and announce when arriving at the finished goal.  The other SME 
believes metrics are vital, and they absolutely help.  The SME posits that things that get 
measured get done.  This SME has seen many strategies with vague and lofty goals but 
believes metrics need to be concrete and achievable.  When objectives are broken out into 
tasks things get done.  By tasking specific measures, people get focused, which leads to 
results.  One SME believed that metrics are an important part of accountability and 
implementing agencies should include their metrics into the work plans of their 
employees.  Metrics should be set to close gaps in desired state capabilities.  Both SMEs 
believed that the feedback from any system of checking progress should be used when 
building the next set of priorities and metrics.   
One SME provided an example of a metric that was not thought out 
completely.  There existed an objective for volunteers.  The goal was met, since they 
managed to meet the required number of volunteers.  But, they found they could not sort 
the list of volunteers to identify the required skills that they might need in a given 
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situation.  They had to take the metric another step to add the capability to sort the 
volunteer lists.  This shows the importance of understanding the practical use of the 
objective to insure it does what is intended.  One SME suggests a routine reevaluation of 
a strategy’s metrics.  The review should include all metrics and do so with all discipline’s 
input.  The SME believed it had been some time since the Indiana metrics were drafted.  
It was time to refresh them and to insure they are the right metrics for what Indiana wants 
and needs done now.   
The review of state strategies above raised the question whether the use of 
metrics with goals, objectives or subobjectives actually produced results.  One SME 
suggested that items like funding or prioritization had a greater influence on progress 
then the use of metrics whereas the other SME suggested that metrics are a critical part of 
accountability and that can drive results.  If employees know that they will be asked to 
account for their progress in achieving assigned objectives, they will strive for success.  
Both SMEs agreed the important part of accountability is having the metrics to measure 
progress and the system that checks and reports regularly that progress or lack thereof.   
One SME believed the use of metrics should be realistic.  Success is not 
necessarily a completed goal but more realistically progress made toward the goal.  Those 
tasked with implementation of objectives or subobjectives should be comfortable that 
their task is not completed so long as reasonable progress is being made.  Objectives will 
go through logical periods of red and yellow before getting to green.  The SME also 
suggests that metrics should include elements outside of the normal span of control of 
those responsible to implement them.  This high goal should not be ignored because it 
seems impossible at first. 
Both SMEs believed a state homeland security strategy cannot be 
effective, if it does not measure progress of its goals, objectives or subobjectives.  They 
also attribute some of the success of their state’s progress toward its goals, objectives or 
subobjectives is based upon the fact that metrics are applied to them.  The SMEs agree 
strongly that a state should attach metrics to their goals, objectives or subobjectives. 
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b. Analysis 
SME 9 and 10 both believed that metrics are important to a homeland 
security strategy.  They provide a target to achieve and help to develop a plan to arrive at 
a desired end state.  One SME strongly believed things that get measured get done.  SME 
3 from the National Capital Region (NCR) discussed how most DHS grant project are 
proposed and funded even though they do not clearly define their metrics.  SME 3 
provided an example of a project to build a house.  The lumber arrives to start the 
building but the plans have no measurements.  The builder does not know whether to 
build a ranch, split level or bungalow; there is no vision of a finished state.  The 
importance of metrics is supported in the literature.  In 2004, the U.S. General 
Accounting Office presented its report Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected 
Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism to the U.S. Congress.  In the 
report, it describes performance measures as a desirable characteristic of an effective 
strategy.  They clarify this statement by stating performance measures address steps to 
achieve results and are useful to gauge results (GAO, 2004, p. 11).  In this same report, 
the GAO reviewed seven national security strategies.  They criticized all seven for not 
identifying milestones or performance measures that the GAO considered necessary for 
evaluating progress, achieving results and ensuring oversight (GAO, 2004, p. 12).  In his 
book, Implementing your Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” Into Effective Action for 
Sustainable Change (Fogg, 1999), C. Davis Fogg argues having measurable objectives 
and accountability are the best predictors of a plan’s success.   
The SMEs agreed that performance measures should be detailed and 
understandable.  One SME stated metrics need to be concrete and achievable.  SME 3 
from the NCR believed objectives should be defined in a measurable way and failure to 
do so results in throwing money down a hole.  The GAO reported to Congress that better 
identification of priorities, milestones, and performance measures would aid 
implementing parties in achieving results in specific timeframes and would enable more 
effective oversight and accountability (GAO, 2004, p. 19).  The U.S. Congress passed the 
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), which was designed to have 
agencies focus on the performance and results of their programs.  The GPRA requires 
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agencies to set strategic quantifiable, measurable performance goals, measure 
performance and report on the degree to which goals are met.  Maria I. Marshall in her 
article Defining Your Business through Goals and Objectives First Steps for New 
Entrepreneurs states that objectives must be clear and concise (2004).  She suggests the 
SMART method of objective writing that requires them to be specific, measurable, action 
oriented, realistic and timely.  To best be measurable, an objective should be expressed in 
terms of dollars or quantities.  Objectives should be clear targets of performance that can 
be evaluated (Marshall, 2004, p. 2).   
SME 9 believed that performance measures should reach beyond the 
comfort zone and control of those responsible to achieve them.  This is supported by the 
authors of the article Goal Setting and Performance Management in the Public Sector 
(Latham et al., 2008).  The authors discuss the goal setting theory of Gary P. Latham and 
Edwin A. Locke.  The goal setting theory states a specific high-level goal will lead to 
higher performance than an easier goal, a general goal or no goal setting.  Given ability 
and commitment, the higher the goal the higher the performance (Latham et al., 2008, p. 
386).  SME 9 also expressed the importance of looking at metrics wisely.  Success is not 
necessarily a completed goal but more realistically progress made toward the goal.  Those 
tasked with implementation of objectives or subobjectives should be comfortable that 
their task is not completed so long as reasonable progress is being made.   
The research showed that accountability is important and that metrics play 
an important role in it.  SME 5 and SME 6, both from Colorado, agreed that a 
combination of prioritization, funding and accountability is the best path to 
accomplishing a strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives.  SME 7 and SME 8, both 
from the National Capital Region, stressed that assignment of responsibility for an 
objective must include accountability.  SME 7 stated a strategy should be specific about 
who should be accountable.  From Washington State, SME 12 spoke of the importance of 
metrics in supporting accountability by stating metrics are milestones that provide 
feedback.  SME 9 and 10 agree that metrics are a critical part of accountability.  They 
also believe that accountability can drive results.  If employees know they will be asked 
to account for their progress in achieving assigned objectives, they will strive for success.  
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SME 9 stated milestones are useful to measure progress and announce when arriving at 
the finished goal.  SME 10 stated without measurement then the accountability is 
worthless.   
The literature supports the connection between clearly defined metrics and 
accountability.  In its review of national strategies, the GAO found they all identified 
goals, objectives and activities, but generally they did not identify priorities, milestones 
or performance measures.  These are elements the GAO considered necessary for 
evaluating progress, achieving results and ensuring oversight (White House, 2001, p. 12).  
In his book Implementing your Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” Into Effective Action 
for Sustainable Change (1999), C. Davis Fogg argues that to be successful companies 
must develop an accountability system.  He argues that strategic plan objectives are 
usually met when they are assigned to employees that are held accountable for achieving 
them.  Organizations that hold their people accountable achieve approximately 85 percent 
of their strategic objectives (Fogg, 1999, p. 57).  Having measurable objectives and 
accountability are the best predictors of a plan’s success.  Fogg’s definition of measurable 
includes a completion date and results that can be measured by numbers such as dollars 
or percentages.   
A number of SMEs discussed the importance of a tracking and reporting 
system for metrics.  Both SME 9 and 10 agreed an important part of accountability is 
having the metrics to measure progress and the system that checks and reports regularly 
that progress or lack thereof.  SME 7, from the NCR, stated a strategy should be specific 
about who should be accountable and that person should be required to make regular 
progress reports.  SME 3 from the NCR believed that accountability does come from the 
use of metrics but only to the point that the data is collected necessary to determine 
progress and that information is used to hold people accountable.  SME 12 from 
Washington State believed that at least quarterly, any progress made should be compared 
to the metrics in place and the results reported to someone in charge of making progress.  
If the metric is not being met, then that would a good time to reevaluate it and readjust 
the objective or metric.   
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2. Strategies with Performance Measures That Are Not Quantifiable 
Nor with an Identifiable Completed State 
a. Washington Statewide Homeland Security Strategic Plan 2006–
2011 
SME 11 and 12 provided a summary of how Washington State used 
metrics in relation to the goals, objectives or subobjectives of its state homeland security 
strategic plan.  One SME recalled that in December 2001, prior to the existence of DHS, 
Washington State submitted a homeland security strategy to the Department of Justice 
(DOJ).  DOJ required submitters to include implementation steps, including completion 
dates.  The use of completion dates continued with each year’s submission and it carried 
over to DHS.  Most of the time lines came from the time lines built into existing grants.  
Washington continued to apply a completion date for each of the objectives and 
implementation steps in its strategy, including its updated strategy issued in 2009.  In this 
latest version completion dates remain the only metric used.   
One SME expressed concern that Washington does not include any 
measurement of success or progress in its strategy.  As an objective or subobjective 
becomes complete or no longer relevant, it is simply dropped from the strategy.  The 
SME pointed to an objective to support the winter Olympics that were held in 
Washington.  Next year, there will be no reporting on the results of this objective, and it 
will just drop off the strategy.  The SME laments that strategies have no place to report 
what has been completed in the past.  This marker of what has been accomplished is part 
of the metrics that should be used in a strategy.  It reflects the baseline and the progress 
made to date.   
One SME spoke of the importance of metrics in supporting accountability.  
Metrics are milestones that provide feedback.  At least quarterly, the progress made 
should be compared to the metrics in place, and the results reported to someone in 
charge.  If the metric is not being met, then that is a good time to reevaluate it and set a 
new date for completion.  Someone needs to be placed in charge of each objective and  
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subobjective.  The SME suggests agency heads should be responsible for collecting the 
data and reporting out on the status of the metrics. This process would bring 
accountability.   
Washington is planning a move to use capabilities based gap analysis in 
the future as its metric standard and to stop using the date of completion method.  An 
SME stated that while not in place yet, the new metrics will be based on gap analysis of 
the federal 37 TCLs.  The baseline and identified gaps from the analysis will serve as the 
standards for setting objectives and subobjectives and measuring their success.  The gap 
can become the metric for the objective to close the identified gap.  Both SMEs agreed 
that capability gap analysis would be a better metric standard for the strategy to use than 
the use of completion dates.  Since 2006, Washington has increased the importance of 
work groups set up for each of the 37 TCLs.  These groups are conducting the assessment 
and gap analysis that is expected to support the move of Washington’s strategy objectives 
toward the 37 TCLs gaps. 
Neither SME could provide any data on the completion rates for and of the 
strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives that had a completion date applied to it.  One 
SME recalled in mid-2007, an assessment was conducted. At that time, just under 50 
percent of the objectives were completed or on track to be completed.  Since that time, 
the number that number has risen to over 60 percent.  This same SME made it clear that 
the success that was made was more a factor of prioritization and supporting funding than 
the completion date assigned in the state strategy.  The goals, objectives or subobjectives 
that were not making any progress were also one that had not been funded.   
In addition, both SMEs felt that the use of metrics was helpful toward 
accomplishing goals, objectives or subobjectives so long as they were used as part of an 
accountability system.  At one point, Washington was conducting regular review of 
progress toward its goals through the use of balanced scorecards.  This motivated people 
to strive to meet the completion dates because they were being evaluated on that 
achievement.  The use of metrics can be effective, if agencies take ownership and 
oversight for projects and are required to report results quarterly based on the metrics. 
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Both SMEs also agreed that a strategy that does not use metrics to 
measure progress will be less effective.  They both felt that the use of completion date 
metrics in the strategy did not contribute to the progress made toward goals, objectives or 
subobjectives.  One reiterated that the use of metrics in a strategy will not result in the 
same progress that prioritization and funding would.  Both SMEs felt that the use of 
metrics was important.  One suggested that they are useful in measuring success.  The 
other felt that measuring must be accompanied by reporting and accountability to be 
effective.   
b. Analysis 
The SMEs agreed that the use of metrics as a tool of accountability is 
effective in bringing progress toward the accomplishment of a strategy’s goals, objectives 
or subobjectives.  One SME believed Washington state’s use of completion date metrics 
did drive progress early in the strategy period when regular progress reviews were made.  
The SME recalled that people would strive to make the completion dates because they 
knew they were being held accountable.  This behavior is supported by the literature.  In 
the article, Goal Setting and Performance Management in the Public Sector (Latham et 
al., 2008), the authors discuss the goal setting theory.  The goal setting theory states a 
specific high-level goal will lead to higher performance than an easier goal, a general 
goal or no goal setting.  Given ability and commitment the higher the goal the higher the 
performance (Latham et al., 2008, p. 386).  In his book, Implementing your Strategic 
Plan how to Turn “Intent” Into Effective Action for Sustainable Change, C. Davis Fogg 
argues that strategic plan objectives are usually met when they are assigned to employees 
that are held accountable for achieving them.  Organizations that hold their people 
accountable achieve approximately 85 percent of their strategic objectives (Fogg, 1999, 
p. 57).  The other SME agrees that metrics are effective if someone will take oversight 
and ownership of the process and require regular reporting.  SME 11 pointed out that 
DHS grant proposals often require milestones of completion dates.  This method of 
metric is very effective in achieving progress because grant recipients want to maintain 
their eligibility for grant funding, so they will insure the necessary progress.   
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Each SME agreed that Washington’s future plan to build metrics from the 
state’s 37 TCL gap analysis would be a better metric than using just completion dates.  
Gap analysis is an annual requirement for DHS funding, so it is already being done.  The 
analysis determines a state’s current level of capability for each targeted capability.  It 
then measures the gap between the present state and the idea completed state.  The 
identified gap could become an actual objective in a strategy.  Clearly defined measurable 
subobjectives could be established toward completing the objective.  If done correctly, 
this could provide a quantifiable standard for measuring progress.  This would include a 
more detail metric than just a completion date.  Support for this idea can be found in the 
literature.  In its report, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in 
National Strategies Related to Terrorism to the U.S. Congress in 2004, the GAO stated a 
better identification of priorities, milestones, and performance measures would aid 
implementing parties in achieving results in specific timeframes and would enable more 
effective oversight and accountability (GAO, 2004, p. 19).   
In March 2003, Raymond J. Decker, Director of Defense Capabilities and 
Management for the GAO presented a report before a U.S. House Subcommittee titled 
Combating Terrorism Observations on National Strategies Related to Terrorism (GAO, 
2003).  Decker spoke of the importance of performance measures and stressed that they 
should define an end-state of what the strategy is trying to achieve.  Decker suggests the 
lack of specific performance measures in federal homeland security strategies makes it 
more important that federal agencies have their own explicit performance measures 
required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA).  The GPRA 
requires agencies to set strategic, quantifiable, measurable performance goals; measure 
performance and report on the degree to which goals are met.  Decker goes on to suggest 
that a strategy should extend beyond its immediate jurisdiction and include performance 
measures for sublevels of government like states, counties, cities and private sector 
entities too (GAO, 2003, p. 18).  In her article Defining Your Business Through Goals 
and Objectives First Steps for New Entrepreneurs, Maria I. Marshall argues that 
objectives must be clear and concise.  To be measurable an objective should be expressed 
in terms of dollars or quantities (Marshall, 2004).  In his book, Implementing your 
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Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” Into Effective Action for Sustainable Change, C. 
Davis Fogg’s definition of measurable includes a completion date and results that can be 
measured by numbers such as dollars or percentages.   
Both of the SMEs felt that use of metrics contributed directly to 
accountability.  If no identifiable measurable work expectation exists, then it is difficult 
to hold someone accountable for work not accomplished.  Those assigned responsibility 
also appreciate clarity in their expectations.  As mentioned above, Maria I. Marshall 
argues that objectives must be clear and concise.  In the article Goal Setting and 
Performance Management in the Public Sector (Latham et al., 2008), the authors state 
specific goals will focus on what is to be accomplished.  Accountability has been raised 
in other parts of this research document as a critical element toward effectively 
accomplishing a strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives.  SME 5 and SME 6 both 
from Colorado agreed that a combination of prioritization, funding and accountability is 
the best path to accomplishing a strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives.  SME 7 and 
SME 8 both from the National Capital Region stressed that assignment of responsibility 
for an objective must include accountability.  SME 7 stated a strategy should be specific 
about who should be accountable and that person should be required to make regular 
progress reports.   
SME 12 from Washington state spoke of the importance of metrics in 
supporting accountability by stating metrics are milestones that provide feedback.  At 
least quarterly, any progress made should be compared to the metrics in place and the 
results reported to someone in charge of making progress on the goals, objectives or 
subobjectives.  If the metric is not being met, then that is a good time to reevaluate it and 
readjust the objective or metric.  The SME’s opinions are supported by the literature.  
David M. Walker, the Comptroller General of the United States in his report Homeland 
Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation's Efforts (Walker, 2001) commented 
that homeland security involves a large number of organizations that must have clearly 
articulated roles, responsibilities and accountability.  In his book, Implementing your 
Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” Into Effective Action for Sustainable Change, C. 
Davis Fogg argues that strategic plan objectives are usually met when they are assigned 
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to employees that are held accountable for achieving them.  Organizations that hold their 
people accountable achieve approximately 85 percent of their strategic objectives (Fogg, 
1999, p. 57).  Fogg added that having measurable objectives and accountability are the 
best predictors of a plan’s success. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND APPLICATION TO FLORIDA 
The research in this chapter determined that clearly defined metrics are a useful 
tool in the process of accomplishing a state homeland security strategy’s goals, objectives 
or subobjectives.  The review of thirty-five state strategies above revealed the majority of 
states (62.8 percent) did not use metrics to further define their goals, objectives or 
subobjectives.  This is in contrast to the benefit of doing so suggested in the literature.  
The goal setting theory states a specific high-level goal will lead to higher performance 
and given ability and commitment the higher the goal the higher the performance 
(Latham et al., 2008, p. 386).  The GAO states that milestones or performance measures 
are necessary for evaluating progress, achieving results and ensuring oversight (GAO, 
2004, p. 12).  The GAO stated a better identification of priorities, milestones, and 
performance measures would aid implementing parties in achieving results in specific 
timeframes and would enable more effective oversight and accountability (GAO, 2004, p. 
19).  SME 9, 10, 11 and 12 all believed that metrics are important to a homeland security 
strategy.  Metrics provide a target to achieve and help to develop a plan to arrive at a 
desired end state.  One SME strongly believed things that get measured get done.   
The review of thirty-five state strategies found thirteen states (37.2 percent) use 
some form of metric to further define their goals, objectives or subobjectives.  Eight (62 
percent) of the 13 use a milestone such as a date for completion.  Five (38 percent) of the 
13 used a more complex metric that was measurable in a quantifiable way or that defined 
an end state to the desired goals, objectives or subobjectives.  The SMEs agreed that 
performance measures should be detailed and understandable.  One SME stated metrics 
need to be concrete and achievable.  SME 3 from the NCR believed objectives should be 
defined in a measurable way and failure to do so results in throwing money down a hole.  
The GAO reported to Congress that better identification of priorities, milestones and 
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performance measures would aid implementing parties in achieving results in specific 
timeframes and would enable more effective oversight and accountability (GAO, 2004, p. 
19).  Maria I. Marshall, in her article Defining Your Business Through Goals and 
Objectives First Steps for New Entrepreneurs, states that objectives must be clear and 
concise and should be clear targets of performance that can be evaluated (2004, p. 2).  
SME 9 believed that performance measures should reach beyond the comfort zone and 
control of those responsible to achieve them.  This is supported by the authors of the 
article Goal Setting and Performance Management in the Public Sector (Latham et al., 
2008).  The authors discuss the goal setting theory of Gary P. Latham and Edwin A. 
Locke.  The goal setting theory states a specific high-level goal will lead to higher 
performance than an easier goal, a general goal or no goal setting.  Given ability and 
commitment, the higher the goal the higher the performance (Latham et al., 2008, p. 386).   
The research was clear that accountability is a strong determinant for progress 
toward the goals, objectives or subobjectives of a strategy and that metrics play an 
important role in it.  SME 5 and SME 6 both from Colorado agreed that a combination of 
prioritization, funding and accountability is the best path to accomplishing a strategy’s 
goals, objectives or subobjectives.  SME 7 and SME 8 both stressed that assignment of 
responsibility for an objective must include accountability.  SME 7 stated a strategy 
should be specific about who should be accountable.  SME 12 spoke of the importance of 
metrics in supporting accountability by stating metrics are milestones that provide 
feedback.  SMEs 9, 10, 11 and 12 agree that metrics are a critical part of accountability.  
They also believe that accountability can drive results.  SME 9 stated milestones are 
useful to measure progress and announce when arriving at the finished goal.  SME 10 
stated without measurement then accountability is worthless.   
The literature supports the connection between clearly defined metrics and 
accountability.  In a review of national strategies, the GAO found they all identified 
goals, objectives and activities, but generally they did not identify priorities, milestones 
or performance measures.  These are elements the GAO considered necessary for 
evaluating progress, achieving results and ensuring oversight (White House, 2001, p. 12).  
In his book, Implementing your Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” Into Effective Action 
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for Sustainable Change (1999), C. Davis Fogg argues that to be successful companies 
must develop an accountability system.  He argues that strategic plan objectives are 
usually met when they are assigned to employees that are held accountable for achieving 
them.  Organizations that hold their people accountable achieve approximately 85 percent 
of their strategic objectives (Fogg, 1999, p. 57).  Having measurable objectives and 
accountability are the best predictors of a plan’s success.  Fogg’s definition of measurable 
includes a completion date and results that can be measured by numbers such as dollars 
or percentages.   
SMEs discussed the importance of a tracking and reporting system for metrics.  
Both SME 9 and 10 agreed an important part of accountability is having the metrics to 
measure progress and the system that checks and reports regularly that progress or lack 
thereof.  SME 11 recalled Washington state’s use of completion date metrics did drive 
progress early in the strategy period when regular progress reviews were made.  The 
SME recalled that people would strive to make the completion dates because they knew 
they were being held accountable.  SME 7, from the NCR, stated a strategy should be 
specific about who should be accountable and that person should be required to make 
regular progress reports.  SME 3, also from the NCR, believed that accountability does 
come from the use of metrics but only to the point that the data is collected necessary to 
determine progress and that information is used to hold people accountable.  SME 12 
from Washington state believed that at least quarterly, any progress made should be 
compared to the metrics in place and the results reported to someone in charge of making 
progress.  If the metric is not being met then that would a good time to reevaluate it and 
readjust the objective or metric.  The GAO felt that measuring performance was 
important enough that if there were limitations on the ability to collect performance data 
then one of the goals of the strategy should be to obtain better data (GAO, 2004, p. 16). 
Florida is amongst the 62 percent of the reviewed states that did not take 
advantage of the benefits of using metrics to clearly define their state strategy’s goals, 




in oversight and accountability over them (GAO, 2004, p. 19).  Florida should adopt the 
use of metrics in their homeland security strategy to take advantage of the benefits 
described above.   
In order to understand the proposed implementation plans listed below, the reader 
will need to understand the way Florida is structured for guidance over its domestic 
security efforts and funding.  This process is described in detail in the chapter summary 
section of Chapter III and will only be summarized here.  Florida’s Domestic Security 
Oversight Council (DSOC) is statutorily empowered to oversee all matters related to 
domestic security in the state.  The DSOC is served by a State Working Group on 
Domestic Preparedness (SWG).  The SWG has an Executive Board that is served by two 
different groups of subcommittees.  The first is known as primary committees, the second 
as funding committees.  The SWG primary committees research and recommend policies 
and response protocols for all the specialty teams and programs funded by DHS grant 
funding.  The SWG funding committees are responsible to review DHS funding 
proposals within their area of expertise from state and local agencies.  The funding 
committees determine which projects are to be selected for funding and to what level of 
funding.   
Florida can implement metrics in three steps.  First, it should develop metrics 
utilizing its existing primary committees; second, tie all grant funding to those metrics 
and third, create a reporting system that provides timely data to the primary and funding 
committees.  The SMEs from Washington state spoke of their state’s future plan to build 
metrics from the federal 37 TCL gap analysis.  It is recommended that Florida adopt this 
method of establishing its metrics.  Florida should look annually at its current capability 
for each of the 37 TCLs.  The analysis would determine the state’s current level of 
capability for each targeted capability.  It would then determine the gap between the 
present state and the idea completed state.  The identified gap then becomes an actual 
objective in the strategy.  Clearly defined measurable subobjectives could be established 
toward completing the objective and the identified end state would be establishing the 
desired capability listed in the TCL list.  If done correctly, this could provide a 
quantifiable standard for measuring progress.  One benefit to adopting this system is that 
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this type of gap analysis is an annual requirement for DHS funding so it is already being 
done.  Another benefit is that establishing metrics to fill TCL gaps will keep Florida 
within the desired prioritizes of DHS and ensure continued funding opportunities.  
At the conclusion of each annual TCL review, the SWG primary committees will 
need to look at the gap analysis results and translate them into more specific metrics that 
need to be met to accomplish the TCL measured gap.  Based on evidence provided by 
this research’s SMEs and the literature, the metrics will need to be measurable in a 
quantifiable way.  The metrics for each TCL category when combined together will need 
to define an end state.  These metrics should be documented into a list for each of the 37 
TCLs.  Since this list potentially could change annually, the state homeland security 
strategy should be amended to refer specifically to this list to be the guiding metrics for 
each year.  The current list should be attached to the strategy in its first year as an 
addendum.  The strategy could clearly state that the addendum will change to the most 
recent copy of the list, as it is produced each year.   
As mentioned above, DHS funding proposals are required to be approved by the 
SWG funding committee that oversees them.  All future DHS grant proposals seeking 
approval from the funding committees should be required to identify what metric(s) they 
will be addressing and estimate the progress expected to be made toward that metric goal.  
Since the members of these subcommittees are SMEs, they would be in a good position 
to judge each project and its proposed progress on the metric(s) it claims to impact.  The 
use of metrics should be used wisely.  Success is not necessarily a completed goal, but 
more realistically progress made toward the goal.   
As suggested by the research, an effective reporting system will need to be 
established to insure data is collected and reviewed on a timely basis.  Each grant 
recipient would be required to report biannually on the progress of its project and, 
specifically, its progress on the metric(s) it intended to affect.  The reporting should be 
done in a quantifiable way that matches the nature of the metric to allow for logical 
comparison.  The report will be provided to the SWG funding committee that oversees 
the grant for review.  The SWG funding committee should insure the grant projects are 
accomplishing their intended results.  If a metric is not being met, then that would a good 
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time to look closely at the issue and readjust either the objective or metric.  The SWG 
funding committee will evaluate future funding requests for projects based on progress 
revealed by the reporting system.  As discussed in detail in the chapter summary of 
Chapter III, this recommendation is not without issue.  As described in Chapter III, most 
of the DHS and other federal funding available to Florida for domestic security related 
issues do not pass through the SWG funding committee for approval but this could be 
changed by the DSOC bring the matter before the Florida Legislature. 
Chapters III, IV and V have detailed the research related to the thesis topic.  In the 
final chapter, the primary research findings will be summarized and suggested 
implementation steps will be offered. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Alice came to a fork in the road. “Which road do I take?” she asked. 
“Where do you want to go?” responded the Cheshire cat. 
“I don't know,” Alice answered. 
“Then,” said the cat, “It doesn't matter.” 
Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland (1865) 
The Florida Domestic Security Oversight Council (DSOC) was given authority 
through Florida Statute 943.0313 to provide executive leadership and fiscal guidance to 
state and local agencies in their terrorism prevention, preparation, protection, response 
and recovery efforts.  In this leadership role, the DSOC issued its Florida Domestic 
Security Strategic Plan for the three year period, covering 2009 to 2011 (Florida 
Domestic Security Oversight Council, 2008).  The Strategic Plan contained five goals 
with 37 supporting objectives.  There are 296 implementation steps offered in the 
Strategic Plan toward accomplishing the objectives.  The Strategic Plan does not 
prioritize its goals, objectives or implementation steps resulting in over 300 equally 
weighed tasks with no clear direction from the DSOC.  The Strategic Plan also does not 
assign responsibility for making progress in achieving its goals, objectives or 
implementation steps.  Without assigning responsibility, the DSOC cannot empower the 
assignee with ownership and authority to carry out the DSOC’s tasking and at the same 
time provide someone who is accountable to the DSOC for progress, or lack thereof.  
Lastly the Strategic Plan does not define its goals, objectives or implementation steps in 
a measureable way.  A step is not attainable if a completed state is not defined.  Knowing 
what is needed and to what extent it is needed enables the achievement of the action 
desired by the Strategic Plan.   
Compounding the problem is the fact that significant portions of domestic 
security related federal grant funds available to Florida are not coordinated directly by the 
DSOC.  While Florida received $33,011,575 in 2010 State Homeland Security Program 
funding, there were five UASI cities in Florida that received a total of $35,367,406 in 
funding (DHS, 2009, pp. 13, 15).  Each UASI city applies funding based on its own 
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priorities.  Therefore, the DSOC, through its state working group funding committees, 
has oversight over less than half the DHS funding awarded to Florida.  In addition, the 
DSOC funding committees have no oversight over hundreds of millions of dollars in 
domestic security related federal grants available to the state such as Health and Human 
Services, Center for Disease Control, Department of Education, Emergency Management 
Performance Grants, Metropolitan Medical Response System, Interoperable Emergency 
Communications Grant Program, Driver’s License Security Grant Program and the Port 
Security Grant Program to name a few. 
The weaknesses of the Florida Domestic Security Strategic Plan have made the 
DSOC less effective.  The DSOC should be empowered to identify the most critical 
domestic security issues facing Florida and direct the resources and funding of the state to 
deal with them.  Without change, Florida will continue to spread it resources over a vast 
number of implementation steps while not completing any one of them.  If the DSOC 
does not assign ownership and authority to strategic tasks along with a clear definition of 
what needs to be done to achieve success, then the state’s strategic plan will not achieve 
tangible policy objectives.  
This research project began with an examination of literature related to goals, 
objectives and strategic plans.  The review concentrated on the supporting and opposing 
arguments for the use of prioritization, assignment and metrics related to goals, objectives 
or subobjectives.  Best practices were identified from the literature.  The best practices 
were then used as a guide in the review of thirty-five existing state homeland security 
strategies.  Each strategy was examined for use of prioritization, assignment or metrics 
and if found, chosen for further examination, which was detailed in Chapters III, IV and 
V, respectively.  As the strategies were examined, similarities or patterns were identified.  
Representative strategies from these patterns were selected for further review.  The 
further review came in the form of subject matter expert (SME) interviews.  SMEs 
related to selected strategies were interviewed and asked to provide data and opinion 
related to their experience with their state’s use of prioritization, assignment or metrics.  
The data collected during these phases of the research were analyzed and best practices 
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were identified.  These best practices were then discussed as options for Florida to 
consider adopting for its future homeland security strategies.   
Primary research findings were identified for each category of prioritization, 
assignment and the use of metrics.  A discussion of the findings from each category 
follows. 
A PRIMARY RESEARCH FINDINGS 
1. Prioritization Primary Research Findings 
The literature supports the idea that prioritization is a necessary element for 
achieving results and that priorities will lead to a desired end state.  The federal 
government ties DHS grant funding to compliance with prioritization to insure progress 
on goals, objectives or subobjectives they deem most important.  Maryland and NCR 
SMEs all agreed that prioritizing goals, objectives or subobjectives within a strategy is 
important and effective.   
The research found two methods to apply priorities in a strategy.  The first was 
Maryland’s approach to make all goals a priority.  The second was NCR’s prioritization 
of just a few of many objectives and subobjectives.  The NCR method is a more 
favorable method, since it allows for all disciplines to have some goals, objectives or 
subobjectives to make progress toward, but also allows additional focus or concentration 
on a few through prioritization.  The SMEs from both Maryland and the NCR agreed that 
prioritized goals should be developed from base line capabilities gap analysis with threat 
as a critical part of the equation.   
Most state homeland security strategies cover periods of three or more years.  
Terrorist tactics and threats to communities can change more quickly.  The research 
suggested that states consider developing a capacity to change the direction of its state 
homeland security strategy and with it the prioritization and funding influence it carries.  




new threats while leadership committees have the authority to alter the priorities of a 
strategy.  The two must work together to insure the appropriate flexibility is available to 
meet changing demand. 
The research suggested that prioritization brings with it funding.  Over half of the 
SMEs interviewed for this research project made statements confirming this.  This is also 
supported by DHS grant guidance, which ties funding to compliance to DHS’ priorities.  
Many of the SMEs interviewed for this research project identified funding as the most 
important determinant whether there will be progress made on a strategy’s goals, 
objectives or subobjectives.   
An important issue discussed by the SMEs was whether a state homeland security 
strategy should guide more than just the distribution of DHS grant funding.  Funding 
sources, such as Center for Disease Control, Health and Human Services, transportation, 
sea port grants and other resources can be useful in making progress toward priorities of a 
homeland security strategy.  The research showed the NCR strategy only guides $59 
million in UASI funding while nearly $87 million in other forms of DHS grants funding 
is prioritized separately by other entities within the same geographical area (DHS, 2009, 
pp. 13–28).  This results in independent groups setting their own priorities and directing 
separate resources to address literally the same problems.  Additionally, SMEs 3 and 8 
described local agencies use of grant funds to meet their local response and preparedness 
needs in competition with the boarder statewide strategic viewpoint.  Three of the SMEs 
interviewed for this thesis agreed that a single strategy should be used to set the priorities 
and direct all the resources available to address the issues of domestic security.  SME 5 
suggests one way to bridge the gap between disparate funding sources is to require 
everyone to use a singular statewide capability assessment and gap analysis.  Currently, 
the different funding sources utilize their own assessments of needs and set their own 
priorities.  Having a single needs analysis could enable and encourage each grant source 
to focus their unique resources on the parts of the single gap analysis where they have 
jurisdiction and expertise.   
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2. Assignment Primary Research Findings 
The literature and SMEs strongly support the use of assignment and recognize it 
as a factor in the equation leading to results.  The most important benefit of assignment 
comes in the form of accountability.  Two methods of assigning responsibility for goals, 
objectives or subobjectives were identified in the research.  The first was assigning them 
to state entities while the second was to assign them to multi agency committees.  The 
research found that each had unique strengths and a shared weakness.  State agency 
personnel have jurisdiction and an understanding of the diversity found throughout their 
state.  They can encourage local agency and multidiscipline contribution and buy in for 
projects that result in accomplishment of assigned objectives.  Multiagency committees 
give a voice to the diverse needs of local communities and brings the expertise of SMEs 
statewide.  The research identified the shared weakness: they lacked true authority.  The 
SMEs felt for assignment to be effective, it must be accompanied by authority.  It was 
pointed out in the literature and by the SMEs that government committees and task forces 
have long dealt with the lack of authority over their member agencies with consensus 
playing a role in every successful multiagency endeavor.  Colorado and the NCR were 
both found to use multiagency work groups in their formula for assigning goals, 
objectives or subobjectives.  The two methods of assigning responsibility could work 
well together by taking advantage of each one’s strengths.   
3. Metrics Primary Research Findings 
The research determined that clearly defined metrics are a useful tool in the 
process of accomplishing a state homeland security strategy’s goals, objectives or 
subobjectives.  The literature, SME 9, SME 10, SME 11 and SME 12 all concurred that 
metrics are important to a homeland security strategy.  Metrics provide a target to achieve 
and help to develop a plan to arrive at a desired end state.  One SME strongly believed 
things that get measured get done.  Most of the strategies reviewed in this category used a 
milestone, such as a date for completion, while the others used a more complex metric 
that was measurable in a quantifiable way or that defined an end state.  The SMEs agreed 
that performance measures should be more like the later.  Nine SMEs and the literature 
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were clear that accountability is a strong determinant for progress toward the goals, 
objectives or subobjectives of a strategy and that metrics play an important role in it.  In 
his book Implementing your Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” Into Effective Action for 
Sustainable Change, C. Davis Fogg argues that organizations that hold their people 
accountable achieve approximately 85 percent of their strategic objectives (1999, p. 57).   
SMEs discussed the importance of a tracking and reporting system for metrics.  
SMEs agreed an important part of accountability is having the metrics to measure 
progress and the system that checks and reports regularly that progress or lack thereof.  
The SMEs suggested that if a metric is not being met, then the review process provides a 
good time to reevaluate it and readjust the objective or metric.  The GAO felt that 
measuring performance was important enough that if there were limitations on the ability 
to collect performance data then one of the goals of the strategy should be to obtain better 
data (GAO, 2004, p. 16). 
B. RECOMMENDED IMPLEMENTATION STEPS FOR FLORIDA 
The shortcomings identified in Florida’s homeland security strategy where 
examined in the light of the primary research findings.  The following recommendations 
and their implementation steps are offered as solutions.  In order to understand the 
proposed implementation steps listed below, the reader will need to understand the way 
Florida is structured for guidance over its domestic security efforts and funding.  
Florida’s Domestic Security Oversight Council is statutorily empowered to oversee all 
matters related to domestic security in the state.  The DSOC is an executive policy 
advisory group.  The DSOC is comprised of heads of state agencies that have a critical 
role in Florida’s domestic security.  Representatives from Florida’s Regional Domestic 
Security Task Forces (RDSTF) and key members of federal, private sector and 
professional associations make up the balance of the executive committee.  The DSOC is 
served by seven Regional Domestic Security Task Forces (RDSTF) and a State Working 
Group on Domestic Preparedness (SWG).  The SWG has an Executive Board that is 
served by two different groups of subcommittees.  The first is known as primary 
committees.  The second group is known as funding committees.   
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The SWG primary committees are staffed by subject matter experts from all 
disciplines and from all regions of the state.  These committees research and recommend 
policies and response protocols for some of the specialty teams and programs funded by 
DHS grant funding in Florida.  Florida’s primary subcommittees are: 
• Operations and Planning 
• Critical Infrastructure 
• Training and Exercise 
• Logistics and Equipment 
• Campus Safety 
• Interoperability 
The second group of SWG subcommittees are known as funding committees.  
These subcommittees are also staffed by subject matter experts from all regions of the 
state but tend to be discipline specific.  These committees are active during DHS grant 
funding cycles.  These subcommittees are responsible to review DHS funding proposals 
within their area of expertise submitted by state and local agencies.  As expected, there 
are more funding requests then DHS grant funds available.  These subcommittees vote to 
determine which projects are to be selected for funding and to what level of funding.  
Once these subcommittees make their selections, they are brought to the SWG Executive 
Board for review and approval.  The approved projects are then brought to the DSOC for 
final review and approval.  In 2010, Florida had the following funding subcommittees: 
• Agriculture and Environment 
• Community Health 
• Campus Security 
• Medical Surge 
• Emergency Management 
• Fire Rescue 
• Interoperable Communications 
• Law Enforcement Prevention 
• Law Enforcement Response 
• Public Information 
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1. Prioritization Implementation Steps 
Florida was included in the 83 percent of the reviewed states that did not take 
advantage of the power of prioritization.  It is recommended that Florida develop and 
implement a prioritization method in its future state homeland security strategies.  It is 
recommended that the SWG primary subcommittees be charged annually with 
developing initial ideas for priorities for the domestic security efforts of the state.  They 
are operational level SMEs who are already responsible to develop the interdisciplinary 
response protocols for Florida’s domestic security assets.  Each primary subcommittee 
should develop its own priorities.   
Based upon the results of the research, it is recommended that Florida prioritize 
only some of its strategy’s goals, objectives and subobjectives.  A total of 10 to 15 
priorities should be the maximum.  This would intensify the resources available to 
accomplish the priorities while remaining within a manageable amount.  The priorities 
would best be based upon capability assessment gap analysis related to the federal 37 
TCL list.  Once draft priorities are prepared, the primary subcommittees should have a 
joint session with the SWG Executive Committee to select the statewide priorities.  The 
selected priorities should then be reviewed and approved by the DSOC.  Another issue 
raised in the research is the flexibility for priorities to be changed in response to changing 
terrorist threats.  The SMEs serving on the SWG primary subcommittees will likely be 
the first to recognize the need to change and adapt to new threats.  Florida will need to 
insure that the changing needs and challenges identified by operational SMEs are clearly 
shared with the DSOC.  The DSOC should remain sensitive to the unique position of 
operational SMEs and heed their call for rapid change.   
To implement the strategy’s priorities, Florida could use a similar system proven 
to be very effective for DHS.  Florida should require that a percentage of its DHS funding 
be spent toward prioritized goals, objectives and subobjectives of its homeland security 
strategy.  All DHS grant proposals must be approved by the SWG funding committees.  
The funding committees could be required to spend the designated percentage of their 
allotted funding toward Florida’s prioritized items.   
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The research determined that it would be more effective if Florida’s state 
homeland security strategy priorities guided more than just the distribution of DHS grant 
funding.  Resources, such as Center for Disease Control (CDC), Health and Human 
Services (HHS), Department of Education, transportation and sea port grants can be 
useful in making progress toward the priorities in Florida’s homeland security strategy.  
In his article, The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning, Henry Mintzberg tells his readers 
that strategic plans are used so that everyone pulls in the same direction (1994, p. 113).  
There is a serious flaw in the SWG funding committees system used in Florida.  They 
have no oversight over Florida’s five UASI funding entities.  While Florida will receive 
$33,011,575 in 2010 State Homeland Security Program funding, the five UASIs in 
Florida will received a total of $35,367,406 in funding (DHS, 2009, pp. 13, 15), and each 
will apply its funding based on its own priorities.  Therefore, the SWG funding 
committees have oversight over less than half the DHS funding awarded to Florida.  In 
addition, the funding committees have no oversight over hundreds of millions of dollars 
in domestic security related federal grants available to the state, such as Health and 
Human Services, Center for Disease Control, Department of Education, Emergency 
Management Performance Grants, Metropolitan Medical Response System, Interoperable 
Emergency Communications Grant Program, Driver’s License Security Grant Program 
and the Port Security Grant Program to name a few.   
Florida could leverage the coordination and prioritization power of this funding 
by requiring state agencies that receive such grants to also gain approval for grant 
proposals through the funding committees.  These agencies would logically need to have 
representative voting powers on the funding committees.  The system problems raised 
here could be corrected if the DSOC would bring the matter before the Florida legislature 
and ask for amendments to the Florida State Statute that gives authority to the DSOC.  To 
support this methodology, it is also recommended that Florida develop a singular 
statewide capability assessment and gap analysis.  Currently, the different funding 
sources utilize their own assessment of needs and set their own priorities.  Having a 
single needs analysis could enable and encourage each grant source to focus its unique 
resources on the parts of the single gap analysis where it has jurisdiction and expertise.   
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2. Assignment Implementation Steps 
A review of thirty-five state strategies showed that only 23 percent used some 
form of assignment of their goals, objectives or subobjectives.  Florida would benefit by 
adopting the use of assignment as recommended in the research.  The research showed 
assignment of goals, objectives or subobjectives will contribute to the effectiveness of a 
state strategy to accomplish them.  It is recommended that Florida adopt a hybrid of the 
two methods of assignment studied in this research.  The first was assigning a strategy’s 
goals, objectives and subobjectives to a state agency.  The second assigned them to a 
multiagency committee.  The two methods could work well together by taking advantage 
of each one’s strengths.  State agency personnel have jurisdiction, an understanding of 
the diversity throughout their state and can encourage local contribution and buy in.  
Multiagency committees give a voice to local communities, bring the expertise of local 
SMEs and can build consensus.  As described above, all DHS grant funding requests 
must be approved by the SWG funding committee that oversees the discipline or 
specialty in which it falls.  These funding committees are uniquely situated to exert 
control over the entire DHS grant process.  As discussed in Chapter III, that control can 
be used to ensure DHS funds are being applied toward priorities established in Florida’s 
homeland security strategy.  The control can also be used to insure accountability that 
DHS grant recipients are making progress toward the goals, objectives and subobjectives 
of Florida’s strategy.  The research has shown that the use of assignment brings 
accountability and that brings results.   
It is recommended that Florida assign responsibility for each goal, objective or 
subobjective of its strategy to one of the SWG funding committees.  Since individual 
agency proposals must be approved by the funding committees, they have the authority to 
approve, deny or modify a proposal and its subsequent funding requests.  This enables the 
funding committee to enforce compliance with Florida’s strategy expectations.  As 
suggested by the research, a Florida state goal leader should be identified and placed as 
the lead chairperson on each funding committee.  This would place the goal leader in a 
position of authority over local agency grant submission with the tempering of a 
multiagency working group to insure statewide consensus prevails.  As discussed above, 
 117
this recommendation is not without issue since most of the DHS and other federal 
funding available to Florida for domestic security related issues do not pass through the 
SWG funding committee for approval.  This could be changed if the DSOC brought the 
matter before the Florida Legislature, which could require such oversight.  
The research suggested that a progress reporting system be established to help the 
SWG funding committees with accountability.  The accurate tracking of projects can 
insure funding committees have the data that they need to make accurate decisions to 
promote progress toward the accomplishment of Florida’s homeland security strategy 
goals, objectives or subobjectives.  This topic will be discussed further below. 
3. Metrics Implementation Steps 
Florida is amongst the 62 percent of the reviewed states that did not take 
advantage of the benefits of using metrics to clearly define their state strategy’s goals, 
objectives or subobjectives.  Florida should adopt the use of metrics in its homeland 
security strategy to take advantage of the benefits described above.  Florida can 
implement metrics in three steps.  First, it should develop metrics utilizing its existing 
primary committees; second, tie all grant funding to those metrics and third, create a 
reporting system that provides timely data to the primary and funding committees.  The 
SMEs from Washington state spoke of their state’s future plan to build metrics from the 
federal 37 TCL gap analysis.  It is recommended that Florida adopt this method of 
establishing their metrics.  Florida should look annually at its current capability for each 
of the 37 TCLs.  The analysis would determine the state’s current level of capability for 
each targeted capability.  It would then determine the gap between the present state and 
the idea completed state.  The identified gap could then become an actual objective in the 
strategy.  Clearly defined measurable subobjectives could be established toward 
completing the objective and the identified end state would be establishing the desired 
capability listed in the TCL list.  If done correctly, this could provide a quantifiable 
standard for measuring progress.  One benefit to adopting this system is that this type of 
gap analysis is an annual requirement for DHS funding, so it is already being done.  
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Another benefit comes from establishing metrics to fill TCL gaps that will keep Florida 
within the desired prioritizes of DHS and ensure continued funding opportunities.  
At the conclusion of each annual TCL review, the SWG primary committees will 
need to look at the gap analysis results and translate them into more specific metrics that 
need to be met to accomplish the TCL measured gap.  Based on evidence provided by 
this research’s SMEs and the literature, the metrics will need to be measurable in a 
quantifiable way.  The metrics for each TCL category, when combined together, will 
need to define an end state.  These metrics should be documented into a list for each of 
the 37 TCLs.  Since this list potentially could change annually, the state homeland 
security strategy should be amended to refer specifically to this list to be the guiding 
metrics for each year.  The current list should be attached to the strategy in its first year 
as an addendum.  The strategy could clearly state that the addendum will change to the 
most recent copy of the list as it is produced each year.   
As mentioned above, DHS funding proposals are required to be approved by the 
SWG funding committee that oversees them.  All future DHS grant proposals seeking 
approval from the funding committees should be required to identify what metric(s) they 
will be addressing and estimate the progress expected to be made toward that metric goal.  
Since the members of these subcommittees are SMEs, they would be in a good position 
to judge each project and its proposed progress on the metric(s) it claims to impact.  The 
use of metrics should be used wisely.  Success is not necessarily a completed goal, but 
more realistically, progress made toward the goal.   
As suggested by the research, an effective reporting system will need to be 
established to insure data is collected and reviewed on a timely basis.  Each grant 
recipient would be required to report biannually on the progress of its project and 
specifically its progress on the metric(s) they intended to affect.  The reporting should be 
done in a quantifiable way that matches the nature of the metric to allow for logical 
comparison.  The report will be provided to the SWG funding committee that oversees 
the grant for review.  The SWG funding committee should insure the grant projects are 
accomplishing their intended results.  If a metric is not being met, then that would a good 
time to look closely at the issue and readjust either the objective or metric.  The SWG 
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funding committee should evaluate future funding requests for projects based on progress 
revealed by the reporting system.  As discussed above, this recommendation is not 
without issue, since most of the DHS and other federal funding available to Florida for 
domestic security related issues do not pass through the SWG funding committee for 
approval.  This could be changed, if the DSOC brought the matter before the Florida 
Legislature, which could require such oversight. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The scope of this research project was made broad by the inclusion of 
prioritization, assignment and metrics.  The researcher was not able to examine the ideas 
and suggestions of the literature and SMEs to their fullest.  One item that should be 
examined further is the idea of Florida adopting a singular capabilities assessment and 
gap analysis to be used by all funding sources related to domestic security issues.  The 
research would have to explore the needs of each unique funding source to identify what 
would need to be included in the one size fits all assessment.  Further research could be 
done to explore how the different funding source oversight groups would share in 
selecting the identified gaps that they would apply their resources to close.  Another area 
untouched by this research is the potential contributions that could be made to this topic 
by examining domestic security strategies from other countries.  Countries that are 
experienced in dealing with acts of terror, such as Israel and Great Britain, could add 
protocols not previously considered by states for use in their homeland security 
strategies.  Finally, researchers should look at the enviable reduction or elimination of 
DHS grant funding and how states could provide oversight to maintain their existing 
capabilities through the use of their homeland security strategies.   
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